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The purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which population aging has led 
to the emergence of age-based politics in Germany, Italy, and Japan.  Many argue that 
the increase in the share of aged relative to youth has led to the development of 
gerontocracy—as aging has intensified, so has the political power of the aged.  I 
argue that assuming political power from the size of demographic groups is flawed 
because political institutions are important vehicles that mediate and articulate the 
myriad interests of a population.  The first pillar of the study explains how different 
party systems create different pressures for the emergence of age-based politics 
through the ways they articulate these interests.  A second pillar of the study uses 
recent labor reforms to examine the trajectory of generational winners and losers 
within the labor policy arena. The study compares quantitative data and includes 
qualitative reviews of primary source material, such as party doctrine.  In Germany, 
Italy, and Japan, there are few signs that older groups are hijacking the political 
agenda—gerontocracy is mostly a myth.  Labor policy in all three states is adjusting 
  
to bring youth into the labor market and reforms often go against the interests of the 
aged.  Though aging issues are present in politics in all three states, the competitive 
multiparty system in Germany encourages parties to appeal to particular age groups, 
while Japan’s more limited system encourages broad appeals.  The fractured Italian 
system shows signs of both types of appeals.  Aging issues do not dominate the 
agendas of these states and in some cases regional identities are more important than 
age-based identities.  As aging intensifies we should expect that institutions will 
continue to mediate the interests of different age groups the way they have over the 
past decade.  External pressures, such as those stemming from globalization, will 
likely continue to encourage convergence in labor policies that bring underutilized 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Politics of Population Aging 
Lou Schwartz: “What can I do?  I work hard and make good money, but the whole thing, 
practically, is taxed away for defense and old age pensions.”  
Em Schwartz: “Lou, hon, I’m not calling you a failure…You just haven’t had a chance to 
be anything or have anything because Gramps and the rest of his generation won’t leave 
and let somebody else take over.”  
(Kurt Vonnegut, Tomorrow and Tomorrow and Tomorrow, 1953) 
 
In “Tomorrow and Tomorrow and Tomorrow” Kurt Vonnegut describes a world 
in which life expectancy has been extended to the point that six generations of a family 
live together under the same roof.  In the beginning of the story, ninety-three year old Em 
bemoans that her one hundred and seventy-two year old father-in-law still rules the roost: 
“I get so sick of seeing his wrinkled old face, watching him take the only private room 
and the best chair and the best food, and getting to pick out what to watch on TV, and 
running everybody’s life by changing his will all the time” (Vonnegut 2006, 316). 
Vonnegut tells the ultimate tale of generational warfare, with the young angry and 
resentful of “all the money and votes the old people’ve got.”  Writing in 1953, Vonnegut 
articulated his generation’s fears of the potential political power accompanying increased 
life expectancy and a baby boom.  But such alarmism over population aging continues.  
So far, life expectancy has stayed well below one hundred years; still, because fertility in 
most advanced industrial democracies has been dramatically declining for decades these 
populations are growing older, shifting the proportions of young and old.  Half a century 
after Vonnegut penned his story, a situation in which the proportions of old outweigh 
those of the young is a reality for advanced industrial states.  But is there really strength 
in numbers?  Has Vonnegut’s story, where the old hijack political power and deprive 
youth, come to life? 
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It seems so according to many academics, think tanks, policymakers, and the 
press.  Peter G. Peterson (2000, 213), author of Gray Dawn, fears that the political mood 
will change as the population ages, saying that “as the culture ages, the social 
temperament will grow more conservative and less flexible.”  Researchers at 
Washington, D.C.’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) express 
concern that  “The burgeoning proportion of elderly in the population, the smaller size of 
families, and growing ethnic diversity promise to recast every facet of society, from the 
popular culture to politics” (Jackson and Howe 2008, 95).  Even headlines of well 
respected publications like The Economist and Foreign Policy Magazine are dominated 
by these fears: “Europe’s Struggle Not to Disappear,” “The Population Implosion,” and 
“Incredible Shrinking Countries” are just a sample of these headlines.1  Fear is the 
common thread between then and now.  Just as Vonnegut feared the unknown time in the 
future when science would fundamentally change the life course, people today fear the 
political, social, and economic effects of the unprecedented trend of population aging—
what this study shows is that the political takeover by the elderly is no less fiction now 
than it was when Vonnegut wrote.   
But even if generational conflict is fiction, population aging and fears about it are 
real.  In Western Europe in 2005, a greater proportion of the population was over age 65 
than was under age 15.  In Southern Europe, the UN projects that those under age 15 will 
compose a mere 12.5 percent of the population by 2025, while 22.6 percent will be aged 
65 and older ("World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 
2007).2  Younger generations in developed countries do indeed face the prospect that they 
                                                 
1 From Foreign Policy, 3/9/07, Foreign Policy, 2001, and The Economist 1/5/06, respectively. 
2 Assuming constant fertility at the level estimated for the years 2000-05. 
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will share less in the prosperity of their countries as increasing numbers of elderly 
demand more of the state’s resources—and more from younger workers to pay for those 
entitlements.  On the flip side, many elderly worry that as family size shrinks there will 
be too few young to care for them and their needs will be marginalized.  Vonnegut 
foresaw this issue as well.  Ironically, Em, Lou, and the whole Schwartz family end up in 
jail from rioting over the eldest Schwartz’s will.  They find themselves delighted at being 
thrown in jail, where for the first time in their lives they have privacy, three square meals 
a day, and room to rest their heads.  Vonnegut’s prescience is remarkable: Japan’s elderly 
have made headlines for committing more petty crime, often to garner a spot in jail where 
they will be sure to be taken care of, as many can no longer rely on the care of their 
children.  According to one account:  
The senior ward…offers more seclusion—a hospital-like environment 
 equipped with many private rooms. Charts on doors indicate special dietary and 
 physical needs. The recreation area, with all walls papered over by prison 
 artwork, allows the older inmates to enjoy pin bowling and light exercise—but 
 never more than they can tolerate, officers insist. (Faiola 2006) 
 
 There is no doubt that the populations of advanced industrial democracies are 
rapidly aging.  In 1950 the median age of developed countries was 29.  By 2010 it is 
projected to be 39, and it will reach about 43 years by 2020.  While the United States 
remains a notable exception to the trend of low fertility, the aging of America’s large 
baby boomer cohort makes these questions of intergenerational equity and political 
power relevant there as well—and US trends drive a lot of the fear that surrounds aging.  
The reason why population aging has captured the fascination of the media is because it 
is so rare.  For most countries in the world, the proportions of youth far outweigh those of 
the old.  In Nigeria, over 40 percent of the population is under age 15, whereas for many 
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developed states the proportion is only about 14 percent ("World Population Prospects: 
The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007).  The reason there is so much alarm over 
population aging is because people fear what they do not know.  But several states are 
already well advanced in aging so we actually do know something about the political 
consequences of this demographic shift.  Western Europe and Japan are the furthest along 
the aging spectrum, as their fertility has been low for decades.  Japan’s median age was 
already 43 in 2005 and their fertility is among the lowest on the planet, while their life 
expectancy is among the highest—there are fewer people but they are living longer.  
Within Europe, Germany is well known for aging, but often surprising to some (because 
of its Catholic heritage, which eschews birth control) is that Italy is also one of the oldest 
states on the continent.  Having had low fertility since at least the late 1970s, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan have become three of the most aged states on the planet.  Though the 
phenomenon of population aging is new and unprecedented, these states’ histories with 
aging provide us with appropriate laboratories within which to study the political effects 
of population aging.   
In the face of fewer children to support growing numbers of elderly, some 
sacrifices are necessary.  The ultimate political question is: who bears the burden of 
sacrifice?  As one scholar notes, “If the size of demographic groups translates into 
political power, the trends in the status of children and the elderly will continue to 
diverge” (Pampel 1994, 154).  Many scholars and journalists assume that the size of these 
groups does matter.  They cite evidence of extravagant social spending on the elderly 
alongside neglect of public schools, high voter participation rates of older citizens and 
apathy of youth, and the influential gray lobby in the United States.  But I believe these 
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assertions ignore two important factors.  The first is the role of political institutions.  In 
this study, I ask: What roles do the political institutions of Germany, Italy, and Japan play 
in translating the interests of the population into policy?  In particular, which 
arrangements of the political party system create pressures for and against the emergence 
of age-based interests?  The second prong of this study asks: Is it true that as aging 
intensifies so does the political power of the aged?  Most stories about this kind of 
“gerontocracy” focus only on the policy areas of entitlements and retirement—but what 
about other issue areas?  In order to begin to tackle the question of whether or not the 
aged or the young are “winning” the political battles of population aging, I examine 
cross-national variation in a different set of policies that captures generational issues—
labor policies.  The young, middle-aged, and old all have a vested interest in labor policy.  
All three groups will be employed at the same time in any given country, but the stakes 
are different for each group.  The young may be worried about entering the labor force, 
hoping there will be enough jobs, while the old may be hopeful about exiting the labor 
force with generous benefits.  Have the old been as politically successful in the arena of 
labor policy as they have in social security and entitlements?  If gerontocracy really exists 
in Germany, Italy, and Japan, this issue area will arguably be a tougher test than that of 
social entitlements since it engages all generations. 
In fact, I find that there is no evidence of gerontocracy in labor policy in 
Germany, Italy, or Japan.  Population aging there may be advanced, but institutions have 
helped prevent the emergence of a regime in which the old govern in their interests only.  
Some institutional arrangements are more effective than others at preventing the 
emergence of age-based interests.  In particular, a federal organization and the multiparty 
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system create opposing pressures for the emergence of age-based interests.  Though I did 
not set out to study federalism, as I examined parties and elections I discovered that a 
federal organization elevates the importance of regional governments and thus fosters 
regional identities and interests even in national politics.  Age-based politics require 
cooperation of cohorts across regions—less likely in a decentralized state.  Regional 
identities in general, including those stemming from cultural legacies, as in Italy, are 
important, even if they are not formalized through political institutions, as Italy has a long 
way to go before it could be considered fully decentralized.   
A multiparty system works in a way opposite to federalism, as it requires that 
parties ideologically differentiate themselves in order to maximize political success.  This 
is an institutional arrangement that favors the emergence of age-based interests, as parties 
can choose to appeal to the large block of elderly voters in an effort to stand out.  The 
two-party system in Japan thus acts as a hindrance to the emergence of age-based politics 
there.  While age-based issues are high on the agendas of all Japanese political parties, 
they appeal to concerns of all generations rather than singling out younger or older 
generations.  Additionally, in some of these cases—Germany, especially—other issue 
areas, like unemployment, are so unsettled and important that they eclipse population 
aging and define the political debate.  Though population aging is one of the constraints 
on advanced industrial countries (including globalization, resource constraints, changing 
family models, and changing social welfare models), to date aging has not been an 
important factor in shaping politics among generations in Germany, Italy, and Japan.  So 
far, the generational conflict warned about in the media is no more reality now than it 
was when Vonnegut wrote—intergenerational conflict is a myth.  As aging progresses, 
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population structure could become more important, but because political institutions are 
the mechanisms through which generational interests are translated, unless there are 
major changes in the political institutions of these states the conclusions of this study 
should hold.  One such change that could accompany greater population aging would be 
the emergence of interest groups as influential political actors.  These groups have the 
potential to spark the politics of aging—as they do in the US—but their influence is 
limited in Germany, Italy, and Japan.  Thus, they are excluded from this study. 
This argument makes contributions along several lines of inquiry.  First, this study 
offers new insight into the importance of demographic structure in policymaking in 
advanced industrial democracies.  Second, it makes a unique contribution by bringing 
together institutional emphasis from comparative politics with a demographic 
perspective.  Finally, the research examines labor policy as a potential site of generational 
contention, expanding on work done in the areas of retirement and social security.  This 
study raises more questions than it answers, yet it is fated to do so for one very important 
reason: population aging is new and ongoing.  However, its newness does not negate the 
value in taking stock of its effects so far and theorizing about ways in which it is or is not 
likely to matter for politics in advanced industrial democracies.  This study should be 
seen as the beginning of a conversation about the political effects of population aging, 
rather than the final answer.  It has the modest aim of bringing demography to the center 
of a traditional political science topic about how power is distributed in society but does 
not attempt to answer all questions about how the two are related.  Instead, the study 
introduces ways to start thinking about the effects of aging by focusing on one way aging 





 Before launching into a discussion of how population aging has affected 
Germany, Italy, and Japan, this section explains how the phenomenon of population 
aging comes about and clarifies some of the demographic terms that will be used in this 
dissertation.  Fertility rate (most often total fertility rate, or TFR) refers to the number of 
children that will be born to an individual in her lifetime.  These numbers are widely 
ranging around the globe.  For example, South Korea and Taiwan were tied for the lowest 
TFR in 2006, at 1.1, and Niger had the highest, at 7.9 ("2006 World Population 
Reference Sheet" 2006).  Developed countries typically have TFRs below replacement 
level, which is generally defined as 2.1 children per woman.  The number of births 
required to “replace” both the mother and father is two, but because some children will 
die before reaching reproductive age the 0.1 is added.  Theoretically, a population with a 
fertility rate of 2.1 will stay static, while one with a fertility rate above 2.1 will grow, and 
below 2.1 will shrink.  The US is one of the few advanced industrial democracies that has 
hovered around this rate for a while, recording a TFR of 2.0 in 2006.   
 While the idea of a 2.1 replacement level is convenient for understanding fertility, 
the real rate of replacement varies in practice.  For developed, industrialized states with 
low infant and child mortality a replacement rate of perhaps 2.04 would suffice, whereas 
for many states in Africa where infant and child mortality are exceedingly high, a 
replacement level of around 3.0 would be more accurate (McFalls 2007, 5).  Birth rate (or 
crude birth rate) is slightly different from TFR, and describes the number of births per 
1,000 people.  It is calculated from the number of babies born in a given year divided by 
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the mid-year population.  This number is used much less often than fertility rate as an 
expression of a state’s population because it does not distinguish between the fact that a 
state with a high proportion of young people will have a higher crude birth rate than a 
state with an older population.  Age-specific birth rates are used to calculate the TFR and 
so are sensitive to a population’s age structure.   
 In 1929, Warren Thompson first postulated the demographic transition model 
when he observed that as states develop and modernize, the fertility and mortality rates of 
the population fluctuate in a discernable pattern.  This theory has been critiqued and 
revised numerous times since then and there is no consensus within the demographic 
community as to why fertility is low in developed states.3  Solving this debate is not the 
concern of this study, but the effects of low fertility are central.  One consequence of low 
fertility is that the average age of the population begins to rise as there are fewer young 
people and the larger cohorts (leftover from earlier high fertility eras) age.  A second 
consequence is that if fertility rates remain low, as those large cohorts die the population 
itself will shrink.  More importantly for this study, population aging lowers the number of 
workers to dependents (and thus changes the context within which labor relations take 
place) and changes the composition of the electorate. 
For the purposes of this study, population aging is specifically the transition from 
a high old-age dependency ratio (those ages 15-59 divided by those ages 60 and over) to 
a low old-age dependency ratio—a shrinking labor force that means fewer workers to 
support more elderly.  Though most of the states in Africa and some in the Middle East 
                                                 
3 Other theories and approaches include: wealth-flows theory (Caldwell 1982); economic approaches 
(Becker 1960); value of children theories (Nauck 2005); theories of planned behavior (Ajzen 1991); 
institutional approaches (McNicoll 1980); anthropological approaches (Greenhalgh 1995); and evolutionary 
approaches (Foster 2000). 
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continue to have high birthrates and their populations are growing rapidly, fertility rates 
have dropped dramatically in other regions.  There are at least eighty-three countries and 
territories that exhibit below-replacement fertility patterns.  For a population to truly be 
aging, in the sense meant in this study, it is not enough that the state’s TFR is falling; it 
must be below replacement of 2.1.  This helps to distinguish the vast differences between 
industrialized and less developed states.  There are a variety of reasons that fertility falls, 
ranging from economic to cultural reasons, but renowned demographer Peter McDonald 
notes that the three most aged states have something in common: Japan, Germany, and 
Italy all follow the male breadwinner model and thus have very low fertility (McDonald 
2006, 499); these are also the countries, as McDonald says, who see themselves as having 
strong traditional family values.  Though this study makes no attempt to “control” for 
culture, in the sense of holding it constant to more closely examine the variables of 
interest, it is important to note that despite their major cultural differences, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan have become the three oldest states on the planet—a feat which 
seemingly would require they have something in common—and yet population aging has 
affected their politics in quite different ways. 
Even if projections are wrong and the birth rate does experience a measurable, 
national-level rise, the population will still not rebound to its youthful past.  Because the 
birth rate has been low for decades, there are fewer potential mothers in each cohort—in 
demographic terms, the population lacks momentum.  A state with a tremendously 
youthful population, such as contemporary Afghanistan or 1910 Germany, has a greater 
number of potential mothers for each cohort, so even if the fertility rate slows the 
population will continue to grow because there are more women.  Germany’s Federal 
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Statistical Office agrees with this assessment, saying, “Even a slight increase in the birth 
rate would not change the situation fundamentally...a rise in the birth rate to 1.6 children 
per woman would actually lead to a somewhat lower birth deficit (difference between 
birth and death rates), which nevertheless would still be three times as high as it was in 
2005” (Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 14). 
 Finally, a note on the statistics used.  The data come from a variety of sources: the 
United Nations Population Division, the Population Reference Bureau in the US, and 
national statistical offices for the cases under review.  All of these bureaus and offices get 
their data from censuses, sample surveys, vital registration systems (such as recorded 
births and deaths by county or appropriate unit), and estimates using demographic 
techniques.  The statistics coming from the various data sources are comparable, and as 
this study uses qualitative methods, not quantitative, minor differences in estimates or 
reported levels are inconsequential. 
Throughout the study I frequently refer to generational differences when actually, 
the term generation describes more of a cultural categorization than a division based on 
age.  For example Aries (1980, 648) summarizes some past generations: people born 
between 1870 and 90 were the “final generation of prudent modernity;” those born 
between 1910 and 1930 were baby boom and trustful modernity; and those born between 
1940 and 1950 tended to be rebellious.  The danger is that the term can be haphazardly 
applied, often by the media (Generation X, Generation Y, etc.), and thus loses its 
significance as unit of analysis.  The term age cohort is more accurate.  Elder et al. (2003, 
9) provide a nice description of the term, worth quoting at length:  
 Locating people in cohorts by birth year provides more precise historical 
 placement. Cohorts, in effect, link age and historical time. Historical changes 
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 often have different implications for people of different ages—that is, for people 
 who differ in life stage (Ryder 1965).  People of different ages bring different 
 experiences and resources to situations and consequently adapt in different ways 
 to new conditions. When historical change differentiates the lives of successive 
 birth cohorts, it generates a cohort effect. Older and younger children, for 
 example, were differentially vulnerable to the economic stresses of tile Great 
 Depression (Elder 1974, , 1999). History also takes tile form of a period effect 
 when the impact of social change is relatively uniform across successive birth 
 cohorts. Both period and cohort effects constitute evidence of historical 
 influences. 
 
I do not eschew the use of the term generation because a wider audience more easily 
recognizes it, but I use it in this study to mean age cohort.  In the final chapter we return 
to the idea that the conclusions of the study are limited in the sense that they are only 
applicable to the age cohorts of today—older generations ten or twenty years from now 
are likely to be very different. 
 Population trees are useful aids to show how the age structure of a population 
looks at any one point in time.  These illustrations are sometimes called population 
pyramids, because they used to resemble pyramids—see the left-most figure, below—for 
most states.  Increasing variety in age structure has necessitated a change in terminology 

















Source: (Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 16) Federal Statistical Office, (www.destatis.de/, accessed July 21, 
2007) 
The first tree is typical of a high fertility country, and could equally describe modern-day 
Afghanistan.  In this profile, each birth cohort is successively larger than the preceding 
one because most women of childbearing age are giving birth to more than one child.  
The second population tree, 1950, is atypical and reflects some of the major political 
effects on childbearing patterns.  When comparing the left, or male, side of the 1950 tree 
versus the right, or female, side we can observe the relatively fewer number of men over 
the age of 25.  This imbalance resulted from the numerous male deaths in World Wars I 
and II, casualties of the 1918 Spanish Flu (which spread rapidly among soldiers), and, for 
those of the older ages, also reflects the generally shorter lifespan of men.  Also 
remarkable are the deep recesses, caused from reduced births and increased deaths during 
the economic crisis of the 1930s and the two world wars.  
 The third population tree, 2005, is typical of an aged society—Italy’s and Japan’s 
look similar, though Japan’s shows even more advanced aging.  The narrowing of the 
“pyramid” illustrates how successive generations of women have been giving birth to 
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fewer than two children, causing a bulge of older persons at the top of the tree; the largest 
bulges are the baby boomers. 
Gerontocracy 
 The term gerontocracy was coined by Jean-Jacques Fazy and “was first used in a 
pejorative sense to describe the old, conservative French parliament in the 1820s 
(Achenbaum 1993)” (Harris 2005, 163).  Most research on gerontocracy is done in Africa 
where old men frequently rule societies.  As literally translated, gerontocracy means “rule 
by the old.”  Thus, many take the term to describe a society in which there are increasing 
numbers of old politicians or old voters.  In Italy, for example, the past few heads of state 
and government have been pensioners.  Other political measures of gerontocracy include 
old-age participation rates of voting, which are generally higher than for younger groups.  
Economists use another measure of gerontocracy: the distribution of economic resources.  
Evidence they cite includes declining rates of elderly poverty, measures of social 
spending by generation, and measures of wealth by age group.   
 Of course, we would expect that as the median age of a democracy’s population 
increases, the median age of its representatives would also increase, as would the median 
age of its voters.  The proportion of social spending would also increasingly go to the 
elderly, ceteris paribus, as their ranks increase while those of the youth decline.  Thus, 
gerontocracy, as defined above, seems inevitable for most western democracies.   
 But I think this definition of gerontocracy is problematic partly because of its 
inevitability.  Its simplicity obscures the complexity of politics by assuming that age 
equals interests.  Though a society may have increasing numbers of elderly, both 
proportionally and in absolute numbers, and elderly may vote in higher numbers, it does 
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not automatically follow that they are voting in their own interests only.  Instead, I take 
inspiration from Aristotle’s classification of political systems.  According to Aristotle, 
democracy is not simply “rule by the people”—in whose interests they are ruling matters.  
I define gerontocracy, then, as rule by the old in the interests of the old.  This definition 
gives a more nuanced view of the politics of aging and allows for additional measures. 
Institutions 
 This study examines how political institutions—namely, the political party 
system—mediate and articulate generational interests over labor policy in states 
experiencing population aging.  Hall and Taylor (1996, 938) define an institution as 
“formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity or political economy.”  I focus on the formal forms 
of institutions and their function within a state because “Institutions provide information, 
opportunities, incentives, and constraints for both citizens and leaders choosing certain 
strategies, and it is only through the intermediation of actors’ strategic decisions that 
collective outcomes can be explained” (Colomer 2001, 4).  Some institutional forms will 
facilitate the fair representation of citizens’ interests whereas others will allow specific 
interests to hijack the political agenda.  Moving back to the idea of age-based politics, 
certain institutional forms will be more likely to facilitate generational equity or justice.  
Political institutions also shape actors’ strategies. 
 There are many formal political institutions that could be important in articulating 
a population’s interest into policy, such as the judicial system, the electoral system, or the 
relationship between interest groups and the state.  Though this study excludes many of 
these in order to focus in detail on party system, I acknowledge that all likely play a role 
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in policy outcomes.   One way to expand this study would be to include some of these 
other institutions and the conclusion will outline ways to do so.  The importance of the 
organization of a state and political party system are outlined in the following section. 
Organization of the state (modes/varieties of federalism) 
 Though I did not set out to include federalism in this study, as my research on 
party systems progressed this issue continued to rise to the surface.  In hindsight, it makes 
sense that state organization would matter; the organization of a state—whether federal or 
unitary, or somewhere along the spectrum—is an essential way that citizens’ interests and 
political parties’ agendas are articulated in the political arena.  As Campbell and Morgan 
say (2005, 889), different forms of federalism “shap[e] the degree to which social 
problems are channeled upward to federal policy makers.”  There are many ways to 
define federalism, but I refer to an arrangement in which power is shared between 
regional and national governments, with some powers exclusively allotted to regional 
governments.  Most definitions include some aspect of self-rule by the regions and insist 
that there exist little hierarchy where the regional governments are subordinate to the 
national government (Wheare 1946, ; Ostrom 1987, ; Elazar 1987).  Federalism can come 
about through different ways and other scholars have devoted entire volumes to the 
origins of different state organizations.  For example, Ziblatt (2006) explains how the 
organizations of the German and Italian states precede their post-World War II creations 
to the late 1800s when the states were first unified.  In Germany, decentralization and 
regionalism prevailed in post-War reconstruction with the creation of eleven Land 
governments coming together to form the new state.  The occupying forces insisted on 
this arrangement for Germany, fearing a resurgence of a force like Nazism.  Though 
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Germany, Italy, and Japan were reformed around the same time, they have different state 
organizations.  In post-War Italy, the new government tried to subsume strong regional 
identities and thus opted for a unitary, rather than federal state.  Though post-War Italian 
state also had the goal of avoiding concentration of power that led to fascism, they chose 
to spread power horizontally over the different branches of government, rather than 
vertically like in Germany.  Germany was federal from its post-War start, while Italy and 
Japan were unitary, though the latter two have undergone some degree of decentralization 
since.    
 A federal organization is often suggested for states with problems of nationalist or 
ethnic conflict because it allows formal representation of those interests on the national 
level.  In a way, federalism encourages the continuance of regional or state-based 
identities and discourages the formation of cross-(domestic)border identities.  Though 
some regions of a state may have a larger proportion of elderly than others (as in East 
Germany), for the most part age-based politics requires the mobilization of aged across 
internal borders, or requires that the old in all regions feel that they have more in 
common as a group than they do with the fellow members of their local region or state.   
Political parties  
 In this study, political parties are treated simply as, “channels of intermediation 
between political elites and voters” (Gunther and Diamond 2003).  Richard Gunther and 
Larry Diamond (2003) discuss how “the social/technological context within which parties 
function has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of different types of partisan 
organizations, and the dominant features of this context will systematically evolve over 
time” (174).  Essentially, the nature of parties is dependent upon the environment in 
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which they operate.  Parties are given central focus in this study because they serve the 
major function in advanced industrial democracies for translating interests: “Both social 
psychologists and rational choice theorists agree that partisan ties are a key element in 
explaining how the average person manages the complexities of politics and makes 
reasonable political choices” (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, 261). 
 Most importantly for this study, the number of effective political parties will 
change how societal interests get translated into policy.  The fewer the parties, the more 
inclusive each party will try to be of a wide range of citizens’ interests.  Having only two 
political parties leads to the development of packaged platforms that are broadly 
encompassing: “voters tend to choose the party ‘package’ that is closest to their 
preferences on the issues they care about most intensely” (Colomer 2001, 141).  Two-
party systems encourage parties to try to appeal to the broadest segment of the electorate 
possible.  The more parties there are, the greater the incentive for parties to differentiate 
themselves and attract niche voters and the greater likelihood voters will find a party in 
line with their preferences.  Multiparty systems are also more ideologically polarized than 
systems with fewer parties, which tend towards the ideological center (Lees 2006).  In a 
multiparty system, “each party can focus on a different set of issues, globally enlarging 
the electoral agenda” (Colomer 2001, 141)—we see this in Germany and Italy.  Even if a 
party does not have enough votes to control the government, they will enter into a 
coalition and bring their ideas and platforms with them, so those ideas still get 
represented in government.  Because of these differences, the likelihood that age-based 
interests will find a foothold in a one-party dominant state, like Japan, is low since parties 
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have to try to be inclusive.  The likelihood that parties could target age groups in a 
multiparty system is high since they have to try to differentiate themselves.   
Literature 
This study is concerned with the extent to which population aging has led to the 
emergence of age-based politics in Germany, Italy, and Japan.  The two central research 
questions of this study are: To what extent do older generations have a monopoly on 
political power? And why and how could older generations gain a political advantage? 
Many scholars and journalists speak of emerging generational conflict because a 
disproportionate share of many advanced industrial countries’ spending goes towards the 
elderly ("The gerontocrats" 1995, ; "Italy - Haven for Gerontocrats" 2006).  Some reason 
that because population aging will increase the share of elderly relative to youth in a 
society, the elderly will have increasing political power and will ensure that the 
government institutes policies that favor their interests (see Cutler 1977, for example). 
Galasso and Profeta (2004, 65) argue that aging has a direct political impact because “as 
an older electorate increases the relevance of pensions spending on the agenda of the 
policy-makers, it tends to foster larger and more generous systems.”  With this 
assumption in mind, two types of approaches attempt to explain why the elderly have 
more political power: political economic approaches and political institutional 
approaches.    
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) offer an economic theory of elderly political 
power.  They say that political institutional explanations are obviously inadequate since 
government policies tend to favor the elderly over youth in a wide range of countries—
social security benefit systems exist in democracies and non-democracies alike.  They 
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argue that the one thing the elderly have in common cross-nationally is time.  Since 
policy changes require political, moral, and social pressure, the elderly hold more power 
than youth in western societies because they have the time to put more pressure on the 
government.  In their explanation, lobbying by the elderly is the key to their political 
success: “an interest group’s political influence depends on the amount of working time 
enjoyed by its members” (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999, 11).  There are two major 
problems with this economic approach, but both stem from the fact that the theory does 
not take a variety of political factors into account.  The first issue is that they assume the 
elderly do indeed have the institutional access to pressure the government.  Mulligan and 
Sala-i-Martin believe that organized interest groups are always important and often 
successful no matter a state’s formal political institutions, including the electoral process.  
Their findings only show a correlation between the presence of old people and the 
presence of generous social security benefits.  We learn nothing about policymaking 
processes cross-nationally and should not infer causality.  By taking the AARP4—an old-
age lobbying group in the US—as a starting point they assume an American bias that 
colors their viewpoint and leads them to believe that organized groups of older persons 
are a) present and b) equally influential (given a state’s institutions) everywhere.  Some 
of the countries they mentioned actually do not have organized groups of older persons or 
have only weakly organized groups and some political institutional arrangements do not 
allow opportunities for interest groups to be influential.  A political institutional approach 
should correct some of these issues. 
                                                 
4 The group used to be called the “American Association for Retired People,” and AARP was an acronym.  
They have since dropped the long version and now go by “AARP” exclusively. 
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Second, the problem with economic theories of aging and politics, like Mulligan 
and Sala-i-Martin’s theory of time allocation and political activity, is that they try to 
apply economic theory regarding self-interest to voting behavior, when we cannot be 
certain that voters vote only in their own self-interest.  They do not draw on any 
scholarship identifying the preferences of the elderly and other age groups, even though 
some studies have shown that the elderly tend to have the same interests as other age 
groups in the population (Binstock and Day 1996, ; Danigelis et al. 2007).  They claim 
that the elderly are a politically homogenous group, while “Those with jobs are likely to 
be from different occupations and industries, each with its own unique political 
concerns”—they show no evidence to substantiate this assumption (p. 11).   
Since the political economy arguments fail to take into account the political 
orientation of the elderly, the interests of the elderly, their participation, and political 
institutional factors, we turn to the political institutional approach.  As Pampel (1994, 
156) notes, while the literature on age structure and politics is underdeveloped, there has 
been movement toward “integrative models in which the political environment shapes the 
impact of social and demographic change...”  One of the first scholars of international 
relations to make this link was Nazli Choucri (1974, 17), who argues that: 
the nature of the political system—including political structures and processes, 
 and political ideology—is often a critical factor in determining the extent to which 
 population variables might generate political outcomes, and conversely, to which 
 population variables may tend to shape the political process.  In each case, 
 structure and process will provide further influences mediating between 
 population and politics.  
 
Pampel (1994) argues that pluralist and corporatist systems are different in how they 
direct spending between youth and elderly in aged states.  Using time-series data for 18 
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advanced, industrial democracies, Pampel concludes that aged-biased spending is 
reduced in states with class-based corporatism and strong leftist parties.  He notes that 
Germany and Italy tend to spend more on the elderly than on children, yet classifies them 
as corporatist systems.  In a pluralist state, spending tends to be biased towards the aged 
because groups align based on age cohort in the absence of the intergenerational 
solidarity encouraged by class politics (age cohorts are ready-made, sizeable groups).  He 
argues that political institutions, not aging alone, drive the allocation of resources. 
While I agree with this last point, one problem with this study is that Pampel 
excludes political divisions based on race in the United States, a case of pluralism he cites 
often and that is key to his analysis.  Though race and the US are not related to this study, 
because they are key to Pampel’s they matter for assessing the value of the study.  While 
there are powerful age-based interest groups in the US, Pampel does not provide evidence 
that class or race-based politics are obsolete in the US.  Additionally, many sociologists 
have observed that class divisions are waxing, while age divisions are becoming more 
salient (Esping-Andersen and Sarasa 2002).  Second, Pampel stops his study in the early 
1990s because he assumes that “the movement toward European integration during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s has reduced the importance of intranation corporatism” (p. 
165).  Actually, it is important to update Pampel’s study by examining the role of 
Europeanization as another factor driving policy change in the context of population 
aging.  Finally, while Pampel found through standard regression that there were no age 
effects (i.e., where high spending on the elderly translated into less spending on children), 
he also found that Christian democratic rule raises spending on the elderly relative to 
children.  A case study approach could provide detail and clarify these inconsistencies. 
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Schmidt (2002) argues that single-actor systems (like Britain) and multi-actor 
systems (like Germany) differently mediate the effects of population aging on the 
traditional welfare state.  She argues that in single-actor systems “policy-making” is 
carried out by a small elite—the public is basically excluded from the process.  In multi-
actor systems the public and various interests are able to voice their opinions during the 
policymaking process—the emphasis is more on coordination and consensus-building.  
This study extends her line of inquiry by examining the relationship between 
demographic structure, single-actor and multi-actor institutions, and labor issues.  There 
is ample room to build on these political institutional theories and we can see that several 
questions are left unanswered.  What role do political institutions play in translating the 
interests of the population into policy?  Which organization of the state and of the party 
system encourages the emergence of age-based politics and which discourages this? 
 The second contribution of this study is challenging the assumption that the 
elderly do in fact have more political power.  It is true that spending on healthcare and 
social security dominates federal budgets in advanced industrial states, making it seem as 
if the elderly must be more politically powerful than other age groups.  But assuming 
political power from federal spending figures and the composition of the electorate is 
insufficient because it excludes the universe of important policies in which the elderly 
may be the political losers.  Instead, we must examine the trajectory of policies related to 
age issues.  If the aged have increased their political power as their ranks grow then we 
should increasingly see a spectrum of policies—not just social welfare—that are 
generous towards those of older ages.  If we see something different then we have to 
challenge this thesis of gerontocracy.  In reality, in the past decade or so reforms in most 
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advanced industrial states have raised the retirement age and become more strict with 
pension benefits, moving to indexing pensions to years of work, etc.  Even in the US 
throughout the 1990s Congress instituted numerous aging policies that went against the 
wishes of the AARP and other old-age interest groups (Binstock and Day 1996, 376).  
When assessing “winners” and “losers,” older generations have more frequently been 
losers of recent labor reforms in Germany, Italy, and Japan.  
A major reason that scholars and journalists predict a takeover of politics by the 
old has to do with the fact that most of the research in this area looks at the US only, 
which has a very strong old-age lobby and where older voters greatly outnumber younger 
voters.5  This study deliberately focuses on a non-US context, one in which lobbying in 
the interests of the old is less prominent and in which young voters may have more 
influence, in order to examine the many institutional issues not covered by studies based 
on the US only. 
Behavior of the elderly 
 Most research on political behavior of the elderly finds that there is little 
difference among age groups but that there are significant differences within age groups.  
The differences that do exist between age groups may be due to period effects (historical 
circumstances), and not to any inherent differences between old and young.  For example, 
older generations today may be influenced by their experiences during the Great 
Depression and thus may favor more generous social welfare.  There are differences in 
some patterns of political behavior, however: “Compared to younger people, the elderly 
tend to engage in more low-intensity political activities, especially voting, and fewer of 
                                                 
5 For example, in their review of the literature on the elderly and politics, Binstock and Day (1996, 362) 
limit their summary to the US because “the majority of political science research on this topic has dealt 
with the United States.” 
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the more demanding and energetic forms of participation,” such as protesting.  Older 
people may also write letters or make phone calls to a political representative more often 
than a younger person (Binstock and Day 1996, 367-8).  
 In many countries, the elderly do vote in larger force than youth but patterns are 
uneven throughout advanced industrial states.  What may be more important, however, is 
the perception that the elderly are a major political force that can be mobilized to the 
polls when needed.  Binstock (1990) calls this the “electoral bluff,” and says that old-age 
advocacy groups in many cases have successfully convinced many elected officials and 
journalists that they ignore the interests of older people at their own peril” (Binstock and 
Day 1996, 367).  In their review of these studies Binstock and Day add: “even though 
older people do not vote as a monolithic bloc, they can be mobilized to contact policy 
makers in large numbers, and few politicians want to risk alienating such a large and 
dispersed segment of the electorate” (371).  On the flip side, the media in many graying 
states has successfully built an alarmist fervor that the elderly will take up more of the 
state’s resources and create generational conflict.  These fears could be enough to change 
policy against their favor, rather than benefiting elderly groups. 
Preferences and interests of the elderly 
Other important factors to include in assessments of age politics are the 
preferences or interests of the elderly.  In their review of the literature, Binstock and Day 
(1996, 364) describe the research in this area and say that “Although older people are 
commonly thought to be more conservative than younger people, most of the evidence on 
self-described conservatism and liberalism in the United States refutes the notion that 
people become more conservative as they age.”  Rather, political orientations tend to be 
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more stable with age and political liberalism actually increases over time among adults of 
all ages, albeit more slowly among the aged (Glenn 1974).  A recently published study by 
Danigelis, et. al (2007) found similar results, that change in sociopolitical attitudes is as 
common in older adults as in younger adults; aging does not lead to conservatism, nor are 
opinions stable over time.  Instead, people of all ages respond to events that surround 
them, like political events and technological change, and these affect their political 
attitudes (p. 823).  The same can be said of people’s attitudes towards parties: “Partisan 
affiliation tends to remain stable throughout life, so that the distribution of partisan 
loyalties within a cohort of young people generally persists as the cohort moves into old 
age” (Binstock and Day 1996, 364).  Of course, some people will switch votes among 
parties depending on the political context but still, this research finding could explain the 
voting patterns described below for Germany where older people are still voting for the 
Christian Democrats even though that party’s stances work against the interests of older 
cohorts.  Additionally, voters may have different policy preferences on different issues.  
As Colomer (2001, 163) says, “they can have rightist preferences on economic 
policy...and leftist, liberal preferences on moral issues.” 
One trait does differentiate the old from young, however—older people’s 
identification with a party may grow stronger over time.  Converse (1969) found that the 
exception was countries that have had major political changes, in parties or regimes, 
where loyalty may be compromised as a matter of circumstance.  This has implications 
for Germany, which had a major change in 1990, but should not matter for Italy and 
Japan because the last major change was after World War II, and this would only affect a 
small proportion of the population.  
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Interests also seem to cut across age groups, as will be described below.  In 
Germany, for example, there is remarkable consistency among age groups with regard to 
naming unemployment as the primary problem facing the government.  Age cohorts there 
show little interest in “age-related” politics as a primary concern, including education, 
family policy, and social security.  Older persons are also willing to vote in the interest of 
other groups: “Even in local referenda on such issues as school bonds or property taxes, 
there is little evidence that older people are more likely than other voters to oppose taxes 
for services that do not directly benefit them (Button and Rosenbaum 1989) (Button & 
Rosenbaum, 1989; Chomitz, 1987)” (Binstock and Day 1996, 368).  Though this has 
been the case to date, it is important to note that future patterns may differ and politics 
could increasingly revolve around age as graying in advanced industrial states intensifies.   
Table 1.1 – Outline of the study 
Question Problem in the literature New approach 
To what extent do older 
generations have a 
monopoly on political 
power? 
Looks mainly at 
entitlements and healthcare 
Examine labor policy 
Why and how could older 
generations gain a political 
advantage? 
No attention to political 
institutions 
Examine party system 
 
Though individuals may not align along age lines to the extent that the media and 
old-age interest groups portray, in each society certain age cohorts will benefit more than 
others from particular kinds of policies, and some cohorts may be seriously 
disadvantaged by particular policies.  This study steps outside the commonly examined 
issues associated with aging politics—social security and healthcare—to provide an 
additional test of the thesis that the presence of larger elderly cohorts lead to policies in 
their favor.  The paper focuses on labor policies—including retirement age—as a set of 
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issues that affect all generations (and thus should mobilize them) but that has clear 
outcomes that would favor one generation over another.  These are outlined in the 
individual case studies, which describe how these policies affect different age groups. 
Main argument 
This study argues that we know older cohorts in Germany, Italy, and Japan have 
not seized political power and established gerontocracy because their needs frequently go 
unmet in labor policy—an important area of domestic policy.  In each case, party system 
matters for the emergence of age-based interests.  The multiparty systems in Germany 
and Italy function to mediate and articulate competing interests in the context of 
population aging but create the conditions for age-based interests to emerge because such 
a situation rewards parties for even small numbers of votes.  Japan’s two-party system, on 
the other hand, discourages the emergence of age-based interests because it rewards 
parties for broad appeals.  Additionally, Germany’s federal organization and Italy’s 
decentralization and regional identities also prevent the emergence of age-based interests.  
Population aging is important because it frames the political debate by determining which 
issues will rise to the forefront of national politics; institutions are important because they 
help structure political outcomes, mediating and articulating those competing interests.  
In any democracy, different institutional arrangements allow different interests to set the 
political debate and see that policies that favor their platforms will be instituted.  Parties 
and other agents “act as mechanisms of representative linkage between state and 
society...the role played by parties and other institutions (typically single-interest groups 
or social movements) in publicly expressing and pursuing the political demands of 
particular social groups” (Webb 2002, 12).  Some arrangements favor a select number of 
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political parties, while others are more inclusive of a wide range of interest groups.  
Institutions show that size doesn’t necessarily matter—bigger elderly cohorts are not by 
definition more powerful.  Rather, political institutions play a bigger role in determining 
policy outcomes.  In other words, institutions determine whether or not there will be 
generational warfare as a result of population aging—and they determine who wins.   
Methods 
 To address the research questions, I use a case study design.  While much of the 
literature on demography’s links with conflict involves large-n studies (Cincotta et al. 
2003, ; Urdal 2005, ; 2006), because population aging is a relatively new demographic 
phenomenon, appearing only in the latter part of the 20th century, there are not enough 
cases in which to perform this type of quantitative methodology.  Even if there were, 
however, because this dissertation seeks to uncover the processes by which institutions 
mediate and articulate the competing interests associated with population aging, a 
research design that can tease out the details of the debates surrounding workforce 
policies in each case is necessary. 
 In each of the case studies, I first establish that there is a context for generational 
conflict, reviewing the data on population aging and social spending by age cohort in a 
manner similar to other scholars who begin from the assumption that gerontocracy exists.  
From this starting point, however, I take a two-prong strategy to determine whether 
gerontocracy, or milder forms of age-based politics, exists.  First, I ask two questions: 
how do parties target different age groups in society and how do the age groups respond 
through their support for parties?  Because population aging is a relatively recent 
phenomenon and because each of the countries in this study underwent major electoral 
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reforms in the early 1990s, I examine only the last decade of policy making.  I look at 
how the parties target different cohorts by reviewing and analyzing their main party 
messages, the same ones that reach citizens—mainly through party manifestos and media 
messages.  During these textual analyses I look for evidence of overt references to 
generational issues (youth, aged, workers, or a combination) and references to labor and 
social welfare policy.  How the cohorts respond—their patterns of support—gives some 
indication of the connection between targeting and response.  I look at vote intention 
patterns in particular and public opinion surveys are the main source of evidence.   
 The second prong of the study looks at major labor reforms in each case, 
especially those governing entry and exit from the workforce—the two areas most likely 
to affect youth and older workers.  Looking at policy outcomes, I try to determine the 
generational winners and losers of labor policy—if the old win often or in each case this 
would give credence to those who say there is gerontocracy.  Finally, I bring these two 
prongs together by looking at the role of parties in labor reforms. 
 The cases were chosen because they represent the most extreme cases of 
population aging in the world and thus give us the most historical data on aged 
populations.  Perhaps coincidentally, these three cases also share a common post-World 
War II heritage of democratic development, having been the major Axis powers during 
that war and experiencing occupation by victorious Allied powers in the decades that 
followed.  Given that these three countries are democracies, it is possible that age groups 
can influence politics by working within institutions, such as through voting or 
supporting interest groups, but, as the study finds, age groups are not monolithic 
influences that can change policy in their favor.  These three cases are often compared in 
 
 31 
the literature because we are able to hold constant many factors—such as regime type—
yet, there is variation in their institutions.  Because the party system is the central 
institution under study here, these cases are useful because two have a multiparty system 
and one has a two-party system.  However, there are limitations with these cases and with 
this methodology.  While Germany, Italy, and Japan have shared experiences with post-
War reconstruction, their histories before World War II are quite different and have 
shaped their individual political cultures.  Additionally, Germany underwent a further 
major change less than two decades ago when East and West unified during the collapse 
of communism.  There are issues with comparing two European states with an Asian state 
as well.  These differences are acknowledged and used whenever possible in each case.  
What we cannot ignore, though, is that despite their many differences, these three 
countries have had enough in common that they have undergone a major change in 
societal patterns of fertility almost in tandem—a factor that should not be underestimated.  
 Another, and important, limitation is that when a process of change is ongoing, it 
is difficult to analyze the outcomes and effects of a trend.  Because population aging is 
new, this study can only be a modest effort to understand its effects.  This study should 
be seen as the beginning of a conversation on the political consequences of population 
aging rather than a definitive answer.  The aim of this study is to shed light on what has 
happened up to this point, which is valuable because other industrialized states will go 
through this phase of aging as well.  What remains to be seen, however, is how politics 
will play out as population aging progresses.  Based on what we learn in this study we 
can extrapolate, but there is no guarantee that the future will be modeled on the past.  Is 
there a tipping point?  Considering that we don’t know how far population aging will go, 
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we cannot guess at a better time to review its effects and so it is useful to take stock at 
this time. 
 Methodologically, because this dissertation relies only on three cases, and because 
population aging has not been a long-standing phenomenon, there are limitations to the 
applicability of the study.  As Lijphart (1971, 685) says, the problem with the case study 
method is “many variables, small number of cases.”  The value in large-n studies is that 
they allow the researcher to say with some confidence that there is a relationship between 
two or more variables in a wide range of cases.  This dissertation makes no such claims 
but does draw some generalizations based on the three cases included.  More research 
will need to be done as states continue to age.  Additionally, as many developing states 
begin to age over the next several decades—like China—different variables may prove to 
be more illuminating.  Other major problems with case studies identified in the literature 
are selection bias, lack of systematic procedures, inattention to rival explanations (for 
example, King et al. 1994, ; Geddes 1990).  Whenever possible, I have tried throughout 
my case studies to acknowledge these limitations or surmount them.  
Labor policy 
Within the three cases, several types of labor policies will be relevant for 
generational concerns.  For convenience, we can broadly categorize these as policies that 
provide barriers to workforce entry for certain age groups and policies that provide 
incentives for exit.  Many labor policies affect particular age groups, but not at the 
expense of other age groups.  For example, parental leave policies may benefit prime age 
workers, but without detriment to younger or older workers.  Both policies that target or 
exclude particular age groups and those that are zero sum—benefiting one generation 
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while excluding another—are important for this analysis, as measures that go against 
youth would seem to substantiate claims of gerontocracy and measures that go against 
older workers would seem to disprove those claims. 
There are two sub-categories within the broader category of barriers to workforce 
entry.  The first issue concerns legalities and cultural norms of lifetime employment.  In 
theory, lifetime employment practices tend to benefit anyone who is employed and 
prevent anyone who is unemployed from obtaining a job.  In practice, prime-age workers 
who are employed benefit the most from these practices and young workers are often 
hindered by these policies.  In some cases, older workers past retirement age who still 
desire employment—such as many in Japan—are also harmed by these policies.  In cases 
where older workers desire to exit the workforce, lifetime employment can be beneficial 
to them: “Stringent [employment protection legislation] has negative effects on youth 
entry into the labour market, while it may benefit older workers, at least where retirement 
incentives are high” (Bassanini and Duval 2006, 7). 
A second policy area that appears often in the cases concerns flexible labor 
contracts.  In essence, firing regulations—how hard it is to get rid of employees—shape 
an employer’s hiring practices.  If it is relatively hard to get rid of an employee those who 
are seeking employment may have a hard time securing it because companies are not 
willing to take a risk on hiring them.  Again, youth are the group most harmed by the 
absence of fixed-term (flexible) contracts in Germany and Italy.  And in Japan, where 
older workers past retirement age often hope to secure some type of part-time work, 
inflexible labor markets harm both younger and older workers.   
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 Policies that provide incentives for exit have generational implications as well.  In 
the cases that follow, two types of policies fall into this category: those regarding 
retirement and those regarding unemployment benefits.  (Parental leave benefits would 
also fall into this category but are outside the scope of this study.)  There are several 
issues regarding retirement.  Early retirement schemes were put into place in Germany 
and Italy in the 1960s and 70s to “cushion rapidly rising unemployment and facilitate 
workforce restructuring” ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 73).  
Therefore, they were designed to be beneficial to youth hoping to obtain employment and 
older workers who wanted to retire with generous benefits.  Mandatory retirement 
schemes, such as those in Japan, harm older workers who want to continue to work.   
 The second policy area is the unemployment benefit system.  On the links 
between benefits and incentives for exit, one study found that “In the ‘average’ OECD 
country, high unemployment benefits and high tax wedges are found to be associated 
with lower employment prospects for all groups studied, namely prime-age males, 
females, older workers and youths” (Bassanini and Duval 2006, 2).  Measures to decrease 
the benefit level and shorten the duration of unemployment benefits in Germany harmed 










Table 1.2 – Relevant labor policies  
Policy category Generational implications 
Barriers to workforce entry 
Lifetime employment Benefits prime-age workers. 
Harms younger and sometimes older 
workers (Japan). 
Inflexible labor practices Benefits prime-age workers. 
Harms younger and sometimes older 
workers (Japan). 
Incentives for exit from workforce 
Early retirement Designed to benefit younger workers and 
prime-age unemployed. 
Mandatory retirement Harms older workers. 
Generous unemployment benefits Benefits older workers who use it as a 
scheme for early retirement. Repealing 
benefits (as in Germany) harms older 
workers by taking away this scheme. 
 
Other pressures  
Advanced industrial democracies today face a variety of pressures, both external 
(globalization and the spread of neoliberal ideas) and internal pressures (endogenous 
social changes and demographic structure changes).  In particular, though, this research 
focuses on just one of these—population aging—and the interaction between institutions 
and demographic structures.  Population aging frames the debate but institutions 
determine the outcome.  Yet, other factors may also serve the same function as 
population aging and institutions.   Since this study finds that the presence of large groups 
of older workers is not enough to drive labor policy in their favor, what does shape labor 
policy?  This section will briefly acknowledge these non-institutional drivers of political 
change; the conclusion will return to this topic in light of the evidence and analysis 




Globalization is a popular driver of economic policy change both in the literature 
and in the media.  As Hinrichs (2005, 48) says, “globalization reinforces the pressure on 
political actors in the welfare state to tackle the aging problem through pension 
reforms…”  There are two aspects of globalization that could be driving workforce policy 
change.  The first is the macroeconomic element—the global economic pressure to be 
competitive.  Multinational corporations (MNCs), for example, would not find a policy 
supporting lifetime employment to be in their interest since the global economy thrives 
on comparative advantage.  Whereas labor for software manufacturing may be available 
only in Japan in any given week, the next it may be cheaper in South Korea—MNCs 
would want the option to follow the comparative advantage.  Shorter workweeks, which 
Europeans typically favor, also may not make sense in a globalized world where the point 
is to work as much as possible around the clock to meet demand in all time zones.   
The globalization explanation for workforce policy outcomes only has credence if 
we can be sure that business has the ability to set the debate in a country.  Otherwise, 
other organized interests, including political parties vying for votes, will likely seek those 
policies that have the greatest support of the population regardless of the market.  
However, even if business has a lot of power in policymaking this macroeconomic 
explanation for policy change may still have holes.  According to corporate liberal 
theory, business may support social policies that contribute to a wide range of goals, 
including encouraging economic growth, avoiding labor disputes, imposing costs on 
competitors, and socializing the cost of firm benefits (Swank and Martin 2001).  Finally, 
we cannot discount that businesses may act in ways contrary to the bottom line—the role 
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of corporate responsibility.  Sometimes, corporate responsibility is carried out as a direct 
act, as in Japan where businesses sometimes employ people to keep them off the streets.  
At other times corporate responsibility is built into a state’s institutional arrangement.  In 
Germany, “the institutional design of social insurance...is much more understood and 
treated as [a] corporatist institution, which brings together employers and employees in 
providing security to the latter” (Bonoli 2003, 1027).  
The second aspect of globalization that could affect workforce policy is diffusion 
of norms.  Globalization not only increases the flows of goods and labor, it also increases 
the flow of ideas and practices.  Neoliberal ideas in particular may matter (Schmidt 
2002).  If there were policy convergence among these three cases, the reason could be 
that Germany, Italy, and Japan are moving towards a common understanding of how the 
workforce should be structured in a globalized economy—not that their common 
population aging trend and institutional arrangements are driving change.   Similarly, 
regionalization—another external pressure—could be the driving force behind political 
change.  The original purpose of the EU was standardization of common policies and 
practices, including economic ones, and as the EU has formed and strengthened over the 
last several decades there have been movements towards convergence.  For the most part, 
shared norms about social welfare have had an effect on domestic and EU-level policies.  
For example, member governments, “coordinate their policies in order to deliver steady 
growth, more jobs and a competitive economy across the EU, one which will at the same 
time preserve the European social model and protect the environment” (Activities of the 
European Union: Economic and Monetary Affairs 2007).  However, these states also 
share the trend of population aging.  Robust social welfare policies are a large part of the 
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EU strategy to mitigate population aging and care for elderly—and a reason why 
European states with weaker social welfare proclivities have been hesitant to fully 
integrate economically.  States like Britain are afraid to promise huge social entitlements 
in the face of dynamics like population aging.  A 2003 EU document explicitly names the 
aging of the European workforce, increasing numbers of pensioners, and declining 
birthrates as the reason for the need for strong welfare policies that invest in people 
("Going for Growth: The Economy of the EU" 2003).  Preliminary analysis shows that 
EU convergence and population aging may not be easily analytically separated when 
determining each one’s effects on workforce policy.  But, the inclusion of Japan as a non-
Western case and the fleshing out of the different stakeholders in each country and 
different outcomes in the policies should help in separating the two effects.  
Culture and path-dependence 
Culture is another common explanation for cross-national variation in policy. 
Throughout the case studies, though, we see that in all three cases workforce policies are 
moving in the same direction so cultural and historical influences—including practices 
prior to industrialization—seem to be less important in driving policy change than either 
demography or institutions.  Culture, the way it is used here, includes shared identity and 
norms, and policy development at the time of industrialization.  This is different from 
political culture, which is embodied in this dissertation by the institutional variables.6 
                                                 
6 Here, political culture is inclusive of, but not limited to, institutions like the party system, nature of 
parties, and role of interest groups in policymaking. 
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Outline of remaining chapters 
 The following chapters will examine empirical evidence for the institutional 
theory offered here.  In Chapter 2 I describe how Germany’s older cohorts remain 
politically weak in the area of labor policy.  Germany’s federal structure prevents the rise 
of age-based politics because it privileges the role of the Länder—regional interests—at 
the national level.   In the multiparty system, however, parties cater to the interests of 
different age groups as they try to differentiate and attract niches of voters.  In Chapter 3 
on Italy, I argue that there are opposing pressures for the emergence of age-based 
interests.  On one side, Italy’s cultural legacy of diverse, regional interests have prevented 
unified age-based interests from forming. The new electoral system, however, creates 
pressures for the formation of age-based interests because it rewards parties for even 
small numbers of votes and encourages them to differentiate their platforms, even 
appealing to narrow interests.  Though youth have been disadvantaged in the employment 
arena, the government is working to bring them into the labor market.  In some ways, 
regional differences in labor, though, are more obvious than age differences—the South 
is especially disadvantaged.  In Chapter 4 I find that in Japan’s party system parties try to 
appeal to the broadest segments of the electorate possible and even though age-related 
issues permeate their platforms, they try to avoid alienating any particular group.  The 
labor situation in Japan is slightly different from Germany’s and Italy’s.  Instead of older 
and younger workers competing, older workers, younger workers, and prime-age women 
all compete with prime-age men in Japan’s inflexible labor market.  But like Germany 
and Italy, Japan is moving towards making the market more flexible to improve the 
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situation of these disadvantaged groups.  Chapter 5 offers a comparison between the three 





Chapter 2: The Politics of Population Aging in Germany 
Introduction 
“A country without children is in every respect a country without a future—socially, 
economically, and culturally.” ("Power for Renewal: Social justice for the twenty-first 
century, Principles for a new manifesto for the SPD" 2006, 5) 
 
 Two factors contribute to fears that population aging in Germany is leading to 
generational conflict and gerontocracy.  First, Germany’s trend of population aging and 
the differential growth of its age cohorts have been leading the number of old to increase 
and the number of youth to decline.  Between 1975 and 1980 Germany’s age structure 
shifted so that there were more people over the age of 60 than under the age of 15; since 
then the imbalance in size of the two cohorts has only grown more stark ("World 
Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007).  Their shrinking 
size makes it seem impossible for younger cohorts to match the potential political power 
of large older cohorts.  Second, gerontocracy seems to be evident because government 
spending on the old, especially for social security, greatly outweighs that on the young.  
They say that only because the old are politically powerful have they been able to 
allocate resources in their favor, leaving younger generations shortchanged. 
 In this chapter, I argue that in Germany’s case assertions of gerontocracy often 
ignore two important factors: the particularities of Germany’s federal state structure and 
multiparty system, and the politics of aging in the labor policy arena.  To some extent, 
intergenerational conflict is a myth.  As I will demonstrate, political parties in Germany 
have taken stances that clearly favor one generation over the others but voter response 
seems to fall in line more with regional—especially East-West—identity, than along age-
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related lines.  Two of Germany’s political institutions create opposing forces for age-
based politics to emerge: the party system and organization of the state.  While the 
multiparty system creates conditions in which parties try to differentiate, potentially 
along generational lines, federalism makes different, non-age-related identities more 
salient.  Federalism elevates the importance of regional politics and discourages factions 
that would align along age.   
 Those who argue that gerontocracy exists because of generous social security 
ignore other important policy domains in which the aged do not fare so well.  Examining 
labor policy in Germany within a generational frame demonstrates that older workers and 
retirees have not consistently benefited from recent labor reforms.  Instead, the trend is 
towards cutting pensions and raising retirement.  Additionally, major unemployment 
reforms have disproportionately disadvantaged older workers.  In Germany, labor issues 
are extremely important and decades of high unemployment have been one of the most 
pressing issues on the past few governments’ agendas so these issues are particularly 
useful to focus on in assessing the politics of aging.   
 To understand the extent to which generational tension exists in Germany and 
how it plays out politically, this chapter examines the politics of aging in Germany in 
three parts.  It first describes Germany’s age structure and explains the breakdown of 
social spending by age cohort, establishing that conditions are present for generational 
tension.  Then to determine whether and in what ways it exists the chapter describes how 
political parties target different age cohorts and how the cohorts respond by supporting 
the various parties.  Finally, the chapter turns to the politics of aging in labor policy.  
When viewed within the context of generational issues, recent labor policies demonstrate 
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that the old are not always successful in encouraging policies that favor their interests.  A 
detailed discussion of the generational politics surrounding some of Germany’s most 
radical labor reforms, the Hartz reforms, further illustrates this point.  The Hartz labor 
policies, which were legislated and implemented between 2002 and 2005, are widely 
unpopular for their strict measures but disproportionately disfavor the old.  The chapter 
concludes with a reflection on the importance of Germany’s political institutional 
structures of federalism, EU membership, and the multiparty system for channeling 
generational interests over labor policy. 
The context for generational conflict in Germany 
 Those who fear that population aging in Germany has led and will continue to 
lead to a hijacking of the political agenda by older generations often begin by citing the 
slow response of policymakers in dealing with the myriad ramifications of low fertility.  
Though the populations of Germany, Italy, and Japan are all aging, the unique legacy of 
population issues in Germany has affected the way policymakers there have approached 
age-related issues.  Germany’s history with Nazism and the divisions over communism 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century have shaped many facets of the 
country’s economy, politics, and society—including both its demographic trends and the 
ways the state has dealt with them.  In Germany, rhetoric surrounding population was 
muted for most of the post-war period even while other countries, such as France and the 
United States, actively examined their changing population profiles and the likely 
implications of these changes.  Because of the history of population control under the 
Nazi and communist regimes, many population topics were taboo in public debate; as a 
result Germany has been slow to address the challenges of population aging.  German 
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writer Elisabeth Niejahr, author of Alt Sind Neur Die Anderen (Only Other People are 
Old), said in an interview that the legacy of past atrocities continues to be important:  
Because demography was stigmatised as a subject for so long and associated 
with the National Socialist past, an obsession with population control and 
German jingoism, the few people who have kept on raising the issue in spite of 
all this…have had to suffer any number of withering attacks. (Sommer-Guist 
2006)   
In the time I spent at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock, 
Germany, in 2007 and 2008, demographers often lamented the impact of this legacy in 
their conversations on German policies towards family planning and retirement.  These 
historical legacies and the resulting slow response matter for two at least two reasons.  
One is that the failure to address low fertility in a timely and effective manner has 
exacerbated and accelerated Germany’s graying.  The second, and more important reason 
for this study, is that the slow response has permitted outdated and unsustainable pension 
and retirement policies to stay in effect, leading to a situation where older generations 
currently receive the lion’s share of social spending while little is spent on youth and 
families.  German politicians have begun to recognize their country’s population aging 
and institute policies, such as a higher retirement age, that reflect willingness to address 
the implications of growing older cohorts.  However, the tardy response to population 
aging partly because of this stigma may be a reason that age-related politics are not at the 
forefront of the political debate in Germany.  Indeed, East-West differences remain one 
of the most important divisions in German society, as we will see—the legacy of division 
has been a potent force in many realms of German society, including demography and 
politics, and has prevented the emergence of cross-regional age-based identity.   
 It is certainly true that Germany’s age structure sets the stage for potential 
generational conflict.  A few details about Germany’s particular demographic challenges 
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are useful both to set the context and to identify aspects of the causes and consequences 
of the trends that are relevant for the politics of aging.  Germany’s age structure is similar 
to most advanced industrial countries in that there are fewer youth and increasing 
numbers of elderly, but is more extreme than most of these other states. Germany’s 
population has been shrinking since 2003 because of low fertility, which has been below 
general replacement of 2.1 children per woman on average since about 1970. 









           

 
Source: (Eurostat 2006b) (Accessed on July 21, 2007) 
There are many reasons why Germany’s birth rate is low, and like with other advanced 
industrial countries, there is no consensus about why or what policy measures could be 
taken to raise the birth rate.  Some argue that Germany’s social welfare model, which 
relies on the concept of the family wage, is partly responsible for the low birth rate; the 
system was set up so that men work and women take care of the home and family (see for 
example McDonald 2000).  Current retirement regulations seem to reflect this bias; there 
are more generous retirement rules for women than men because of an assumed shorter 
work career for women.  The aforementioned legacy of keeping family planning out of 
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the public debate is reflected in this statement by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of 
Germany:  
Successful child and family policy is the key to the future of our country…The 
reasons for the consistently low birth rate in Germany, among other factors, are 
outdated role models and political failures. Child and family policy must be 
shifted from the margins to the focus of our attention.” ("Social Democracy in the 
21st Century: "The Bremen Draft" of a New Manifesto for the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany" 2007, 48)  
No matter the reason, low fertility will continue to cause Germany’s population to age for 
the foreseeable future.  The Federal Statistical Office even projects that the birth rate will 
continue to fall in the future (Eisenmenger et al. 2006).  They predict a worsening of 
population aging, based on this low birth rate and the prospect that life expectancy is 
expected to increase by around seven years between 2006 and 2050.  































Source: ("Fertility Rates for Low Birth-Rate Countries, 1995 to Most Recent Year" 2007) 
 Finally, longer life expectancy drives Germany’s population aging.  For children 
born during the period of 2002-2004, life expectancy was 75.9 years for boys and 81.5 
years for girls, expressed as an average over the period.  Not only is life expectancy at 
birth high, but during this same period total life expectancy for 60-year-olds was 80.0 
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years for men and 84.1 years for women (Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 38).  This increase in 
the number of persons living well beyond retirement has major implications for the 
demands on the working-age population to support projected increases in pension 
payments. 
 While the overall population is projected to continue shrinking, there are major 
generational differences in growth rates—a disparity with the potential to instigate 
generational conflict.  Between 2006 and 2010, the number of youth under 20 years of 
age will shrink by 10 percent and will continue to rapidly decrease thereafter 
(Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 5).  Specifically, the number of children between ages 6 and 10 
are expected to drop by 600,000 between 2005-2010 (Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 19).  
Older cohorts, however, will grow rapidly.  Germans aged 60 and older made up around a 
quarter of the population in 2005, five percentage points greater than twenty years earlier.  
The UN projects that in 2025 this cohort will comprise almost 33 percent of the 


























Source: ("World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007) 
 In what other ways does Germany’s changing population profile supposedly set 
the stage for generational conflict?  The most frequently cited implication in publications 
like The Economist is how low fertility and population aging changes the ratio of workers 
to dependents in Germany, and how this interacts with policies directing social spending.  
As the preceding graph shows, between 2000 and 2025 the proportion of the population 
of working age will decrease from 61 percent to 55 percent, while the proportion of 
elderly dependents will grow from 23 to 33 percent.  These changes are well underway.  
Not only will there be more elderly dependents supported by fewer workers, in general, 
older workers—those aged 50 to 64 years—will increasingly dominate the working-age 
population in Germany.  These ages are when labor force participation rates tend to 
decline in many countries ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 3).  In 
2005 older workers were about 30 percent of the working-age population (comprised of 
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those 20 to 64 years) but will be about 40 percent by 2020.  This age set will grow so 
steadily that it could theoretically offset reductions in younger workers to keep the total 
working-age population steady at around 50 million until 2015 (Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 
6).  As later sections will demonstrate, however, labor force participation rates of older 
workers are low and thus the theory may not match the reality.  In the longer term, even 
accounting for migration of 200,000 annually, the workforce is projected to decline from 
50 million to 40 million by 2050 and there is little doubt that aging of the workforce will 
continue ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 11).   
 Immigration will play a role in mediating the shrinking of Germany’s working 
age population, but because immigrants are not likely to compose a large percentage of 
the 50 million workers already in Germany, immigration will not likely play a decisive 
role in keeping the German workforce young, partially because of the many political 
obstacles to high immigration.  The number of migrants needed to preserve the current 
ratio of workers to dependents in Europe would be 25 million annually.  According to 
demographer David Coleman (2005), this high rate of migration “would treble Europe’s 
population by 2050 from 754 million to 2.35 billion, and so on at an accelerating rate.”  
Not only would European citizens feel hostile to the prospect of their population tripling, 
which would greatly strain housing and land resources, as the recent growth in right-wing 
political groups demonstrates they also would likely object to the changes in national 
identity brought by an influx of foreign-born.  Germany has a sufficiently strong right-




Demographic differences between East and West Germany 
 The legacy of German reunification creates a different context for the politics of 
aging than in Italy and Japan—one that continues to be relevant, as the remainder of the 
chapter will demonstrate.  Not only did the East and West have different economic and 
political systems during the Cold War, those systems also had implications for the 
development of demographic trends in the two regions.  Eisenmenger, et al. (2006, 28), 
report on the former East: 
 In the former GDR (German Democratic Republic) birth rates developed 
 differently from those of the former federal territory after the mid-1970s. There 
 the government adopted comprehensive benefits for families with children to 
 counteract a further decline of birth numbers. In 1980, this policy even led to a 
 clear increase in the total fertility rate to 1.94 children per woman. Afterwards the 
 birth rate again began to decline slowly.  
 
Though this study does not try to answer why fertility declined, uncertainty and 
pessimism about the future are oft-cited reasons for the general low fertility of former 
communist countries and these effects clearly extend to the formerly communist segment 
of Germany as well.  In the former Eastern states between 1989 and 1995 the total 
fertility rate fell from 1.56 to 0.84 (Kohli 2004, 279).  The latter figure is astonishingly 
low—fertility has rarely reached that nadir anywhere at any point in history. 
 Since reunification the East German birth rate has increased to match that of the 
West.  The birth rate in the East is now just 5 percent below the former West, compared 
to 30 percent below in 1991.  Instead of seeing rises only in births to women in their early 
twenties (which is normally the group with the highest fertility), as the German economy 
and political system stabilized and grew, women who had delayed childbirth—those 
between the ages of 25 and 35—now began to have children (Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 
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28).  Though birth rates in the East and West are close, high unemployment in the East 
has driven youth and skilled workers to migrate to the West; because of youth 
emigration, which takes away the population momentum mentioned earlier, and because 
the birth rate was lower there for many years, the workforce of the New Länder (new 
states) will age and shrink before that of the West and there will be significant skill 
shortages there first as well.  Most of those emigrating from the East have been in the 18-
25-year age range and the majority have been female ("Ageing and Employment Policies: 
Germany" 2005, 12).  Thus there are fewer potential mothers in the East and fewer 
younger workers to support the economy—a problem when states carry the burden for 
many social welfare benefits.  Though most German states have similar population 
profiles (median age, dependency ratios), the legacy of East-West differences means that 
some of the New Länder have older populations than average for Germany.  These 
internal differences allow us to determine whether age or regional identity are more 
important divisions in Germany because we can hold age constant for the majority of 
states to look at regional differences, and we can more closely examine how much age 
matters politically for the oldest and youngest states.  Details about internal differences 
















Figure 2.4 – Germany’s population age structure as of 31 December 2005 
 
Source: (Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 16) Federal Statistical Office, (www.destatis.de/, accessed July 21, 
2007) 
 
This population tree illustrates how few youth there were in Germany in 2005.  The 
narrowing at the bottom of the figure shows the effect of the low birthrate over time: each 
cohort under the age of 15 is smaller than the preceding one.  The bulge of baby boomers 
in the middle of the tree is beginning to move into retirement age, creating a large group 
of elderly dependents that, under current legislation, will soon receive generous social 
welfare benefits.  Further, the tree shows how if older workers’ (those aged 50-64) high 
unemployment continues, the challenge of supporting dependents will worsen.  Under all 
scenarios by the German Federal Statistical Office—a future where the population 
becomes relatively young, relatively old, or somewhere in between—the average age of 
the German population is projected to rise between now and 2050, with the lowest 
projection at just over 48 years by 2050 and the highest at just over 52 years 
(Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 19).  For half of the population to be over 50 years of age is a 
mark of major scientific achievements in the ability to extend life expectancy.  However, 
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many scholars, journalists, and politicians believe this unprecedented age structure will 
bring many economic, social, and political challenges, different than, but no less 
important than, age structures where half of the population is under age 18, as in most 
developing states.  Even Germany’s Federal Statistical Office assesses that “The relations 
between old and young people will strongly change” (Eisenmenger et al. 2006, 5).  So 
far, as we will see below, though population aging is present it has not led to generational 
tension to the degree predicted.   
 When a population is aging there are fewer workers to support growing numbers 
of elderly dependents and, as the logic goes, there are fewer youth to fight politically for 
their share of the pie.  In addition to demographic trends themselves, imbalances in social 
spending among young and old seem to be evidence that younger generations are 
politically powerless—in Germany the system is set up so that the old receive the lion’s 
share of social spending.  Around 50 percent of all public expenditure goes towards 
social welfare and spending specifically on the aged is about six times greater than 
spending specifically on youth—this ratio has been fairly constant over time.  Pension 
and retirement programs make up the bulk of old age spending, taking up around 23 
percent of government spending and 11 percent of GDP.  These numbers do not include 
healthcare, which also tends to be disproportionately spent on the old.  The bottom line is 
that the age structure is changing dramatically and spending on the old greatly outpaces 
that on the young.  The following sections try to challenge the assumption that the old 
have more political power in Germany by closely examining a few recent labor policies 
with generational implications and examine policy making within the context of aging to 
understand how and why older generations could turn their numbers into political power. 
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 The following table breaks down social expenditure in Germany by those 
programs that arguably favor one specific age cohort or generation over another.  The 
table lists spending three ways: per person, at current prices and current purchasing 
power parities (PPPH) in current US dollars; as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(PCT_GDP); and as a percentage of total general government expenditure (PCT_GOV). 
The category of old age spending includes pensions and retirement (OECD category 
OLD AGE); survivor benefits for widows and widowers; and disability measures, 
including incapacity-related benefits and employment measures for the disabled.  The 
category of youth includes all family benefits, as categorized by the OECD, and youth-
related Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs): those specific to youth, measures for 
disadvantaged youth, and apprentice allowances.  Because labor policy is central to this 
study, data on other ALMPs and on unemployment (minus early retirement for labor 
market reasons) are shown at the bottom of the chart; I could not easily categorize these 
based on available information but, as I will argue below, they could be considered as 
spending on older persons since many of these measures are designed to bring older 





Table 2.1 – Social expenditure in Germany (in millions) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ("The Social Expenditure Database" 2007) 
* Minus early retirement for labor market reasons
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If it is true that population aging has led to gerontocracy in Germany then we should 
already see signs.  Though the system has been set up so that the old now receive a higher 
share of benefits from the state than younger generations, the movement is not linear.   
Characteristics of German institutions 
 Though the previous section described some seemingly powerful demographic 
patterns, demography is not destiny—its effects depend on the ways institutions, such as 
arrangements of parties and often those of interest groups, mediate and articulate 
competing interests stemming from population trends.  Germany is different from the 
other two cases in this study because of its political history and institutions, which were 
of course shaped by that history.  But as with the other cases, institutions are key for 
translating generational interests into policy.  In Germany, two important institutions are 
federalism and the multiparty system.  This section describes the institutional setting in 
Germany and the ways in which various actors, particularly political parties and voters, 
navigate these institutions.  Germany’s federal organization and its competitive 
multiparty system create opposing forces for the emergence of generation-based politics.  
Based on the literature in political science, we should expect that in Germany’s 
multiparty system parties will try to differentiate themselves to appeal to blocks of voters, 
potentially along generational lines.  But we should also expect that German federalism 
makes state-level politics and interests very important and acts as a force uniting the 
interests of the people within states, rather than across them.  The following sections 
evaluate these hypotheses in light of evidence of how parties target age groups and how 
they respond with their support for parties.  I ask two main questions: To what extent do 
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parties target young and old through their general party positions?  And to what extent do 
generations respond through supporting various parties?   
 We begin with a short review of party politics in Germany and move to a 
contemporary discussion of the relevance of age-related issues.  I find that, as expected, 
political parties do try to appeal to voters along age lines by targeting their messages to 
specific generations and focusing on issues related to their interests.  The institution of a 
competitive, stable multiparty system like Germany’s does facilitate the emergence of 
age-based party politics.  Then, we move to a discussion of generational response to the 
parties.  In examining voting patterns by age I find that though we cannot completely 
discount that there is some sort of an age effect in the most aged and youthful states, on 
the whole votes are determined more by region than by age—East-West differences in 
Germany remain important.  The federal organization of Germany matters because it 
formalizes those identities and gives them longevity.  Federalism means that state-level 
interests continue to be important.  Though identities and societies can be fluid, 
institutions serve as an anchor.    
German multiparty system 
 The first area of investigation involves examining the hypothesis that in 
Germany’s competitive multiparty system parties try to differentiate along age-based 
lines.  Two aspects make the German system a multi-actor system.  The first is the 
number of parties and the shifting coalitions among them.  The second is the role of the 
Länder.  There has never been absolute dominance of any one party in Germany, even 
during long periods of center-right government, because voters use the Länder to check 
the Bundestag.  In the first elections after World War II twelve parties managed to gain 
 
 58 
seats in the Bundestag.  Now, there are five major parties in German politics.  Nationally, 
because of electoral rules that require a party to win at least five percent of the vote or 
three constituencies to gain seats in the legislature, there is little opportunity for smaller 
parties to compete. The parties that get more votes get more government financing—this 
perpetuates the large and well-established parties (Scarrow 2002, 87).  Germany was 
mainly a “two-and-a-half-party system” from around the mid-1950s until 1983, when the 
Green party emerged, though the Greens did not become viable partners until the mid-
1990s (Scarrow 2002, 78).  For that almost 30-year period the center-right Christian 
Democrats and the center-left Social Democrats ruled German politics.   
 The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) is a much smaller party and switched 
allegiances between the two major parties to stay in government.  In a sense, the FDP 
were the most powerful of the three between the 1950s and 1983 because they were 
strategically important in determining which of the two major parties would be in power.  
Whoever they chose to form a coalition with would become the ruling government.  With 
the advent of the Green party, the FDP lost their strategic position.  As their name 
suggests, the Greens existed on an environmental platform and joined with Alliance 90—
their East German counterpart—in the early 1990s.  They have since expanded their 
platform and often focus on economic issues.  After reunification, the post-communist 
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) played a role in East Germany, but, though 
independently successful, have mostly been marginalized by the other parties since the 
end of the Cold War because none of the major parties want to take the far left party as 
their sole partner.  PDS recently merged with an offshoot of SPD members to form The 
Left (Die Linke).  The party will be referred to as both PDS and The Left in this chapter, 
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depending on the time period to which I am referring.  Before the most recent federal 
election in 2005, many had argued that because the most ardent supporters of the PDS are 
aging its important role in the East may have been waning.  As we will see, however, 
support for The Left—both among the population and in terms of other parties—has 
actually grown, especially in state elections from 2005 until March of 2008, and there are 
reasons to believe this trend will continue.  
Table 2.2 – Summary of German political parties 
CDU 
- One of two major parties 
- Center-right 
- CSU is Bavarian-based 
counterpart 
- Dominated German 
politics along with SPD 
from mid-1950s to 1983 
SPD 
- One of two major parties; 
oldest party 
- Center-left 
- Dominated German 
politics along with CSU 
from mid-1950s to 1983 
 
FDP 
- Far right party 
- Smaller party that switched 
allegiances between the 
CDU and SPD to form part 
of the governing coalition 
until advent of Greens 
 
Alliance 90/The Greens 
- Emerged in 1983, became viable partner 
mid-1990s 
- Strategically important smaller party in 
governing coalitions 
- Alliance 90 is East German counterpart 
- Originally existed on environmental 
platform, now broadly leftist 
The Left 
- Formerly the post-communist party 
(PDS) 
- Formed Die Linke (The Left) with an 
offshoot of SPD members  
- Often marginalized for communist 
association 
- Still popular in East Germany 
- Far left party 
  
  
Despite the viability of the Greens and PDS in the late 20th century, the two most 
powerful parties remain the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union 
(CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD); support for these parties tends to be 
split among the populace and the two parties have alternated as the main governing 
coalition partner.  The CDU is a center-right party and the Christian Social Union (CSU) 
is its Bavarian-based counterpart.  The Social Democratic Party (SPD) occupies the 
center-left position, though it has at times during the last decade seemed more centrist.  In 
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the 2005 federal elections, support for the parties was so even that the SPD and CDU 
formed a “red-green-black” coalition with Alliance 90/Greens.  Even as the SPD have 
moved from far left to center-left, the overall orientation of the German public appears to 
be moving slightly left of center.  Like Italy, “in 2005 the German party system displayed 
a strong territorial cleavage and a wider ideological range, within which the ideological 
centre of gravity has skewed leftwards” (Lees 2006, 369).  A later section on labor policy 
in Germany will begin to examine what this will mean for social welfare policies in 
Germany, especially as social welfare policies that favor one group, such as retirees, may 
be at odds with those that favor different youth or families.   
A lot has changed in German politics since 2002.  Many argue that the CDU and 
SPD have been so damaged by their support for unpopular labor reforms that their ability 
to gain an electoral majority has been permanently undermined and that smaller parties 
are gaining in importance.  Electoral data seem to support this claim.  Nevertheless, 
coalitions remain a cornerstone of Germany’s multiparty system and competition among 
all the parties is robust. 
Generational issues within the parties 
All five of the major parties have been in the process of developing new party 
guidelines over the past several years, many of which they are just adopting in 2007.  
However, these current positions are indicative of political struggles over time because 
they have been debated over the last several years and influenced by developments over 
this time period.  I examined media accounts of party platforms surrounding the 1998, 
2002, and 2005 federal elections and found them to be consistent with the documents 
below.  I feel confident that the general generational orientations of the political parties 
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reflected in their most recent manifestos are consistent over the time period 1998-2008, 
allowing us to examine how parties target different generations in detail.  This section 
examines the parties’ general orientations towards generations in Germany, while the 
section on Germany’s Hartz reforms examines the parties’ specific stances on youth and 
old age unemployment.   After examining the parties’ stances I categorized them 
according to the degree to which they clearly supported youth or older persons.  I found 
that all parties made explicit age-related statements and that there was great variety 
among their positions.  There is a politics of aging among political parties in Germany.   
The results are illustrated below; the size of the boxes represents the relative size of the 
parties.   










 In order to interpret party statements we must first set forth criteria by which to 
evaluate the interests of different generations.  Most of this is seems like common 
sense—each age group wants to maximize its position in society.  Youth would likely 
favor policies that aid in their education and transition to the workforce; older generations 
would likely favor retirement policies that are not overly burdensome in requiring a 
longer time to work and higher contributions.  But a major shortcoming of the literature 
on aging is that it assumes interests of age groups without providing data to corroborate 







Support for aged Support for youth 
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opinion surveys that ask respondents their views about age-related issues like education 
and retirement.  Second, when there are no surveys, to some degree we can extrapolate 
interests by looking at behavior—though this can be just as problematic as making an 
assumption based on common sense, when it enhances, rather than replaces, survey data 
extrapolating can be useful.  For example, the age at which most older workers exit the 
labor force in Germany is several years younger than the official retirement age—this 
means that older workers try to find alternative pathways out of the workforce.  We can 
take this behavior and assume that they would like to retire as early as possible 
(remuneration being equal) or at least have the option of retiring early rather than being 
forced to work longer.  Opinion surveys back up this assumption, though there are 
differences between East and West Germany.  According to a Eurobarometer survey 
about pension financing, in Western Germany 18 percent of those aged 15-44 and 20 
percent of those aged 45+ thought that the solution to pension financing was to work and 
contribute longer; in the East only 5 percent of the younger group and 7 percent of the 
older group thought this was an acceptable solution ("Eurobarometer 64.2: The European 
Constitution, Globalization, Energy Resources, and Agricultural Policy, October-
November 2005" 2005).  Only between 16 and 18 percent of both age groups in the East 
and West thought the solution was to keep the retirement age the same but take lower 
benefits.  These interests are taken into account in interpreting the party statements.   
CDU 
The main documents of the CDU from the past several years paint a picture of 
support for families and children instead of older cohorts and present an unsympathetic 
view towards those who are unemployed.  In the new party principles developed by the 
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CDU and scheduled to be approved in early December 2007, family and education are 
the highest priorities outlined.  They say, “The CDU aims to create the preconditions that 
allow people to follow their wish to start a family and have children” ("New Party 
Principles of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany" 2007, 3).  To support this goal 
they plan to implement new employment and tax laws: “Along with public measures it is 
necessary to create family friendly working conditions in the economy and business 
world...There has to be more tax relief for families with children than for those without 
children” ("New Party Principles of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany" 2007, 
4).  Though they name demographic change as one of the two biggest challenges facing 
Germany, they have no explicit proposals to provide for the elderly and in fact try to shift 
the burden for old age care from the government to the family, saying that children have 
responsibility to take care of their parents ("New Party Principles of the Christian 
Democratic Union of Germany" 4).   
The CDU is also tough on the unemployed, and in Germany older workers have 
higher unemployment rates than prime age workers.  In a concession to older workers, 
though, the CDU wants “more flexibility in the dismissals protection law” and “wants to 
link the period of getting unemployment benefit to the period of having paid previously 
into the system”—a stance tough on youth, who have had shorter careers (The New 
Principles of CDU Germany: 10 Central Statements).  They want better job opportunities 
for the elderly, but the propensity for early retirement in Germany strongly indicates that 
Germany’s elderly do not want to be forced into employment—though opinion surveys 
show that some welcome the choice to stay in the workforce on their own terms7—
especially given the CDU’s lack of support for the option of part-time work.  The party’s 
                                                 
7 This issue will be explored when discussing generational response to parties. 
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strict stance can be seen in the following statement: “We follow the principle that 
someone who works should have more than someone who does not work” ("New Party 
Principles of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany" 2007, 7).  They want to 
replace Germany’s pay-as-you-go pension system as soon as possible and argue that 
private pension funds will be a necessity in the future.  Their support for families and 
children is not surprising given the party’s explicit Christian roots.  The CDU’s strict 
views on unemployment are also in line with the party’s core principles, in this case their 
emphasis on the market economy and concern that Germany be competitive 
internationally.  They see the market economy as a positive force for German society and 
support privatization. 
SPD 
 According to one author, the SPD has tried to serve as a bridge between the old 
and new left by bringing together traditional social democratic, labor-oriented policies 
with the ecological and post-materialist values of the left-libertarian movements of the 
late 1960s, and contemporary concerns with globalization’s effects on workers (Jun 2003, 
73).  However, the language of the main party principles and some of the policies the 
SPD have supported over the past several years portray the party as less the party of labor 
than Jun’s characterization.  Rather, they seem to try to strike a balance between a desire 
for economic growth and the interests of labor.  In contrast to the CDU, the SPD puts a 
major emphasis on catering to all generations in Germany, what they term “inter-
generational solidarity.”  But, like the CDU’s view on major challenges, the SPD says 
that “Finding ways and means of ameliorating the effects of unfavorable demographic 
developments is the first task of a policy of generational solidarity” ("Power for Renewal: 
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Social justice for the twenty-first century, Principles for a new manifesto for the SPD" 
2006, 5).  They explicitly want to institute policies that will make it easier for Germans to 
start families and thus raise the birth rate. 
The SPD, as can be expected, differs greatly from the CDU with respect to the 
economy: “in a market economy there must be areas of life and public goods which are 
not subject to market logic and are oriented to need” ("Power for Renewal: Social justice 
for the twenty-first century, Principles for a new manifesto for the SPD" 2006, 3).  They 
bring their theme of inter-generational solidarity into their views on the welfare state, 
saying: 
The welfare state is organized in solidarity. In a community of solidarity the 
young stand by the old, the healthy by the sick, the non-disabled by the disabled 
and the employed by the unemployed. Social security and participation 
guaranteed by the state, the actionable statutory right to social benefits and the 
legally safeguarded position of the workforce will remain in the focus of 
Germany’s welfare state. ("Social Democracy in the 21st Century: "The Bremen 
Draft" of a New Manifesto for the Social Democratic Party of Germany" 2007, 
38)  
 
Like the CDU, they show a degree of toughness on unemployment, a logical strategy 
since Germany has been plagued by unemployment under both CDU- and SPD-led 
coalitions.  But, the SPD add some caveats to their stance: “On the one hand, there must 
be sufficient jobs, and on the other hand people must be supported in the course of their 
working lives to adapt to changing occupational demands” ("Power for Renewal: Social 
justice for the twenty-first century, Principles for a new manifesto for the SPD" 2006, 5).  
The SPD use softer language than the CDU in their effort to strike a balance through 
inter-generational solidarity: “Everyone should have an adequate income in old age also 
in the future.  At the same time, the generation which is still working and paying 
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contributions should not be overstrained” (p. 12).  Thus, to some degree these two major 
parties are not taking a widely different stance, particularly with the goal to increase the 
employment of older persons, but the SPD are a bit softer in their language and attempt to 
strike a balance between support for the different generations rather than clearly 
supporting or shunning one or the other.  The SPD are also a bit easier on the 
unemployed: “the preventive social welfare state supports people in coping with 
transitions and interruptions in their employment histories, which helps them to maintain 
their employability” ("Social Democracy in the 21st Century: "The Bremen Draft" of a 
New Manifesto for the Social Democratic Party of Germany" 2007, 33).   
Continuing their theme of a balance between individual and state, or collective, 
responsibility, the SPD seem to issue a call to older persons to step up to responsibility: 
“Demographic change, however, also requires a new image of old age. The older 
generation will be needed more in [the] future to actively shape society” ("Social 
Democracy in the 21st Century: "The Bremen Draft" of a New Manifesto for the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany" 2007, 7).  This theme of “active” aging is echoed in some 
other parties’ statements.  I interpret this as a stance that requires older persons to work 
and contribute as long as possible, rather than retire and take benefits from the state—it 
requires older persons to put into the system more than they take out for as long as 
possible.  Therefore, it is a stance that does not favor the interests of the aged, who have 
paid into the system for decades and generally favor the option of retirement with full 




As would be expected from a liberal (in the classical sense) party, the FDP 
emphasize the individual over the communal in all of their main tenets.  They call for 
“private responsibility before state regulation” and equality of opportunities rather than 
equality of outcome ("The Chances of Freedom").  I interpret this as favoring less social 
welfare spending.  In Germany, older persons receive a disproportionate share of social 
welfare spending, thus this stance is particularly against the interests of the aged.  Like 
the CDU and SPD, they aim to support families; their strategy is lower taxes, which 
presumably would free money for families to spend.  In another traditionally liberal 
stance they desire less bureaucracy and want to dissolve the Federal Employment Agency 
because they argue it is too large a bureaucracy.  They want to reduce compulsory 
schooling to 12 years but do not supply a reason other than attributing this position to a 
desire for equal opportunities.  They say little about either youth or older persons 
specifically, but their emphasis on individual responsibility, support for education, and 
equality of opportunity over equality of outcome place them more in favor of the youth 
than older workers.  They also express dislike for unions and say that “the protection 
against dismissal by law must no longer be an impediment to new recruitment” ("The 
Chances of Freedom"). 
PDS 
To examine the stance of the PDS it is now necessary to look at the successor 
organization, The Left (Die Linke), which formed in mid-2007, as mentioned above.  The 
Left issued their new party principles in 2007 to create discussion about the future 
direction of the party; it is from this document that the following positions are taken.  
Unlike all of the other parties, even Alliance 90/Greens, The Left emphasize the 
 
 68 
collective over the individual—they say that unemployment is a collective problem, not 
an individual problem, and they firmly oppose all neo-liberal policies.  They take a stance 
against recent tough unemployment reforms by saying, “We are opposed to a policy of 
‘Fordern und Fördern’ (supporting and demanding), of support based on merit, that turns 
unemployment into a problem of the individual” ("Founding programmatic document of 
the political party DIE LINKE" 2007, 2).  The position on ‘Fordern und Fördern’ 
references the language of the Hartz reforms, described in a following section, which are 
based on this principle.  In direct opposition to the FDP’s position on firing practices, The 
Left want more protection from dismissal in the workplace (p. 6).      
The Left tries to establish themselves as a clear alternative to the other political 
parties, saying, “Our party makes a change of political direction its strategic objective” 
("Founding programmatic document of the political party DIE LINKE" 2007, 3).  This is 
the only party to devote space in its main document to issues with pensions, and their 
stances indicate their orientation as a party clearly on the side of older generations.  They 
say: 
We oppose raising the pensionable age to more than 65 as a covert attack on the 
pension rate.  What are needed are flexible possibilities of retiring before the age 
of 65.  Our aim is retirement from age 60 without deductions...At the very least, 
partial retirement should be re-introduced and access to pensions for reduced 
earning capacity should be made easier. ("Founding programmatic document of 
the political party DIE LINKE" 2007, 8)   
 
They want to make sure that pensions rise when wages rise and want to equalize pension 
benefits in East and West Germany; this puts them more firmly as a party of the East as 
well.  In the same Eurobarometer survey on pension financing referenced above, 40 
percent of both younger and older workers in the East thought that working longer, 
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paying in more, or accepting lower contributions were unacceptable solutions to pension 
financing.  Western respondents showed much less antipathy (between 10 and 17 
percentage points lower) for these proposals ("Eurobarometer 64.2: The European 
Constitution, Globalization, Energy Resources, and Agricultural Policy, October-
November 2005" 2005). 
 The Left spend much more time talking about the concerns of older people than 
they do talking about youth or families.  Alliance90/Greens, on the other hand, focus 
more on families.  The Left say that “Poverty in old age must be prevented” ("Founding 
programmatic document of the political party DIE LINKE" 2007, 8), whereas 
Alliance90/The Greens say, “Families with young children are at the greatest risk of 
poverty” ("The future is green: Alliance 90/The Greens: Party Program and Principles" 
2007, 50).  Alliance 90/The Greens even want to lower the voting age because “The 
changing age-structure in society will have a considerable effect on the life of young 
people” (p. 61).  Presumably, this is their attempt to balance the voting power of older 
people.  They also emphasize the importance of education. 
 Like the SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens have intergenerational concerns at the heart 
of their mission.  However, Alliance 90/The Greens are more concerned with 
generational justice, which they see as older generations being fair to younger 
generations, rather than vice versa (the latter would likely be the position of The Left, 
were they to comment on the idea directly).  Alliance 90/The Greens even directly 
reference population aging as a major force for change, saying, “The on-going 
demographic changes are reformulating the question of equitability,” and imply that it is 
only fair for older generations to continue to contribute ("The future is green: Alliance 
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90/The Greens: Party Program and Principles" 2007, 15).  They discuss the need for 
family-friendly policy and for older people to continue to work, presumably to fund this 
policy.  The two of their 12 party principles that have generational relevance again 
support this interpretation.  They say, “The concept of a basic standard of living describes 
our perspective of a new foundation for social security. In policy from the children's 
perspective we want to ensure practical equality across the generations” ("The future is 
green: Alliance 90/The Greens: Party Program and Principles" 2007, 18); by focusing on 
the perspective of the children instead of the aged, they are clearly not courting the 
elderly.   
 Also like the SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens promote “Active involvement for older 
people,” again interpreted as the need for older people to continue to contribute through 
working, rather than take early retirement.  This interpretation is further substantiated 
when they say, “We want a society that welcomes children, does not banish the old into 
retirement or reject people with disabilities, where poverty is a thing of the past and the 
future is not badly planned but actively shaped” ("The future is green: Alliance 90/The 
Greens: Party Program and Principles" 2007, 48).  The phrase, “not banish the old into 
retirement” is another way of saying the old need to work longer, something they may 
rather wish to have a choice in.  Alliance 90/The Greens want “a culture of older people 
working” ("The future is green: Alliance 90/The Greens: Party Program and Principles" 
2007, 54).  This stance is basically opposite of The Left, who want to lower the 
retirement age.  The following table and summarizes the positions of the major German 
parties with regard to their support for one or another age cohort in Germany. 
Table 2.3 – Summary of intergenerational party stances 
CDU FDP Alliance 90/The Greens 
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- Create family-friendly 
conditions 
- Encourage elderly to work 
- Tough on unemployed 
- Favor market economy 
- Individual over collective 
- Equality of outcome over 
opportunity 
- Pro-family 
- Emphasize education 
- Focus on family 
- Support “active” aging 
- Intergenerational justice is 
older generations 
contributing to younger ones 
SPD 
- Create family-friendly conditions 
- Intergenerational solidarity 
- Limited market economy 
- Both individual & collective 
responsibility for unemployment 
- Support “active” aging 
The Left 
- Collective over individual responsibility, 
including for unemployment 
- Oppose neo-liberal policy 
- Support opportunities to retire early 
- Support more generous pensions 
- Focus more on older generations than 
younger generations 
 
Generational support for parties  
 The previous section demonstrated that parties in Germany do target specific 
generations in their messages.  Support for the old varies, with The Left showing the 
greatest support and the CDU and FDP showing more support for families.  To some 
extent voters respond accordingly, states with the oldest age profiles have greater support 
for The Left and states with the youngest age profiles have the greatest support for the 
CDU.  But rather than being an age effect, I believe that patterns of support are driven 
more by the legacy of East-West differences in areas from the economy to values, which 
at times may either trump or obscure the politics of aging.  Six Länder have age profiles 
with greater disparity between young and old and in those states votes do line up with the 
way parties target age groups.  But do older states vote for The Left because The Left 
targets the old?  Actually, for the nine Länder with more balanced age profiles8 votes are 
still very different by party, demonstrating that region is a better determinant of vote than 
                                                 
8 I am excluding Berlin because in addition to age profile, we are also interested in region, and Berlin’s 
history as a state split between East and West complicates the analysis. 
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age—those states of the East, even the ones with balanced age profiles, still vote for The 
Left.   
 As described at the beginning of this chapter the age profiles of the Länder in 
Germany differ.  States of the former East have older age profiles than do those of the 
West, but the variance among them is great.  Overall, about 23 percent of the East is aged 
25 or below, while in the West that youth cohort makes up 30 percent of the population—
the Western states are much younger.  But, the Eastern states are not necessarily much 
older when aggregated: 27 percent of the Western states’ population is aged 60 or older, 
compared with 28 percent of the East.  Individually, however, greater differences are 
apparent.  The below chart compares election results in the two oldest and two youngest 
states in Germany in 2005 (which also are in different regions).   
Table 2.4 – Population and election results in Germany—by age of state and region, 2005 
State %60+ %<25 SPD CDU/CSU FDP Greens Left 
Saxony (old) 29% 23% 25% 30% 5% 10% 23% 
Saxony-
Anhalt (old) 




24% 27% 30% 39% 11% 12% 4% 
Bavaria 
(young) 
24% 27% 26% 49% 8% 10% 3% 
Germany 
(whole) 
25% 26% 34% 35% 8% 10% 9% 
Source: ("Statistical Yearbook 2007 for the Federal Republic of Germany" 2007) 
We can see that the oldest states show much greater support for The Left, the party that 
specifically targets the interests of the old.  Indeed, The Left in these states received 
around a quarter of the vote in 2005—remarkable for a small party. The oldest states in 
2005—Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia—had the highest votes for 
the The Left in that election.  The two youngest states, Baden-Württemburg and Bavaria, 
had negligible support for The Left, but 39 and 49 percent of voters, respectively, voted 
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for the CDU/CSU, the parties that greatly favor the young.  It appears at first glance that 
generations do respond by favoring parties that favor their generational interests.  
However, several factors cast doubt on this conclusion.  First, the “youngest” states are 
really not that different from the age profile in Germany as a whole, though they are 
younger, they are not necessarily young.  Second, Bavaria, categorized here as a 
relatively young state, showed great support for the CDU/CSU but the CSU is a party 
based in Bavaria, and thus support for the CSU in Bavaria may have more to do with 
regional interests and the legacy of the party there than with Bavaria’s age profile.  Third, 
though The Left received nearly a quarter of the vote in the two oldest states, these are 
also former communist states in the East, and The Left is the communist successor party.  
Given their historical relevance to the East, plus their emphasis on communal values 
(which are likely more ingrained in the East because of its past), it is not surprising that 
The Left is popular in the East and more popular in the East than West—the stigma 
associated with its communist past likely still hurts them in the West as it did throughout 
the 1990s.  Fourth, the majority of states in Germany have balanced age profiles—they 
are neither clearly young nor old, but have roughly equal proportions of each segment.  
And for the majority, there are major differences in party support that appear to have little 
to do with age and a great deal to do with geography.  For example, in the 2006 state 
elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (a former Eastern state) and Rhineland-Palatinate 
(a former Western state) there were vast differences in party support even though these 
two states have nearly identical age structures.  Almost 17 percent of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern voters favored The Left while the party received no support in Rhineland-
Palatinate.  Voters in the latter shifted their support to the CDU/CSU.  I examined all 
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federal and state elections by Länder and compared election results.  They followed the 
same pattern described previously; The Left had much greater support in the East, the 
SPD in the West, and the CDU in the South.9  Other state elections reflect the same 
pattern.  Thus, it appears that while we cannot completely discount that there is some 
degree of age effect in voting, East-West differences are still strong and continue to shape 
voting patterns to a greater degree than does age.   
 To move past this problem and disentangle region from age, we have to turn to 
individual-level data reflecting motivation for voting.  What issues do people care most 
about that might influence their voting?  When asked what they see as the most important 
issue facing Germany today, respondents in both the East and West overwhelmingly 
named unemployment and economic issues—this was the case over time and for all age 
groups (Berger et al. 2005a, ; Berger et al. 2005b).  And in one survey, voters of all age 
groups in the East and West felt that the best party to provide new jobs in 2005 was the 
CDU; federal election results from 2005 put the CDU in power as the major coalition 
partner.  Since, as Politbarometer surveys from 1998 to 2005 indicate, voters’ greatest 
concern was unemployment, and voters felt that the CDU was the best party to create 
new jobs, it is not surprising that the CDU came out on top in that election.  But, these 
data also tell us something about the politics of aging.  Were voters in 2005 only 
concerned about new jobs then the election results would have been a better match than 
the reality.  The CDU did not get as much support from voters in the actual elections as 
the surveys would indicate.   Other issues must also be important and other dynamics at 
play.  
                                                 
9 A detailed chart of these results is included in the Appendix.  
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 Voters in the East thought that the PDS would do a good job of protecting 
pensions.  This was especially so among prime-age workers between ages 30-59, the 
group that would be most immediately affected by increases in the retirement age, which 
The Left oppose.  But PDS (now The Left) got more of the vote in many Eastern and 
Western states in 2005 and subsequent state elections than even surveys would indicate.  
How can we explain this?  Actually, it appears that many may have only voted for the 
PDS out of protest, and not because they necessarily supported their policies.  


































Source: (Berger et al. 2005a, ; Berger et al. 2005b) 
 These data also tell us whether the parties’ messages to voters—their generational 
and issue appeals—are being received by the voters or if voters perceive the parties 
differently then how parties present themselves.  Indeed, the following chart 
demonstrates a mismatch between parties’ messages and citizens’ interpretation.  The 
most obvious example concerns family policy.  As the review of party manifestos 
indicated, The Left (PDS) was much more a party of older generations than younger 
ones; family issues were absent from their platform.  However, when asked about the best 
party to support family policy, responses indicated that between 15 and 25 percent of 
 
 76 
voters in the East thought that the PDS were the best party.  The highest result, 25 
percent, was among those aged 30-44, who are the age group most likely to benefit from 
family policies.  Therefore, there is a mismatch between party messages and the way 
voters receive them.  In the West, young respondents indicated that the SPD were the best 
party for family policy, while older respondents thought that the CDU were better.  Only 
a very small percentage of voters thought that the FDP were the best party for family 














Table 2.5 – Survey on best party to protect pensions, create new jobs, and support family 
policy, East and West Germany, 2005 (percent) 
   CDU SPD GREENS FDP PDS NONE 
E 42 37 0 9 7 42 18-29 
W 51 39 0 6 4 33 
Best 
pensions 
30-44 E 35 40 1 5 19 46 
 
 77 
W 53 34 3 8 3 49 
E 57 26 1 2 14 45 45-59 
W 46 43 3 3 5 40 
E 42 47 0 <1 10 35 60+ 
W 66 28 <1 5 <1 35 
E 52 31 3 8 7 37 18-29 
W 55 33 4 6 2 28 
E 62 20 2 7 9 40 30-44 
W 63 25 3 7 2 35 
E 64 20 2 5 9 48 45-59 
W 65 24 3 5 3 37 





W 81 15 <1 3 1 37 
E 27 39 6 3 15 8 18-29 
W 38 39 9 4 3 7 
E 22 35 5 3 25 10 30-44 
W 32 41 9 2 4 11 
E 29 29 3 4 22 13 45-59 
W 35 41 8 3 4 10 





W 54 32 3 1 <1 8 
Source: (Berger et al. 2005a, ; Berger et al. 2005b) 
Other measures of support  
 Overall membership in both the CDU and SPD has been declining, but this 
pattern is mainly driven by declines in young members.  The proportion of young 
members in the SPD (ages 16-30) dropped from 10.8 to 2.8 percent from 1974 to 1999. 
At the end of 2007, those under age 30 composed 5.3 percent of SPD membership and 
those aged 60 and over almost 46 percent of the membership ("Mitgliederbestand nach 
Alter; Stichtag: 31.12.2007" 2007).  In the PDS at the end of 2005, the proportions were 
3.3 percent for those up to age 30 and over 70 percent for those aged 60 and over—this is 
a remarkable difference (Alterstruktur der PDS 2005).  Clearly, older persons dominate 
political party membership in Germany.  As Jun (2003, 88) says of the decline in 
membership, especially youth:  
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 Even though this negative development is true for all parties in Germany, it is 
 especially noticeable in more recent SPD history because in the early 1970s the 
 wave of new SPD members was mainly under thirty. The SPD has undergone a 
 smooth transition from this structure of old members to the executive level: the 
 party leadership is clearly dominated by a group of those above fifty, while 
 younger members only provide a leadership reserve. This generation gap could in 
 the medium term pose a leadership problem to German social democracy.  
 
I think that interpreting these data as a harbinger of the downfall of German social 
democracy is an exaggeration, but the trend does point to important differences in the 
participation aspect of political culture between generations in Germany and, depending 
on how parties view these patterns of support, these differences may increasingly lead 
parties to target generations differently.  
 Youth are notably absent from political party membership and are much less 
likely to vote than older persons.  One interpretation is that youth are indifferent; another 
is that youth are not united as a generation—they may see themselves more attached to 
particular issues not based on age.  When asked why his generation was not initiating an 
outcry at bearing the responsibility for paying for elders, an under-40 member of the 
Bundestag replied, “‘you can’t make a mark in our party-based democracy as someone 
who speaks for particular interests, as a representative, as the champion of just one 
generation’” (Sommer-Guist 2006). 
German federalism  
 The previous section examined the effects of the multiparty system in detail, but 
there is another institution, tied to the East-West differences we observed, that is also 
important for channeling generational interests in Germany: the federal organization of 
the state.  The German state experiences pressures from below—the Länder, or states—
 
 79 
that reinforce regional identities and work against the emergence of cross-regional age-
based interests.  In Germany, legislative powers are allocated to both the Bundestag, the 
federal parliament, and to the Bundesrat, or the body representing German ‘states’ 
(Länder).  Decentralization elevates the importance of local politics.  Thus, German 
federalism gives Länder direct leverage at the national level.  The reason why federalism 
is relevant for preventing the emergence of age-based interests is because in Germany, 
the Bundesrat represents state interests, not popular interests.  Also the Bundesrat is a 
council, not a senate, which means that it represents regional governments, not regional 
populations—thus it represents the interests of the government, not the people (Hueglin 
and Fenna 2006, 182).   
 Because the Länder have their own state-level policies on issues like social 
welfare and employment, differences between the Länder emerge and make local 
problems and solutions important. Many policies that would involve age-based interests, 
like education, employment, and long-term care, are made at the Länder level so age 
groups have little opportunity or reason to unite cross-regionally.  The Länder also have 
the ability to affect policies on these issues at the national level; they can initiate 
legislation and “play a crucial role in policy formulation” (Hueglin and Fenna 2006, 200).  
They are important players in translating generational interests related to their local 
populations over issues like unemployment, education, and long-term care (Campbell and 
Morgan 2005, 895). 
 On the opposite end is the role of supra-national bodies.  The degree to which the 
European Union has usurped national-level policies varies for each European country.  In 
Germany, the process of European integration has required Germany to transfer some 
 
 80 
power to the EU, but, because European states do not give up total rights, the 
organization of German federalism means that Länder governments are able to influence 
European policy:  
 The criterion of ‘subsidiarity’ developed in the Maastricht Treaty and later the 
 Amsterdam Treaty means, according to the Basic Law, that the principles of 
 federalism have to be respected and the agreement of the Bundesrat (the upper 
 house of the federal parliament and representative of the federal states) has to be 
 obtained. (Glaessner 2005, 70) 
 
The German constitution has even been amended in light of EU expansion and 
integration.  A constitutional amendment says that “within the EU framework the 
responsibility for decision-making in matters that affect the exclusive legislative authority 
of the Länder (for example, questions of education) is to be transferred from the federal 
level to a Länder Committee appointed by the Bundesrat” (Glaessner 2005, 70).  Again, 
institutional arrangement underscores the importance of the Länder and downplays the 
influence of the EU on German policies.  However, there are some examples in which the 
German legislature has only instituted a policy after the EU directive, demonstrating that 
there are also pressures on the states from above.  Germany’s Agenda 2010, discussed in 
the below section on the Hartz reforms, was named after the EU’s Lisbon strategy to 
improve the European economy.  Germany’s age discrimination law also followed an EU 
directive.  Thus, we cannot discount the role of the EU in driving German policymaking.  
In fiscal and employment policy, the EU seems to be more important than population 
aging (by itself) in dictating the direction of German policy.   
 Another relevant aspect of German federalism is the way it affects the parties.  
Because of federalism, there are frequent disjunctions between the state and federal 
governing coalitions.  For example, a party may cooperate with its ally nationally but 
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with a rival at the state level (Scarrow 2002, 93).  These pressures from below and above 
discourage the emergence of age-based interests.  The importance of the Länder in 
German federalism means that regional politics (e.g., East-West; Bavarian versus the 
rest) are important.  Unlike federalism and the EU, Germany’s multiparty system 
facilitates the formation of factions within German society that may not depend on 
regional identities.  German federalism institutionalizes and crystallizes regional 
identities by giving them representation on the national scale.  The system is set up to 
make it so that a 16-year-old Bavarian has interests more closely related to a 60-year-old 
Bavarian than to a 16-year-old from the Northeast of Germany. 
Labor issues 
 Before getting to the particular case study, it is useful to take a broad look at labor 
issues in Germany within the context of generational issues.  The employment situation is 
part of the graying issue in Germany; graying causes a general aging of the workforce 
from fewer young workers entering the labor force as greater numbers of elderly exit and 
begin to draw social security from the state.  I have argued that labor issues could be a 
tougher test of gerontocracy than social security because they involve the immediate 
interests of all generations.  The next few sections will examine the generational “winners 
and losers” of labor policy in Germany to test the degree to which gerontocracy exists.   
 This section describes labor force participation by age and gender and general 
trends in labor policy over the last couple of decades.  Germany has been plagued by high 
unemployment over much of its recent history; in 2005 over 11 percent of the civilian 
labor force was unemployed ("OECD in Figures: 2006-2007 Edition" 2006, 36).  In 
general, females participate in the workforce to a much lesser degree than do males; on 
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average from 1995 to 2006, 58 percent of females were employed while 72 percent of 
males were (Eurostat 2006a).  The solution to high unemployment in advanced industrial 
states is often to encourage early retirement; pushing older workers out of the workforce 
theoretically creates space for younger workers to enter.  However, as graying intensifies 
unemployment cannot be solved by encouraging early retirement since retirement itself 
causes economic constraints by increasing the number of dependents relative to workers, 
and is especially a problem when those dependents receive generous benefits from the 
state. 
 Since our main concern is generational issues over labor policy it is important to 
understand the different labor force participation rates of various age cohorts in Germany.  
This should give a picture of the context in which generations view themselves in relation 
to each other and to the state.  A considerable part of Germany's unemployment is 
structural, due to mismatches in skills and caused by work disincentives in the social 
protection system, or frictional, caused by a lack of occupational or regional mobility 
("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 51).  The high unemployment and 
labor market disadvantage for low-skilled workers is the same for all age groups, but 
unemployment for medium- and high-skilled workers increases with age ("Ageing and 
Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 55).  The following chart demonstrates that 
unemployment for older workers was up to three percentage points higher than that for 
younger workers in the late 1990s, but has converged in recent years.  As later sections 
will demonstrate, convergence is in great part due to the major Hartz labor reform that 
changed regulations for unemployment.   
Table 2.6 – Employment and unemployment rates in Germany by age, 1998-2006 
Percentage of population (remainder is inactive) 
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 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un 
18-30 68 6.9 68 6.4 68 5.7 68 5.5 67 6.4 
31-49 79 7.5 80 6.8 81 6.0 81 6.1 81 6.9 
50-59 62 10 63 9.1 65 8.4 67 8.0 68 7.8 
 2003 2004 2005 2006  
 Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un  
18-30 67 6.4 62 8.7 62 10 64 9.0  
31-49 81 6.9 79 8.6 80 8.8 82 8.0  
50-59 68 7.8 68 9.5 70 10 71 9.4  
Source: ("The European Union Labour Force Survey" 2008) 
 Despite numerous reforms to get rid of early retirement incentives and increase 
labor force participation rates of older workers aged 50-64, the average age of exit from 
the labor force has increased only gradually since 2001, from 60.6 years of age in that 
year to 61.3 years in 2004 (Eurostat 2006a).  From surveys, we know that older persons 
in Germany prefer to have the choice whether to retire or work but in the absence of 
choice would prefer to retire rather than work, remuneration being equal.  There are both 
cultural and structural reasons for low labor force participation rates among older cohorts.  
There is an “early retirement culture that has become part of the German landscape since 
the late 1970s, and [is responsible for] the relatively low employment rate of older 
workers” ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 103).  But a culture of 
retirement is not sufficient to pay the bills—there must be policy mechanisms in place to 
provide pathways for exit.  Given that the effective retirement age is lower than the legal 
retirement age of 65, there are obviously many other ways for workers to exit the system 
besides traditional retirement.  Some of these are through specific programs, like those 
for disability and unemployment.  Since 1990, workers aged 58 to 60 have been taking 
“quasi-retirement” through the unemployment insurance system.  From 1990 to 1997, the 
unemployment rate for workers aged 55-59 increased to 16 percent for men and 19 
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percent for women; these numbers are much higher than unemployment rates for other 
segments of the population ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 63).  A 
significant number of older workers exit through disability schemes, though there are not 
enough data to tell how many of these are severe disabilities and how many are taking 
advantage of the system to retire—it is likely a mixture of both.  For older workers aged 
55-64, gender differences are still prevalent: men’s participation rates were around 16 
percent higher than women’s in 2006.  The average employment rate of older workers 
from 1995 to 2006 was 43.4 years but for the total working age population the 
employment rate was 65.1 percent.   
 Similar to recent increases in female labor force participation, however, 
participation rates for older workers have steadily increased over ten percentage points 
between 1995 and 2006 (Eurostat 2006a).  This increase can likely be attributed to 
policies designed to get rid of early retirement and bring older workers into the 
workforce, such as subsidies for employers who hire older workers.  Those out of the 
labor force who have not exited through one of these alternative schemes may just have a 
hard time finding employment.  Though many firms take advantage of early and pre-
retirement schemes to “restructure and rejuvenate their workforce,” the OECD found that 
most employers do not have disdain for older workers ("Ageing and Employment 
Policies: Germany" 2005, 103).  Perhaps these employers mainly use early retirement 
schemes to downsize their workforces as the economy changes and service industries 
predominate.  The OECD lists two additional structural reasons for low labor force 
participation among older cohorts: “they are over-represented in declining industries and 
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in manual occupations; and they have a lower level of educational attainment than 
younger generations” ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 11).  
Employment regulations 
 The following sections examine some recent German labor reforms with 
generational interests in mind.  As policies change frequently, it would be impossible to 
capture the most up-to-date reforms; thus, the list is not exhaustive and policies are 
intended primarily as examples to show that there are a variety of winners and losers.   
One thing to keep in mind is that in Germany, according to the OECD, the employment 
situation for older and younger workers is not zero-sum, with both groups competing 
over a fixed number of jobs.  Instead, it seems that trends for both move in tandem: when 
the employment situation is dire, it is dire for both groups, and likewise when 
employment prospects are improving ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 
2005, 155).  Thus, while it is useful to examine whether policies have clear generational 
benefits, it may be more likely that policies benefit groups not based on age, but rather 
based on either their skill set (skilled and unskilled) or employment status (employed and 
unemployed).  If young and old workers are substitutes for each other then they will 
compete in the workforce, and the old may lose since employers can be sure that they 
will retire soon.  If, however, young and old workers are complements because each 
generation possesses unique skills and experiences, then there will be little generational 
competition.  In general, it is more likely that young and old unskilled workers are 
substitutes, and the same for young and old skilled workers.  Still, there are some age 
effects that we can separate out.  For example, the youngest members of baby boom 
cohort are over 30 and most are concentrated in the ‘prime-age’ work group (25-49).  The 
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OECD says, “This has probably created some ‘generational crowding’ against older 
workers, whereby firms have opted to take on better-educated prime-age workers instead 
[of older workers]” ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 47).  But, 
characteristics of prime-age workers themselves are a barrier to entry for young workers 
as well.  Many politicians argue that it is important to try and keep baby boomers in the 
workforce as long as possible because subsequent generations are too small to support 
them.  They entered later because of education so it is reasonable to expect them to stay 
longer.  If baby boomers do stay in the workforce longer—and young and older workers 
are substitutes—they may crowd out younger generations looking for jobs.  Evidence to 
date that the OECD cites in arguing that there is little generational competition may be 
premature because workers have tended to exit the labor force before age 60.  As that 
norm changes—in part due to legislation—these tradeoffs could come to bear. 
Table 2.7 – Generational implications of recent employment policies 
Major Employment Policy Areas Generational Implications 
Full-time vs. Part-time work 
- Part-time: facilitates entry into 
workforce (Old-Age Part-time 
Employment Act) 
- Full-time: discourages entry into 
workforce 
 
- Benefits women with children and 
older workers transitioning to 
retirement 
Education benefits 
- Delays entry into workforce and 
provides students with skills 
 
 
- Benefits younger persons through 
increasing their skills; benefits 
older workers by delaying entry of 
younger cohorts 
 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
- Protection from dismissal 
(collective dismissal and 
termination procedures) 
- Lifetime vs. Fixed-term 
o Lifetime employment leads 
to a tighter labor market and 
makes it difficult for people 
 
- Supposed to benefit older workers 
but is actually a significant hiring 
barrier 
o Benefits older workers who 




to enter the workforce; 
employers are cautious in 
hiring 
o Fixed-term contracts mean 
more job opportunities are 
available at any given time 
unemployed, especially 
those entering the market 
for the first time 
o Benefits job-seekers in 
general 
Parental leave and child benefits 
- Lack of childcare facilities 
- Generous parental leave 
- Male-breadwinner system 
- Tax relief, not cash benefits  
- Women return to “comparable job” 
 
- Harms younger women  
- Only helps younger women if there 
is flexibility and there are options 
- Indeterminable  
- If part-time work is an option then 
skills will be up-to-date; if not then 
women may stay out of the 
workforce so long that they are 
unable to return 
Retirement regulations 
- Increase in retirement age from 65 
to 67 
 
- Hurts older workers because they 
have paid into the system with the 
expectation of retiring earlier 
Disability 
- Disability benefits  - Allows older workers to exit the 
workforce and keep benefits 
Pension rules 
- Benefits reduced by 3.6% for each 
year of early retirement 
 




- Hartz I –IV 
 
- Generous benefits used to help 
older workers exit the workforce 
- Bad for older workers   
 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
 Strict employment protections can harm both older and younger job seekers but in 
Germany especially disadvantage older groups. Employment Protection Legislation 
(EPL) is a broad category that encompasses a lot of the issues regarding hiring and firing 
practices.  Most EPL debates concern dismissal protection, including collective dismissal 
and termination procedures, and fixed-term contract legislation.  Dismissal protection can 
include protection at the termination of employment relationships, and judicial 
procedures at termination—protections for workers from dismissal is supposed to benefit 
 
 88 
older workers aged 50-64.  In reality is a barrier to hiring them.  EPL is a significant 
hiring barrier in Germany because employers may be afraid of the ramifications of future 
dismissal and so may not be willing to risk hiring a particular employee.  Younger and 
older workers are probably the most risky to hire because they may lack the experience—
in the case of younger workers—or skills—in the case of older workers—that prime age 
workers possess.  In a 2003 survey undertaken by the Institute of the German Economy, 
80% of the 859 employers interviewed said EPL was an employment barrier and 57% 
said that it has had a negative impact on their own hiring practices:   
In this survey, EPL is perceived as the key labour law-related obstacle, even if 
high non-wage labour costs and taxes are more prominent obstacles.  Almost nine 
in ten employers say that a dismissal process bears considerable financial risks for 
employers, and almost eight in ten believe that special protection for special 
groups will reduce hiring probabilities for those groups. ("Ageing and 
Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 118) 
 
Usually, the “groups” referenced above are older workers, aged 50-64 years.  These 
protection policies often ostensibly discriminate against youth and favor older workers, as 
when determining collective dismissal decisions they require employers to consider 
disability, job tenure, age, and the presence of dependents in a household.  However, both 
may be hurt by EPL.  According to the preceding quote, though older workers receive 
special protection in theory, in practice their special status prevents employers from 
hiring them.  Employers have a further disincentive to hire older workers given the 
“potential threat of reimbursement of unemployment benefits by employers in case of 
dismissal of those [older workers] who have a long-term employment relationship with 
the same employer (Erstattungspflicht)” ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 
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2005, 118).  Overall, the OECD assesses that strict EPL is likely to impede the hiring of 
older workers into new jobs. 
 Another side of EPL is fixed-term contract legislation, which “allows 
employment relationships of short duration and sets conditions for renewal of contracts 
and temporary agency work” ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 116). 
Under a lifetime employment system employees have a high measure of job security and 
typically spend their entire working career with one firm or agency.  Lifetime 
employment practices—whether legally mandated or just the norm—lead to a tighter 
labor market—fewer available jobs means that it is hard for those outside of the system to 
enter.  Youth are particularly harmed by lifetime employment because they will be 
entering the labor force for the first time.  Because employers will be more cautious in 
their hiring practices lifetime employment disadvantages all of those trying to enter the 
employment system, including older workers.  However, lifetime employment and full-
time employment are becoming less popular in Germany ("Ageing and Employment 
Policies: Germany" 2005, 64).  Instead, there is growing use of fixed-term contracts.  
With these new changes there is more frequent job turnover and so there are more job 
opportunities available at any one time.  This benefits those who are entering the labor 
market for the first time.  Older workers who may have skills limited to the one company 
they have been with for decades will be harmed as lifetime employment is phased out 
because they may not be competitive on the market.  Even though lifetime employment is 
falling out of use, an informal system of guaranteed employment may be functioning: 
“Job tenure is particularly high among older workers (55+), who are protected against 
dismissal after 10-15 years of service under most collective agreements” (Ebbinghaus 
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and Eichhorst 2006, 17).  There is no consensus that long job tenure for older workers 
prevents the entry of younger workers.   According to the OECD, “a stricter EPL will 
lower the re-employment potential for older unemployed, while it may increase the 
likelihood of employment retention for those in work” ("Ageing and Employment 
Policies: Germany" 2005, 116).  Thus, the elderly who are unemployed will be helped by 
stricter employment protection, while those who are employed will be helped.    
 Older workers may often be impeded from entering the workforce because of 
employers’ norms against hiring older persons and difficulty matching their often lower 
skills and education with the demands of the modern workforce.  To remedy this, the 
government has instituted several measures.  In August 2006, the German Bundestag 
adopted the General Act on Equal Treatment.  For the first time, legislation is now in 
place in Germany to prohibit discrimination on the basis of age.  According to Dr. Guido 
Klumpp, legal adviser to the German Federation of Senior Citizens’ Organizations, “As it 
stands, Germany's General Act on Equal Treatment goes beyond what is required by the 
EU directives. The German legislation covers discrimination on the basis of age in access 
to goods and services as well” (Loick 2006).  This legislation was partly a response to an 
EU mandate against age discrimination.  The EU directives make it illegal to discriminate 
against anyone because of their age in the workplace or in job or vocational training.  On 
the one hand these incentives to hire older workers seem to be a political victory for the 
aged, showcasing their power.  On the other hand, if there were truly gerontocracy in 
Germany it would not have taken so long for Germany to pass age discrimination laws—
the aged have been large and active enough for at least two decades.  Instead, only after 
the EU became active on the subject did Germany change.  Thus institutional 
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organization—in this case the ability for the EU to exert pressures from above—seems 
more important than the domestic political power of age cohorts.   
 Another measure tackled the exclusion of the old in a different way.  In 2003, 
legislators introduced wage subsidies for employers hiring older workers aged 50 and 
over; these benefits could be up to 50 percent of the wage for up to 3 years.  The same 
2003 legislation said that “unemployed jobseekers aged 50 and over who accept a lower-
paid job can receive a temporary wage guarantee - 50% of the difference between the 
owner and the previous wage, payable until the unemployment benefit entitlement 
expires” ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 13).  Though not a direct 
measure to combat discrimination, per se, this legislation was designed to encourage both 
employers to hire older workers and older people to seek employment. 
 Another important area of labor policy is retirement, which helps older workers 
exit the workforce.  One of the most interesting facets of retirement in Germany is its 
relative unimportance as a mechanism through which older persons exit the workforce.  
Despite public rhetoric arguing that an increase in retirement age is the solution to the 
employment issues surrounding population aging, the proportion of older persons who 
stay in the workforce until their legal retirement age is only a fraction of older persons. 
Early in the decade, only one in four German men retired at the statutory age of 65; the 
fraction of women who did so was higher, usually because of their delayed entry into the 
workforce in the first place, but was still only about 40 percent.  The remaining 75 
percent of men retired before age 65 through special early retirement schemes for the 
following reasons: up to 2005, of those retiring early, 40 percent took unemployment 
(usually at age 60); 40 percent took disability benefits; and 20 percent left on the grounds 
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of long-term insurance at age 63 ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 
72).  The government has been working to get rid of many of these special schemes for 
older persons, which will keep people in the workforce longer and delay when the 
German government has to start paying retirement benefits.  This works against the 
interests of older persons and demonstrates a political loss for them.   
 Germany implemented early retirement policies before most other OECD 
countries but started trying to reverse them even as early as 1992.  Similar reforms 
followed in 1999, 2001, and 2004.  The 1999 reform gradually increased (until 2016) 
early retirement age limits and introduced a gradual phasing out of some eligibility for 
early retirement, such as after long-term unemployment.  The 2001 reform introduced the 
multi-pillar pension system and other changes.  The 2004 reform made it so that pensions 
can be reviewed and adjusted annually based on demographic developments and labor 
force participation rates ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 13).  
Though originally the decision to increase the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 
years was postponed to until 2008, on March 30, 2007 legislators passed the bill to go 
ahead and raise the age.  Interestingly, and perhaps unfortunately for Germany, the new 
legislation raising the statutory retirement age does not really address any of these early 
retirement schemes, except that in a roundabout way it works to decrease unemployment 
by offering subsidies to employers who hire older workers.  A lot of these early 
retirement options were put in place in 1973 to “cushion rapidly rising unemployment 
and facilitate workforce restructuring” so the average retirement age dropped by about 
four years: for men it went from 62.2 years in 1973 to 58.4 years in 1981 ("Ageing and 
Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 73).  We are ultimately concerned with assessing 
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generational “winners” and “losers” of these major labor policy reforms to address the 
argument that Germany’s older cohorts have a lock on political power.  The retirement 
policy, however, complicates this mission because even though it does not actually raise 
the retirement age for those near retirement, and instead affects prime-age workers, it is 
perceived by Germany’s old to be a political loss.  This group has been the most vocal 
opponent of the reform even though basically unaffected.  Thus, the perception that it is a 
political loss for the old may be just as important as if it were actually a political loss.  
 Another incentive to leave the workforce is that people can receive pensions even 
before reaching age 65, though payments may be significantly smaller, as is the case in 
many other countries.  In Germany, the pension rate is reduced by 3.6 percent for each 
year of early retirement ("Country Note: Database on Social Expenditure 1980-2003, 
Germany" 2007, 4).  It is unclear the extent to which the old benefit from pension 
policies.  On the one hand, they benefit because they are able to exit early and receive 
benefits; on the other, they are penalized for doing so. 
 Disability coverage also mainly benefits older workers.  In 1999, 85% of all new 
disability benefit recipients in Germany were 45 years old or older ("Ageing and 
Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 94).  Disability benefits are another way of 
exiting the workforce at older ages without taking pensions and statutory retirement. 
Incidence of disability increases sharply with age: "11% of all workers aged 20-49 but 
more than 30% of those aged 50-64 report a health condition or disability due to which 
they are hampered in their daily activities" ("Ageing and Employment Policies: 
Germany" 2005, 107). 
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 The use of unemployment benefits is a relatively new phenomenon in Germany 
and is a legacy of reunification.  According to the OECD, “For men, the reunification of 
Germany has led to a pronounced shift of early retirement pathways; those leaving 
because of unemployment rose from 15% to 35% within only a few years” ("Ageing and 
Employment Policies: Germany" 2005, 72).  This is probably because of special pre-
retirement regulations for workers in the New Länder.   
 In addition to the retirement legislations, another incentive for exit from the 
workforce is the German old-age part-time employment act, for which persons aged 55 
and older that have been insured against unemployment for at least three years during the 
last five are eligible.  The purpose is supposedly to keep older persons in the workforce 
until the time they would normally receive a pension, thus benefiting workers who don’t 
want to work, and employers who don’t want them to, but in practice older persons can 
still exit early by working full time for half the period then not at all for the remainder of 
the period (their work time just has to average 50%).  This is still an effective way to get 
older persons out of the workforce but without speeding up the time the state has to pay 
out pensions and other retirement entitlements ("Ageing and Employment Policies: 
Germany" 2005, 92-3).  Thus, this is positive for both the state and older workers. 
 A 2003 legislation, mentioned earlier, that significantly benefits older workers 
through wage subsidies to employers who hire them and through temporary wage 
guarantees, does crack down on unemployment, though.  Starting in 2006, the maximum 
duration for receiving benefits will be reduced from 32 to 18 months.  After 
unemployment and social assistance merge, “the long-term unemployed will have to 
accept any job offer at the risk of losing their benefit” ("Ageing and Employment 
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Policies: Germany" 2005, 13).  In conclusion, Germany’s older cohorts have not clearly 
established a monopoly on political power in Germany because they have not been able 
to universally assure that labor reforms favor their interests.  However, they have been 
moderately successful in the policy areas noted previously.  The Hartz labor policies, 
described in the following section, paint a very different picture in which the old have 
seen recent significant political losses in the arena of labor policy, challenging those who 
argue that population aging in Germany has given the old a disproportionate share of 
political power. 
Germany’s Hartz reforms 
 Many times, labor policies only change in response to a substantial change in a 
state’s economic situation.  For Germany, the economic turmoil in the aftermath of 
reunification logically should have provided impetus for substantial reform.  In West 
Germany, unemployment was fairly low between the 1970s and early 1990s, but sharply 
spiked after reunification because of the huge increase in East Germans needing 
employment but having insufficient skills for the modern workforce—according to one 
estimate, reunification increased the labor force in Germany by a third (Jacobi and Kluve 
2006, 3).  The unemployment rate in West Germany in 1990 was 4.8 percent of the total 
labor force; by 1993, unified Germany’s total unemployment rate rose to 7.7 percent and 
continued to climb and stay high throughout the decade, often reaching above 9 percent, 
as in 1997 ("OECD Employment Outlook: Statistical Annex" 2005, 3).  Despite the poor 
economic situation after reunification, other than some expansions there were few 
substantive labor policy reforms until the Kohl government’s 1998 Employment 
Promotion Act (Dingeldey 2007, 829).  The body of reforms between late 1998 and 2001, 
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including the forum Alliance for Jobs, were characterized by a tripartite approach 
primarily by the social partners (such as unions) (Kemmerling and Bruttel 2006, 91) and 
did little to turn the labor market around.  Jun (2003, 78) attributes the failure of Alliance 
for Jobs to “conflicting strategies and a polarized atmosphere between employers and 
trade unions.” Jacobi and Kluve (2006, 25) argue that the measures themselves, not so 
much the process, was faulty:  
 German ALMP before Hartz was dominated by training and public job creation 
 measures. These measures were characterised by a long duration compared to 
 other countries. Especially in East Germany the extensive use of job creation 
 measures created a sheltered labour market of substantial magnitude. In contrast, 
 measures directly supporting integration into regular employment (e.g. wage 
 subsidies and start-up subsidies) were introduced relatively recently and played a 
 minor role before.   
 
Without effective policies high unemployment continued even after 1998, though it did 
fall below 8 percent in 1999, 2000, and 2001 ("OECD Employment Outlook: Statistical 
Annex" 2005, 3).  Women and older persons, in particular, continued to have very low 
participation rates in the labor market, as the Kohl reforms provided little incentive for 
them to work (and did little to sanction them from not working).   
 Throughout the 1990s, Jacobi and Kluve (2006, 6) say that “In both the political 
and academic debates the benefit system was criticised for creating adverse work 
incentives and increasing long-term unemployment, deteriorating skills and thus 
worsening the mismatch on the labour market.” Clearly, more ambitious reforms were 
needed to deal with the more disadvantaged groups, particularly women and older 
persons. 
 As the 2002 elections approached, the political context grew heated as Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder was increasingly called upon to account for Germany’s poor economic 
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situation, especially the continuing high unemployment, which many saw as evidence of 
Schröder’s failure during his first term in office, after taking power in 1998.  In addition 
to high unemployment, strained public budgets and tight EU regulations on expansive 
growth policies further increased pressure for labor market reforms.  Reforms had been 
stalled (in Germany they referred to this as “Reformstau,” or reform logjam) but Hinrichs 
(2007, 222) says that two events coincided in February 2002 that created institutional 
opportunities for reform to finally take shape.  The first was the dissolution of the 
Alliance for Jobs, mentioned previously, and the second was the scandal involving the 
federal employment office, which showed how the agency had falsified the figures on its 
job placement performance.  Certainly, factors such as the approaching war in Iraq 
affected the outcome of the election, helping Schröder to get elected despite high 
unemployment, but even the importance of this international development could not 
diminish the requirement for Schröder and his SPD team to deal with domestic labor 
issues.   
 The SPD’s solution was Agenda 2010, a package of reforms primarily aimed at 
mediating Germany’s poor economic situation, and named after the date that the Lisbon 
economic reforms mandated by the EU were due to be implemented.  Agenda 2010 was 
supposed to revamp Germany’s welfare state, including the pension and healthcare 
systems.  Irwin Collier (2004, 1) argues that the Schröder team had a two-prong strategy 
to deal with public outcry over unemployment.  One prong was to blame the continued 
labor market stagnation on a weak global economy.  The second prong was to appoint a 
commission to be staffed by prominent German businessmen, scholars, and politicians to 
develop a proposal for labor market reform.  This commission, begun in spring 2002, 
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came to be known as the Hartz Commission, led by and named after Peter Hartz, who at 
the time was a member of the board of Volkswagen and head of their personnel affairs.  
Other members of the Commission included a few scientists, representatives from the 
social partners, and some Länder and municipal-level politicians, totaling 15 members.  
Entrepreneurs and business consultants held prominent roles on the Commission 
(Eichhorst and Wintermann 2005, 9). 
 The Commission delivered its report in August 2002 and many from the media, 
the public, and the academy have recognized the major political shift the report signaled.  
Kemmerling and Bruttel (2006, 90) called it “one of the most ambitious German reform 
project[s] in social insurance policy since World War II;” Jacobi and Kluve (2006, 2) 
called the suggested reforms “the most far-reaching reform endeavor in the history of the 
German welfare state.”  The byproducts of the Commission were four laws, Hartz I-IV.  
The first two became effective on January 1, 2003 and the latter two became effective 
one and two years later, respectively.  Legislation for these four laws occurred between 
the end of 2002 and the end of 2003 and the laws were passed with approval of most of 
the parties, despite expected reservations.  Schröder wanted to implement the reforms 
without major compromises from anyone—the social partners, especially the unions, the 
opposition parties or even his own party—and remained stubborn on most issues.  
Eventually, the Christian Democrats agreed to the measures in the second chamber of 
Parliament and two-thirds of the modules recommended by the Hartz Commission were 
implemented, with varying degrees of modification.  The remaining third were dropped.  
The portion not implemented included a US-type bonus system in the unemployment 
insurance system for employers that have low dismissal rates; Parliament also decided 
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not to take away responsibilities from the state-level offices of employment (Kemmerling 
and Bruttel 2006, 91-2).  On the whole, the laws have been very unpopular; negative 
sentiment spilled over to Schröder, who was seen as reneging on his electoral promise not 
to cut social welfare spending.   
 The laws changed many aspects of labor policy.  A large portion of the reforms 
involved administrative changes; in particular they shifted the burden for financing 
benefits and finding employment for job seekers from the federal to the local level.  The 
non-administrative parts—those affecting individual unemployed and job seekers—were 
the more politically heated reforms, however.  Because these latter reforms activated the 
citizenry in protest, they will be the focus of this analysis, though the administrative 
reforms will be discussed in the context of East-West and Länder elections.  A 











Table 2.8 – Hartz reforms in Germany 




Hartz I (1/1/2003)  Implemented occupational training programs 
 Implemented subsistence payments on behalf of the 
employment agency 
 Facilitated new forms of employment for the elderly or 
temporary employment 
Hartz II (1/1/2003)  Instituted special programs for self-employment 
 Implemented Job-Centers, agencies to improve matching 
between unemployed persons and firms 
 Introduced Mini- and Midi-jobs, which are low-paid or part-
time employment that: 
o Are partially exempted from taxation and social security 
contributions 
o Operate under different rules than regular jobs 
Hartz III 
(1/1/2004) 




 Changed rules for entitlement to unemployment assistance and 
benefits 
 Changed administrative rules for unemployment 
 Changed the definition of unemployed 
Source: (Fahr and Sunde 2006, 1-2)  
 
As a package, the reforms reflected neoliberal moves towards deregulation of the labor 
market and reduced employment protection in some segments.   
 The reforms were designed around the idea of Fördern und Fordern, translated as 
promote and oblige, and in practice meaning both push and pull measures to decrease 
unemployment.  Jacobi and Kluve (2006) claim that the reforms had three major 
cornerstones.  The first was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the labor 
market, particularly by introducing market mechanisms in placement services.  Through a 
system of vouchers, job seekers were allowed to seek competitive placement services and 
thus could avoid being stuck with a service that was not working for them.  The laws also 
introduced a scientific evaluation mandate (this was groundbreaking as well).  The 
second cornerstone was to activate the unemployed.  On the pull side were the incentives 
to work; the Mini- and Midi-jobs were designed to make it easier for people to take some 
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sort of work rather than being one hundred percent unemployed by providing tax 
exemptions for some low paying jobs.  Jacobi and Kluve (2006, 12) say: 
 The reform introduced incentives to workers aged 50 and older to take up 
 employment even when it pays less than previous employment.  In these cases, 
 elderly workers may receive a wage subsidy, the so-called wage protection, when 
 they accept a job offer that pays less than their previous job.  The wage subsidy 
 amounts to 50% of the difference between the previous wage and the actual wage.  
 It is paid for the same duration as the unemployment benefit would have been 
 paid for if the person had remained unemployed.   
 
On the push side, the reforms made unemployment less attractive.  They reorganized the 
benefit system and put in place sanctions for not finding jobs.  Sanctions can now take a 
broader range: whereas before the reforms, sanctions were supposed to be a strict 12-
week withdrawal of payments, and thus were infrequently imposed, now they can be 
imposed for 3, 6, or 12 weeks and have now been used more often to activate jobseekers 
(Kemmerling and Bruttel 2006, 98).  Noncompliance is generally defined as a benefit 
recipient refusing to take a job—under Hartz IV there are very few jobs that the 
unemployed would not be required to take.  One major change has been a switch from 
benefits defined by the recipient’s last salary to a flat-rate, subsistence-level benefit of 
345 euros in the West and 331 euros in the East—in either case the benefit is lower than 
pre-Hartz levels.  Under the reforms, individuals are expected to be proactive and, under 
certain conditions, may even be required move to a different city to find work. 
 The third cornerstone of the reforms was to deregulate the labor market to create 
employment demand.  This included deregulating the temporary work sector, exempting 
fixed-term contracts, and exempting dismissal protection.  However, “the integration into 
paid employment may be supported by several forms of wage subsidies which are paid to 
employers when hiring a certain type of hard-to-place worker. The idea is to compensate 
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the firm for the presumably lower productivity of this type of worker” (Jacobi and Kluve 
2006, 11). 
The reforms made it so that Germans relied less on the state and more on the market.  
The administrative reforms decentralized the system by reducing the role of the federal 
government in unemployment administration and increasing the roles of the local 
governments.  They marketized the placement system, as mentioned above.  
Additionally, pull factors were supposed to “make work pay” for Germans, meaning that 
it should be more worthwhile to work than to receive social benefits.  The push factors 
discouraged—or made impossible—long-term reliance on state unemployment benefits 
and forced those of all ages to get jobs.  Interestingly, the SPD was the main sponsor of 
these reforms; this was a shift for the party, which, though growing somewhat centrist 
over time, had traditionally been a leftist party emphasizing social welfare.  After losing 
power in the 2005 elections, the SPD has again been turning to the left, even issuing a 
new manifesto (only one of three ever issued) that describes the party as a major 
proponent of social welfare. 
Generational “winners” and “losers” 
 The Hartz reforms were harsh on all unemployed persons but were 
disproportionately harsh on the old for three reasons.  First, not only were older cohorts a 
larger segment of the unemployed before Hartz, they were mostly long-term unemployed, 
and Hartz was particularly harsh on the long-term unemployed.  Long-term unemployed 
now have much stricter requirements, whereas short-term unemployed have not seen 
many changes.  Second, the flat-rate benefit had a disproportionate and negative effect on 
the old.  After Hartz IV, older workers who may have worked for 20 years and paid into 
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the tax system to support unemployed are now subject to the same regulations and benefit 
levels as those who have only worked one year (young workers) and who have not paid 
into the system for such a long time.  Thus, there was an element of generational 
injustice.  The older persons who paid in all those years could expect to get a generous 
unemployment benefit, should the need arise, but after Hartz IV they would receive a 
lower benefit and for only 18 months.  Finally, as mentioned above, 40 percent of males 
retiring early exited by taking unemployment benefits before Hartz.  The Hartz reforms 
took away these retirement mechanisms to encourage them to work longer. 
 Hinrichs (2007, 227) says that about three-fifths of those previously receiving 
unemployment benefits who had high earnings before becoming unemployed, those 
whose spouse or partner has a full-time job, or those who live alone were the main losers 
in the reforms, mainly because of the flat-rate benefit and strict housing allowances.  
Those who benefited from the reforms were single parents and those who had low 
benefits before the reforms.   
Table 2.9 – Employment rates in Germany by gender and age, 1998-2006 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Females 55.8 57.4 58.1 58.7 58.9 58.9 59.2 59.6 61.5 
Males 71.9 72.8 72.9 72.8 71.8 70.9 70.8 71.3 72.8 
Older workers* 37.7 37.8 37.6 37.9 38.9 39.9 41.8 45.4 48.4 
Older females 27.8 28.8 29.0 29.4 30.6 31.6 33.0 37.5 40.6 
Older males 47.2 46.8 46.4 46.5 47.3 48.2 50.7 53.5 56.4 
Legend:  * Older workers are those ages 50-64 
  Light gray: Hartz I & II effective 
  Medium gray: Hartz III effective 
  Dark gray: Hartz IV effective 
Source: ("The European Union Labour Force Survey " 2007) 
Political parties and the Hartz reforms 
 According to Poguntke (2005, 1022), public resistance to Hartz IV led to protests, 
mainly in East Germany, even though the majority of the population recognized the need 
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for some sort of unemployment reforms.  The consequences of SPD sponsorship of 
Agenda 2010 were large.  They lost badly in 2004 EU Parliamentary elections; lost in the 
2005 regional elections; and lost the 2005 federal elections, which Schröder called one 
year early.  I argue that after the 2002 elections, in which unemployment threatened to 
unseat the party, the SPD stepped away from its core values and instituted Hartz because 
of EU and domestic pressures from all age groups.  They lost power in 2005 anyway (to 
some extent because they stepped away from their values) but were politically tied 
between 2002 and 2005 because they would have lost if they hadn’t tried to remedy 
unemployment, and lost because they did try.  The SPD have been trying to reclaim their 
base since then but have thus far been unsuccessful.   
 Since the 2005 electoral loss, Kurt Beck, party chief of the SPD, has been pushing 
the party more towards its leftist, working-class roots, most recently calling for moves to 
extend the period of time workers over age 45 can receive unemployment benefits, which 
are normally capped after several months, forcing older unemployed persons to go on 
subsistence-level welfare ("German party push to reverse reform" 2007).  The SPD’s 
structure and membership were also hurt by their stance.  According to Hinrichs (2007, 
228-9) “the labour market reforms alienated the traditional allies, the labour unions and 
the Social Democrats.  Some unions, or at least, strong internal factions openly 
sympathise with the party Die Linke.”  Schröder threatened to resign but because there 
was no obvious successor he received the support he needed from both the SPD and their 
coalition partner, The Greens, and the reforms were passed.  About 100,000 SPD party 
members left, however, and formed a new party, the WASG (Wahlalternative Arbeit und 
Soziale Gerechtigkeit).  These former members felt the party was moving away from its 
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core social welfare principles.  The party ran in 2005 in North Rhine-Westphalia and got 
2.2 percent of the vote.  They have since merged with PDS to form The Left, and as 
mentioned, were very successful in the most recent federal election.   
 Because the reforms, especially Hartz IV, were widely unpopular, parties that 
supported them have been hurt in elections but parties that took a stance against them 
have greatly benefited.  PDS was the only Agenda 2010 opponent at the national level, 
though some local PDS politicians still implemented the reforms.   In the 2005 elections, 
the The Left probably performed so well because of their campaign to get rid of Hartz IV. 
The Left’s webpage has the slogan: “Hartz I-IV muss weg!” or “Hartz I-IV must go!”   
The Left now has a very specific agenda to get rid of the Hartz reforms, saying that the 
Hartz reforms are “poverty by law” (Hartz IV Positionen und Forderungen).  They want 
to take the money earmarked for Hartz IV, housing, and 1-euro jobs, and disperse it as 
better wages for better jobs.  They also call for an immediate rise in Hartz benefits to 420 
euros per month and think they can create more jobs by having everyone one work 
shorter hours.  So, instead of having a few employees work long hours or overtime, there 
could be more employees working shorter hours (Hartz IV Positionen und Forderungen).  
In 2008 The Left party entered three important West German regional parliaments for the 
first time and in early March, Beck announced that the SPD should align with The Left to 
curb and at the same time take advantage of their rise.  This is monumental since The 
Left, as the former communist party, had been ostracized as a coalition partner for their 
whole history.  Their growing support is also uncharacteristic. 
Table 2.10 – Percent change in electoral support by age between 2002 and 2005 federal 
elections 
AGE SPD CDU/CSU GREENS FDP LEFT 
18-25 -1.2 -5.6 -0.3 +0.9 +4.1 
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25-35 -4.4 -3.7 -1.0 +3.3 +4.1 
35-45 -5.2 -2.4 -1.1 +2.7 +4.8 
45-60 -4.4 -4.4 -0.1 +2.3 +6.4 
60+ -4.4 -2.7 -0.1 +3.0 +3.6 
Total -4.3 -4.3 -0.5 +1.4 +4.7 
Source: ("Statistical Yearbook 2006 for the Federal Republic of Germany" 2006, 103) 
 
 Comparing across elections in the preceding table shows that the two major 
parties—the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats—fell out of favor with voters 
of all ages between 2002 and 2005.  The Greens also lost a little support (about a 
percentage point) among all ages, while the FDP gained a few percentage points among 
all ages.  The Left, however, were clearly the big electoral winners between 2002 and 
2005, gaining significantly among all age groups.  The Left nearly doubled their 
percentage of votes for all age groups, and had the biggest gains among those aged 45 to 
60 years, 6.4 percentage points.  Likely, The Left benefited not only from their own 
stances but also from the electorate’s disappointment with the biggest parties.  The 
party’s stances on old age and on unemployment (the Hartz IV labor reform in particular) 
likely in large part drove this electoral gain.  As explained previously, it is important to 
put patterns of voter support in context and figure out what issues are important to 
Germans.  We know that Germans of all ages view unemployment as the number one 
issue facing Germany and it is possible that the majority of Germans based their votes in 
2002 and 2005 on a party’s stance on labor and unemployment, and in the 2005 elections 
this was a highly contentious issue, as we will see.  The outcome of the 2002 election 
seems to have been decided by Schröder’s successful populist campaign and his ability to 
detract from Germany’s poor unemployment situation by focusing on Iraq.  
Unemployment was certainly the central issue in 2002, as in 2005, but voters in 2002 
 
 107 
were willing to give Schröder another shot.  Graying issues did not figure prominently in 
either election.   
 Interest groups have not yet shown the kind of policymaking power in Germany 
as they have in the United States.  With regard to the Hartz reforms one scholar says, “In 
the tight schedule of the run-up to the elections, the government committed itself credibly 
to a comprehensive implementation of the Hartz proposals, thus attempting to bind hands 
through “government by commission”, leaving little room for interest group intervention, 
in particular trade union opposition (Dyson 2005)” (Eichhorst and Wintermann 2005, 
13).  Since the trade unions were basically excluded from the Hartz policy negotiations, 
they are excluded here as well.  As the sections on labor policy and the Hartz reforms 
have shown, the old have often been the political “losers” of labor policy, despite their 
relatively large size and their political involvement.  Studies that warn of gerontocracy by 
only examining social security and pensions leave out employment and the range of labor 
policies, including retirement.  Population aging is likely a driver of higher retirement 
ages and efforts to increase the labor force participation of older people in Germany 
because their ranks and growing and current social welfare promises are generous.  The 
EU, which recognizes population aging, also puts pressure on its member states—
including Germany—to institute such reforms.  Some political parties, especially the 
SPD, have suffered as a result of their efforts to decrease unemployment but others, 
namely The Left, have gained from opposing the reforms.   
Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that in Germany, unemployment is such an important 
issue to the population that it has covered the effects of aging so far.  While 
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unemployment is related to aging because workers support the social welfare system, 
which favors the aged, and population aging is shifting the number and age of workers, 
there is little evidence that the public has responded to the issue of unemployment along 
generational lines.  Rather, East-West differences in the economy and citizens’ values are 
still salient.  The Left are more popular in the East probably because of their stance on 
social welfare and their emphasis on communal responsibility, rather than individual 
responsibility.  This stance likely resonates with those reared under the Communist 
system.  But, surveys also showed that a significant number of Germans in the East and 
West voted for The Left out of protest against the ruling parties, who happen to be the 
ones that shepherded the Hartz reforms.   
 In Germany, the political party system is important for creating conditions for 
aging politics to instigate generational rivalry.  The multiparty system allows parties to 
polarize, as opposed to a less competitive system in which parties appeal broadly.  Parties 
in Germany are targeting different generations, but the generations are not necessarily 
voting in response to party platforms.   The latter sections on labor policy showed that the 
old seem to be falling out of favor politically in this arena, actually due to the major 
changes demographic age structure is bringing.  The retirement age is rising, pensions are 
becoming more austere, and unemployment schemes are disadvantaging older workers. 
 I have argued that labor policy is an important test of the argument that population 
aging will lead to gerontocracy because studies that examine only pensions do not 
capture the range of interests of the young.  As Claudius Seidl relates of Germany: 
Here in my department, I have a few really young journalists and colleagues and 
they tell me, ‘Please stop going on about generational equity! I’m going to have to 
yawn in a moment, it is so unbelievably boring.’ When I then say, ‘Listen here, 
young man, you are 30! Just think how many people’s pensions you will have to 
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finance...’ then their answer is, ‘Let’s not talk about pensions, I’m 30.’” (Sommer-
Guist 2006)   
 
Labor policies, though, involve all generations and labor is an important issue in 
Germany.  This review shows that different generations benefit from different aspects of 
labor policy but that the old frequently lose.  Thus, there is little evidence of gerontocracy 
in Germany. 
 In the future, it is possible that generational conflicts could arise, but not likely. 
As Elisabeth Niejahr, the author mentioned in the introduction, says: “There is a great 
deal of talk about the generational conflicts of the future. I believe that the great social 
conflicts of the future are more likely to occur within generations than between 
generations because both old people and young people will be ever less uniform groups” 
(Sommer-Guist 2006).  One division is regional.  Germany’s federal organization 
crystallizes and formalizes regional identities, giving them prominence in policymaking.  
Thus, even when the generations who grew up under divided Germany pass on, these 
formal institutions will remain.  A wildcard, however, would be if Germany’s political 
institutions change.  While federalism and the multiparty system create opposing forces 
for age-based interests to arise, interest groups could facilitate age-related identities.  
Interest groups have not yet become influential in these issues to the extent of groups in 
other states such as the US.  As Scarrow (2002, 97) says, “While single-issue associations 
continue to be effective in bringing national, and particularly local, issues to public 
attention, as a whole the citizens’ initiatives remain too loosely organized to supersede 
parties in their roles as interest aggregators or policy-makers.”  In theory, interest groups 
could be important in representing citizens’ interests since German party membership is 
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small—3-5 percent of the electorate—and is unrepresentative of the general population.  
However, Elisabeth Niejahr makes a funny assertion: “I do not think we will see a large 
organisation of this kind concerned with the issue of ageing because it is not attractive to 
admit you belong to the target group. It is attractive to say I am environmentally 
conscious, I demonstrate against nuclear power stations or I recycle rubbish, but it is not 
attractive to say I am old” (Sommer-Guist 2006).  If other Germans share her sentiment 
then Germany will not likely see the rise of powerful US-like age-based interest groups.  
As the SPD say, “though parties are increasingly in competition for influence with other 
social actors, they will remain important because they are the sole vehicle through which 
legislation is enacted” ("Social Democracy in the 21st Century: "The Bremen Draft" of a 




Chapter 3: The Politics of Population Aging in Italy 
Introduction 
 Much as in Germany, all signs in Italy point to a context ripe for generational 
conflict.  More than forty percent of tax revenue is spent on supporting retired Italians 
and it is clear when looking at the age distribution in Italy that spending on the older 
generations will only grow larger as older cohorts are rapidly entering retirement.  
Additionally, Italian youth have high rates of unemployment and have had difficulties 
getting established in the labor market.  But though the context is set for conflict, how 
have age issues played out politically?  For a study asking if population aging leads to the 
politics of aging, Italy can present a puzzle.  Doomsayers argue that population aging 
leads to increasingly generous benefits to the elderly and a neglect of youth.  What is 
puzzling is that in Italy during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when fertility was above 
replacement and population aging was not on the radar, Italy instituted one of the world’s 
most generous pension reforms while making almost no social provisions for families or 
youth.  As the population has grown older, however, Italian governments have begun to 
institute reforms to raise the retirement age, limit benefits to the old, and reduce pension 
payouts, all while trying to offer greater support to the family and employ youth.   
 Institutions matter for whether conflict erupts because they channel interests of 
the population into policy.  Italy’s party system has been rapidly and frequently changing, 
especially since electoral reforms of the early 1990s.  Italy has a fragmented multiparty 
system, with increasingly bipolar coalitions.  Though we would expect to see that the 
multiparty system facilitates age-based politics, only some parties choose to target 
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generational interests.  Those that do tend to focus on families, rather than the aged.  
Coalitions greatly complicate the issue.  Rather than functioning like a two-party system, 
where parties try to appeal to the broadest segments of the population in order to garner 
the largest numbers of votes, coalitions tend to act like the major coalition partner—their 
platforms mimic those of the biggest party and its major personality.  While a unitary 
state structure could function to foster the emergence of age-based interests because it 
makes non-geographic identities, such as race, ethnicity, and age, salient, Italy’s political 
culture of strong regional identities and moves toward decentralization mimic the effects 
of a federal structure.   
 Finally, even though Italian youth have faced much higher unemployment than 
older workers, regional differences are even greater than those between young and older 
workers, with Southern youth the most disadvantaged and Northern older workers having 
the lowest unemployment rates.  Alone, these numbers would lead us to think that Italy 
fits the profile of a gerontocracy.  However, most of the most major labor reforms over 
the last decade have focused on improving the situation of Italian youth, so even if their 
effects have not yet been felt by all, the intention to help is there.  Even as Italy’s 
population has aged, youth have been the main targets of recent labor reforms. 
The context for generational conflict in Italy 
 When you take demographic structure and government spending as starting points 
for an analysis of population aging, the situation in Italy looks bleak.  The combination of 
Italy’s rapid population aging and its historically generous old-age benefits have created 
conditions conducive to generational conflict.  We begin our exploration of Italy by 
describing how these two traits came about to better understand the context within which 
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policymaking over age-related issues is taking place.  Though Italy joins Germany and 
Japan as one of the world’s oldest countries, three aspects of Italy’s demographic 
situation are unique and particularly relevant to understanding how political power might 
be unevenly distributed between young and old: the rapidity with which its fertility rate 
fell, its dynamics of late marriage, and its regional variations.  Between the periods 1970-
75 and 1985-90 Italy’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell by almost a “whole child,” from 2.33 
children per woman to 1.35, and in 2005 the TFR was 1.29 ("World Population 
Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007).  





































































Source: ("World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007) 
 
As can be expected, because of the speed with which Italy’s fertility rate fell the 
population is aging rapidly.  Italy’s median age went from 35 years in 1985 to 42 years 
just twenty years later.  By 2025 the UN projects that Italy’s median age will be 49 years, 
if fertility stays at current levels.  The below chart demonstrates the major shifts in age 
structure of Italy’s population.  The innermost ring represents the population in 1975; the 
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middle ring 2000; and the outer ring is the projection for 2025.  We see that the working-
age population grew between 1975-2000 because cohorts of those ages were born when 
fertility was higher—they are therefore larger.  However, between 2000-2025 there are 
fewer young people aging into this category and large numbers of older people moving 
into retirement, so that by 2025 the workforce will have contracted to just 55 percent of 
the population.  The proportion of youth is halved over this period, while the proportion 
aged 60 and over doubles.  More important for our purposes, though, is the difference in 
the proportions of young and old already present: even in 2000 youth aged 0-14 were 
only 14 percent of the population while those aged 60 and over were 24 percent.  It is in 
large part due to this imbalance that many worry about the political power of the old at 
the expense of the young. 














Source: ("World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007) 
 One of the questions of this study is: Who has the agenda-setting power in aged 
societies?  To answer this, we have to think broadly about institutions and the population 
structure, but we also have to think about societal trends that may empower or 
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disenfranchise one generation or another.  One of the key aspects of Italy’s population is 
something demographers often refer to as “postponement in the passage to adult life,” 
meaning an increase in the age at which young adults move out of their parents’ 
households, marry, and have children.  As of the late-1990s, 81 percent of 20-30-year old 
unemployed Italian youth lived with their parents (Esping-Andersen 1999, 69).  In 2005 
the mean age at first wedding was 32.6 years for men and 29.8 years for women, and this 
was about 2 years higher than in 1999 (Kertzer et al. 2008, 8).  It is counterintuitive that a 
country with such a strong Catholic heritage, a tradition that eschews birth control, would 
have such a low fertility rate, yet this is the case for many religiously conservative states 
throughout Europe.  The countries with the lowest fertility, such as Poland, Spain, 
Greece, and Italy, show a strong commitment to “the traditional forms of family 
formation, with relatively low divorce, non-marital cohabitation, and illegitimacy rates, 
and in the propensity of adult children to remain in their parental household until 
marriage and to live very close to them thereafter (McDonald 2001)” (Kertzer et al. 2008, 
3).  Countries in Europe with less of a stigma attached to out-of-wedlock births actually 
have much higher overall fertility rates.  Because out-of-wedlock births are relatively rare 
in Italy (compared with Scandinavia, for example), under 19 percent in 2006, the age at 
which women are having children is higher, and this has implications for fecundity (the 
ability to bear children), which declines with age.  The mean age at childbearing was 
almost 31 years in 2005.  Thus, the pattern of adult children staying at home has 
negatively affected Italy’s birth rate, but it also has generational implications relevant for 
this study.  As anyone who has moved through the stages of getting their first home, 
getting married, and having children knows, there is little ability to set the agenda when 
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you are young and dependent on your parents.  The Italian state has been very concerned 
with the connection between these societal trends and the lack of opportunities for young 
people, which are mutually reinforcing.  As this chapter moves to a discussion of 
contemporary labor politics the context of passage from youth to adulthood will be an 
important consideration. 
 Finally, there are clear regional differences in Italy, as well.  In parts of Northern 
Italy, replacement fertility began as early as the 1910 birth cohort, while fertility 
remained above 2.1 in some southern regions as late as the early 1980s (Kertzer et al. 
2008, 4).  Most of Italy’s major falls in fertility in the last two decades of the 20th 
century, then, were from the Southern regions finally experiencing declines.  And though 
they have mostly converged, regional differences still persist, partly due to gender norms.  
For example, as will be discussed in more detail below, female labor force participation is 
twice as high in Northern Italy than in the South.  As Kertzer, et al (2008, 5) say, “There 
is consistent empirical evidence that egalitarian gender norms and spousal (female) 
autonomy are stronger in the North (Sabbadini 1999, tab. 6.3), where also premarital 
cohabitation rates and divorce rates are notably higher (Sabbadini 1999, tab. 4.7; Barbagli 
1990).”  There is still significant internal migration from the Southern regions to the rest 
of Italy, mostly for economic reasons.  There are also some regional differences with 
regard to age structure.  Northern and Central Italy have much lower proportions of 
children and young adults than do Southern regions.  In the North, those aged 0-29 
comprise around 28 percent of those regions’ populations, whereas in the South and the 
Islands children and youth make up 35 percent of the population.  Those aged 50 and up 
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are around 40 percent of the North’s population, but only 35 percent of the South’s 
(ISTAT 2008a). 
 In a population with high proportions of elderly dependents and few workers the 
state will have difficulty funding generous social benefits to the elderly, and without 
policy changes systems that are skewed towards providing for the old face bankruptcy—
this is one instance where alarmism over aging is probably justified.  In Italy, as in 
Germany, a significant portion of the public budget is spent on social welfare.  Spending 
on both the youth and aged has increased since 1991, though in 2002 and 2003 spending 
on youth as both a percentage of all government spending and a percentage of GDP 
declined, while that on the elderly has continued to increase.  The Italian state spends a 
significantly greater proportion of its budget on the aged than on youth and families, to an 
even greater degree (1-2 percentage points of GDP more in the case of the aged and less 
in the case of youth) than in Germany.  Part of this generational discrepancy is because 
the Italian state spends little on family-related programs, relying on the actual family for 
childcare and support, and part of the imbalance comes from the fact that the Italian 
pension system is particularly expensive.  The level of public spending on pensions in 
Italy is one of the highest in the OECD ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Italy" 2005).  
Finally, unemployment programs take up less of Italy’s government spending than they 
do in Germany, possibly because the family is again used as a social support net, rather 
than the state.  
 As in the previous chapter, the following table lists spending three ways: per 
person, at current prices and current purchasing power parities (PPPH) in current US 
dollars; as a percentage of gross domestic product (PCT_GDP); and as a percentage of 
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total general government expenditure (PCT_GOV).  The category of old age spending 
includes pensions and retirement (OECD category OLD AGE); survivor benefits for 
widows and widowers; and disability measures, including incapacity-related benefits and 
employment measures for the disabled.  The category of youth includes all family 
benefits, as categorized by the OECD, and youth-related Active Labor Market Programs 
(ALMPs): those specific to youth, measures for disadvantaged youth, and apprentice 
allowances.  Because labor policy is central to this study, data on unemployment (minus 
early retirement for labor market reasons) are shown at the bottom of the chart for 
reference.  
 As in the case of Germany, social expenditure patterns in Italy set the context for 
generational tension to arise.  Older persons receive a disproportionate share of 
government spending and their ranks are rising, meaning that if policies do not 
dramatically change they will be using even more of the government’s resources.  
Spending on the aged (which is mostly their benefits) is about 33 percent of all 
government spending, whereas spending on youth, including family benefits and youth-




Table 3.1 – Social expenditure in Italy (in millions) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 




























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ("The Social Expenditure Database" 2007) 
* Minus early retirement for labor market reasons.
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Characteristics of Italian institutions 
 Though the context for generational tension is set in Italy, this study argues that 
the particularity of Italy’s institutions matter for whether the politics of aging erupts.  
This section describes the institutional setting in Italy and the ways in which various 
actors, particularly political parties and voters, navigate these institutions.  Two important 
institutions in Italy are its fragmented multiparty system, with increasingly bipolar 
coalitions, and its decentralizing state structure.   Political science research tells us that 
we should expect that Italy’s multiparty system, which rewards parties for even small 
numbers of votes, will encourage parties to make appeals to specific interests, such as 
those based on age.  However, scholars of Italian politics have noted that the movement 
towards two broad center-left and center-right coalitions functions in a way like a two-
party system, and so we should expect to see these coalitions make broad appeals to 
attract the greatest number of voters possible—there are two dynamics within the party 
system.  If Italy’s state organization were completely centralized we should expect it to 
foster the emergence of age-based factions that focus on policymaking in Rome; but, 
since Italy is moving away from this model we should see a greater focus on regional 
policies that discourage the banding together of cross-border age-based factions.   
 To explore the validity of these hypotheses, this chapter begins by describing the 
process of state formation in Italy and the ways the history of regionalism has affected 
the decentralization of the state and the politics of aging.  It then moves to a discussion of 
the chaotic nature of Italian party politics.  I find that in Italy, the ability for small parties 
to gain seats by appealing to niche interests encourages age-based politics, while the 
reliance on two large coalitions encourages broad appeals that transcend age.  The strong 
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regional identities in Italy and moves to legitimize them through decentralization work 
against the creation of cross-border age-based identities. 
Scholars of the historical-cultural approach often argue that the diversity of the Italian 
state from its inception facilitated the fragmentary nature of today’s party politics—there 
were no unifying ideologies or cultures and, as only about two percent of the population 
could vote, representation and the people’s sense of connectedness to the government 
were limited (Newell 2000, 46).  Italy’s government was centralized in 1861 for the first 
time since the fall of the Roman Empire, uniting a diverse peninsula with regional 
languages and regional interests that still prevail.  Italy is politically divided into twenty 
regions, and these are often informally grouped into three larger regions: Northern, 
Central, and Southern Italy.  These regions continue to have distinct identities, dialects, 
and interests that carry over into their political identities. 
Table 3.2 – Regions of Italy 
North Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trenito-Alto Adige, 
Friuli-Benezia Giulia, Vento, Emilia-Romagna 
Central Toscana, Lazio, Umbria, Marche 
South Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia, 
Sardegna 
 
Many scholars argue that because Italian unification was top-down, it was tenuous.  Even 
after unification North-South differences—which remain salient—were expressed 
through a two-party system in which the right was prominent in the North and the left in 
the South (Amoretti 2002, 130).  Fascism suppressed regionalism, but this was only 
temporary.  After the end of fascism and the German occupation, an ideological struggle 
between Western and Soviet forces replaced the regional North-South pressures, though 
the latter remained latent and, as we will see, cropped up after the fall of communism in 
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1989.  During the post-War years, though, the forces of the Catholic Church and 
communism provided ideological umbrellas under which Italy’s diverse interests united, 
stabilizing the political system until the 1990s (with some cracks in the structure in the 
1970s).  But, both scholars and Italian citizens argued, the government was weak 
(Donovan 2003).  Perhaps this weakness was the impetus for the series of political 
changes and crises that have since unseated the ideological model of the Church and 
communism and in some ways have left a vacuum filled by diverse and fleeting parties.  
Change in Italy’s government has been rapid and frequent over the last few decades.  
These changes have led most to characterize the Italian state as fractured, chaotic, and 
corrupt.  These characteristics, along with other more formal institutional traits, influence 
the politics of aging in Italy, in ways that we will develop throughout the chapter. 
 As in Germany there are opposing pressures for the emergence of age-based 
interests in Italy.  On the one hand, Italy’s cultural legacy of diverse, regional interests 
should prevent unified age-based interests from forming.10  On the other hand, Italy’s 
unique party politics itself creates opposing pressures for aging politics.  The new 
electoral system facilitates the formation of age-based interests because it rewards parties 
for even small numbers of votes and encourages them to differentiate their platforms, 
appealing to narrow interests.  These interests can then get represented in the ruling 
government because of the importance of coalitions—another key institutional factor.  As 
Floridia (2007, 4) says, “the minor political forces are structurally advantaged in so far as 
they may deliberately choose to turn to an electoral market niche and they may be 
rewarded exactly because those ‘scattered’ votes are not at all ‘wasted.’”  He states: 
                                                 
10 At the same time I acknowledge that political identities can always be created. 
 
 123 
 Such an electoral system, certainly, renders the electoral competition highly 
 contestable and decidable, producing an extreme polarization of the electoral race 
 and strongly divisive issue campaigning, but at the same time it facilitates, 
 without any limits, the entry of any small force in the electoral arena and offering 
 them great opportunities to build and reinforce comfortable and advantageous 
 niches. (4)  
 
We might, then, expect that Italy’s center-Left and center-Right coalitions has created a 
defacto bipolar party system that leads coalitions to try and appeal to the broadest 
electorate possible for support.  However, these two coalitions tend to take on the 
characteristics of their dominant party, rather then behaving as independent coalitions.  
Thus, some parties and coalitions make broad appeals while others cater more to niche 
age interests.  
Italian regionalism 
 In Germany, East-West differences remain salient and have leverage through the 
federal organization of the state.  In the previous chapter I argued that German federalism 
was an impediment to the emergence of age-based identities because it privileged local 
politics.  Italy has a mostly unitary organization but its strong regional identities function 
to suppress the emergence of age based politics in much the same way as a federal 
organization.  And, in fact, it is these strong regional movements that are driving Italy 
toward decentralization and a potential federal organization.  Italy’s regional identities, 
like a federal structure, are an impediment to age-based politics, since in order to align 
along age lines the latter requires unifying age groups across regions and subsuming 
regional politics in favor of national-level, age-specific issues.  To qualify, though, 
formal decentralization is limited, and the varying success of the regional Northern 
League over time demonstrates that federalization has not been a linear process in Italy.  
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Several aspects of Italy’s regionalism and decentralization are relevant for this review of 
the politics of aging.  First, historical cultural divisions have set the stage for 
contemporary regional differences and distinct identities.  Second, the growth and 
success of regional parties have begun to crystallize those identities and formalize them 
by pushing for decentralization—in these parties regional issues, not age issues, are key.  
Finally, the major differences in support for parties by region—much greater than those 
by age—demonstrate that regional identities are stronger than cross-regional age-based 
identities.  This section explores these aspects of Italy’s regionalism. 
 The historical regional divisions in Italy still linger in contemporary politics.  As 
with the original unification of Italy in 1861, the government that was established in the 
late 1940s tried to subsume sub-national identities—the new constitution spread power 
widely, but horizontally, rather than vertically.  It set up a unitary rather than federal 
system.  The main parties in those post-War years were the Christian Democrats (DC), 
affiliated with the Catholic ideology, and the communists (PCI).  Though these two 
parties were key during this era, it was the DC that held governmental power; the PCI 
was the opposition party.  During this time both the unitary structure of the state and the 
nature of party politics in Italy, with two, ideologically-based parties, subsumed regional 
interests.  The stability these two ideological umbrellas provided started to slip in the 
1960s, when they reversed their views on centralization.  The DC had always favored 
decentralization, but the communists, because they had the goals of social and economic 
equality, needed a strong central state to carry out their mandate.  But starting in the 
1960s, “the PCI was so frustrated by its continued exclusion from every new government 
formed in Rome that it looked to regionalism as its best hope of being able to take control 
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of some administration, somewhere.  The DC, fearing precisely that prospect, had turned 
centralist in response” (Amoretti 2002, 133).  Formally, though, despite murmurings of 
decentralization and even cracks in the DC-PCI stronghold, as late as 1976 the DC and 
PCI still won 73 percent of the vote, demonstrating that power was still strong at the 
center (Amoretti 2002, 134).   
 Parliament passed modest decentralization legislation in the 1970s, but the 
reforms established more of a patronage system than anything and kept regionalism at 
bay.  In the early 1970s weak regional governments were created but, because ideology 
did not resonate at the local level, locally these governments actually began to undermine 
the leading parties, the DC and PCI.  Little changed at the national level (Amoretti 2002, 
133-4).  After 1976 the first of many changes occurred that began to crystallize regional 
identities and make regional issues important (rather than issues that unite age groups).  
New parties began to win and regional movements gained support, especially in the more 
prosperous North, whose citizens began to resent that their high taxes went to support the 
economically lagging South, with whom they felt little affinity; these grievances still 
echo in today’s party politics.  Economic issues became more salient in the North than 
ideological issues and regionalism began to break through the post-War party system.  
The Venetian League (LV) was the first northern movement to show promise in the 1983 
elections and the Lombard League (LL) soon followed suit.  In 1989 several of these 
movements joined with the LL to form the Northern League (LN) (Amoretti 2002, 134).  
As new interests were taking shape in the North but were still in infancy, the region was 
especially fractured during 1992-4 so national governments during this time period were 
Southern-based (Amoretti 2002, 135).  Though the LN used economic, rather than 
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cultural or ideological, appeals to voters in its early days, they also had populist 
attraction, due in large part to charismatic leader Umberto Bossi, who helped unite the 
LN and propel them to success in the 1996 general elections.  In the early 1990s support 
for the Northern League grew because voters bought into the idea that there was too 
much crime and wasteful public expenditures in the South and that Northern tax money 
went to the South (Newell 2000, 23).  Depending on the political tenor—and what they 
stand to gain or lose—the Northern League has at times insisted upon secession for 
Northern Italy, a region they refer to as Padania (named after the Latin term for the Po 
River).  At different points in its history, the full name of the League has been various 
forms of “The Northern League for the Independence of Padania.”  Their official 
platform reflects a desire for Scotland-like devolution.  I have argued that federalism 
elevates the importance of local politics and hinders the emergence of national age-based 
interests.  The platform of the Northern League supports this argument, as they say, “The 
movement founded by Umberto Bossi does not interpret the political struggle as a clash 
between social classes or categories, but as a conflict between centralist States and the 
people who claim their right to self-determination and freedom” (Lega Nord Seveso 
2008).  The LN is popular in small villages and towns and among the self-employed 
(Hellman 2002).  Their leader, Umberto Bossi, remains a powerful part of the Center-
Right and the LN shows no signs of disappearing.  
 It is in large part due to the success of Northern-based parties that Italy has been 
decentralizing.  Whenever they have been part of the ruling center-right coalition they 
push for federalism.  Yet until an October 2001 referendum Italy was still highly 
centralized.  What went before the people was originally a center-left package that did 
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not have enough parliamentary support to pass without referendum because the North and 
other center-right parties did not think the package went far enough to devolve power 
from the central authorities.  When change finally did come, it was from the people by 
popular referendum, rather than top-down.  Though voter turnout was low, to some extent 
the outcome demonstrates that regional identities are fairly strong at the individual level 
among the majority of voters.  In a 2001 survey, the majority of people of all ages 
thought more autonomy should be given to the regions; though it was more so in the 
North, this sentiment held true for all regions of Italy (Caciagli and Corbetta 2001).  The 
reforms granted some residual powers to Italy’s 20 regions.  The package: 
 devolves powers and responsibilities to the lowest feasible level of government, 
 encourages officials to involve citizens in public affairs, gives regions a nominal 
 and still somewhat hazily defined ‘fiscal autonomy,’ and ends the central 
 government’s power to suspend new regional legislation pending a Constitutional 
 Court ruling on its constitutionality.  (Amoretti 2002, 127)  
 
Coalitions and parties were divided in their support for the package as it was written; the 
center-right did not think the package went far enough, the center-left supported the 
package, and the Communists were the only party who opposed decentralization in 
general.  Their opposition was presumably because they rely on ideological resonance, 
and as we saw in the brief history of decentralization above, ideological messages have 
more resonance in Italy at the national level—regionalism was partly responsible for 
unseating the Communists nationally.  
 There have been moves toward decentralization, but the Italian state still does not 
have a federal organization and the process is ongoing, though not linear.  The regions 
still do not have representation at the national level the way the Länder do in Germany.  
Berlusconi’s House of Freedoms coalition ran in the 2001 elections on a promise to see 
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that Italy becomes a federal republic (Amoretti 2002, 137) but was unsuccessful in seeing 
that through.  Indeed, support for the LN reached a peak of 10 percent in the 1996 general 
elections, fell to around 4 percent in the 2001 and 2006 elections, and rose to another 
peak of 8 percent in the 2008 elections. 
 But the final aspect of Italian regionalism that reinforces the argument that 
regional identities are more salient than cross-regional age based identities is the major 
differences in party support by region, which are much greater than those by age.  In the 
1992 elections for the Chamber of Deputies, 40 percent in the Northeast and South voted 
for the Christian Democrats (DC), but only 11 percent in the Central region did (Corbetta 
and Parisi 1992).  A 1996 survey asking about the most serious social problem had 
consistent results across ages, but differed greatly by region.  As we would expect, in the 
North a smaller percentage saw unemployment as the number one problem: 50 percent 
versus 61 in the Center and around 70 percent in the South and Islands.  The Northwest, 
where the LN is very popular, had almost 7 percent of respondents name immigration as 
the number one problem.  (The LN often runs on an anti-immigration platform.)  The 
North and Center were more concerned about taxes and corruption than the South  
(Corbetta and Parisi 1996).    
Parties 
 It is hard to study a moving object, and Italy’s party system definitely qualifies as 
a moving object.  But even though parties and coalitions among them are fleeting, it is 
still valuable to attempt to trace the role of aging in party politics, as some parties do 
appear to appeal to different age groups.  This section first briefly describes the history of 
party politics in Italy, which is necessary to understand contemporary issues, and then 
 
 129 
moves on to describe in greater detail how the parties target different generations in Italy.  
Italy’s post-War democracy has often been described as a partitocrazia, literally 
partyocracy, a term that emphasizes the important role of political parties in the Italian 
Republic, especially in the decades after the end of World War II.  According to one 
scholar, “Partitocrazia was a power system with an extremely solid and permanent 
structure, established by an almost total overlap or connivance between party, state 
(including the judiciary) and social elites, through which parties exercised their control” 
(Bardi 2004, 133).  Most scholars agree that this system has facilitated two other 
enduring features of Italian politics: clientelism and corruption.  As Newell (2000, 48) 
says:  
 Partitocrazia, then, constituted a complete system of power relations.  Based on a 
 weak state allowing for considerable overlap between the personnel of the parties 
 on the one hand, and interest groups and administrative positions on the other, it 
 made it difficult to draw clear boundaries between these entities and to know, in 
 any given case, in what capacity individuals were acting. 
 
Parties, despite their number and shifting identities, are the principle vehicles through 
which policy is made in Italy, and thus their central focus in this study is justified.  I have 
argued that a competitive multiparty system facilitates the emergence of age-based party 
politics because it encourages parties to appeal to niche interests.  But because the Italian 
party system has changed so much since the early 1990s, it is difficult to classify—it is 
both a multiparty system, and a system with bipolar coalitions.  Most scholars agree that 
during the Cold War the party system was bipolar, with the biggest divisions between the 
Catholic, center-right Christian Democrats (DC) and the Soviet-leaning, center-left 
Communists (PCI).  Though the PCI had a lot of support among Italians, the stigma 
attached to the party because of its communist roots was similar to that of the PDS in 
 
 130 
Germany; in Italy the concern was that the PCI would take power during the Cold War, 
in Germany there was more concern that the communists would gain seats after 
reunification.  In addition, parties on the extreme right—namely the Italian Social 
Movement (MSI)—were so discredited as to be unavailable for coalition formation 
(Newell 2000, 18).  Thus, DC were the only credible party in Italian politics during most 
of the Cold War and they stayed in power through coalitions with smaller centrist parties 
and, starting in 1963, with the Socialist Party (PSI).   
 Though one might think that the dominance of the Christian Democrats stabilized 
Italian politics, because of the need for coalition governments the opposite was true.  
Italy’s multiparty system is fractured and chaotic and there were over 50 governments 
between 1948 and 1992.  Pushing real reform in such an unstable environment is nearly 
impossible and Newell (2000, 18) says that important areas such as health, welfare, and 
education were stagnant during this time. 
 The early 1990s provide an excellent starting point for analyzing generational 
politics in the Italian party system.  Not only had population aging become rooted by this 
time, the party system in Italy faced a series of major changes as a result of political 
scandals, crises, and electoral reforms that have set the tone of the last 16 years of party 
politics there.  So fundamental was the break with the old system that Italian politics is 
often described in terms of pre-1992-94 and post-1992-94.  What happened and why?  
First, the 1992 elections were significant because they were the first without the 
communist party, which had been disbanded and discredited after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989—this removed one of the two major poles of the Italian party system.  Now, 
though, the left has reinvented itself and is no longer seen as illegitimate—they even 
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supplied Italy’s Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, from 2006 until a vote of no confidence 
in January 2008.  Second, a series of political scandals discredited the other ruling pole, 
the Christian Democrats, who had been in power for most of the post-War period.  In 
February 1992 an anti-corruption drive started with the arrest of an elder home head, 
which exposed the “extensive illegal payments to the political parties in exchange for 
public works contracts” (Newell 2000, 25).  The scandal was termed Tangentopoli, 
meaning “bribe-city,” and referred to Milan, the locus of the scandal.  Fallout from 
Tangentopoli took away the ruling parties’ sources of funding and discredited them to the 
public.  It also effectively ended the corrupt clientelistic practices that characterized 
Italian politics.  Without clientelist networks, however, many could no longer see a 
reason to be a member of a party—the parties’ ideological base was not strong.  The five 
ruling parties were basically wiped off the political map and only survived in weakened 
forms or as barely recognizable offshoots (or offshoots of offshoots).  In the wake of 
Tangentopoli, there was a dramatic decline in party membership, in some cases to one-
third of what it had been before, according to some estimates (Newell 2000, 63).  In the 
1992 general election held on April 5th the seats in both the Chamber and Senate were 
widely spread among groups, demonstrating the viability of even the smaller parties.  The 
root of Italy’s label as a fragmented and chaotic political party system is perhaps these 
elections, in which a total of 17 parties got seats in the Senate and 16 in the Chamber. 
 In an attempt to remedy this fragmentation, the 1994 elections took place under a 
mixed proportional representation-single member district (SMD) system, instead of a 
purely proportional system, as it was before.  For both the Chamber and Senate, 75 
percent of the seats were allocated by SMD with plurality rule and the other 25 were 
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proportional.  This system was intended to stabilize politics because the majority of seats 
would be “first past the post,” meaning that parties who could garner large shares of votes 
were rewarded—this would effectively limit the number of viable parties.  The new 
system worked in that regard, bringing the number of seated parties to 11 in the Senate 
and 7 in the Chamber ("Archivio Storico delle Elezione" 2008). 
 Many scholars have argued that these electoral rules, in effect from the 1994 
elections until the 2006 elections, shaped Italy into a bipolar party system, with the 
center-left and center-right making up the two poles around which electoral alliances 
converged (Bartolini et al. 2004, ; Agnew 2007).  Indeed, in 1994 the center-right and -
left poles together got 80 percent of the votes in the Chamber; in 1996 they got 85 
percent; in 2001 they got almost 90 percent; and in 2006 they got nearly 100 percent 
("Archivio Storico delle Elezione" 2008).  At various times the electoral system has been 
set up to encourage coalitions so the movement towards them is not surprising.  In the 
2006 federal election parties needed a threshold of four percent of the votes to acquire 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies if they stayed out of the two coalitions, but only a two 
percent threshold if they remained inside (Agnew 2007, 27).  The outcome was that far 
fewer parties strayed outside of the coalitions than in the past.  Thus, unlike Germany, 
Italy does not cleanly fit the definition of a competitive multiparty system.  What does 
this mean for our hypotheses about age-based politics?  If under a multiparty system we 
expect to see parties attempt to differentiate their messages and under a two-party or one-
party dominant system we expect to see parties attempt to appeal to the widest electorate 
possible, then in Italy we should see a little of both.  On the one hand, Italy’s system is 
similar to a two-party system and we should expect that the two major coalitions, the 
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center-left and center-right, will try to broadly appeal to voters—their platforms may be 
very similar.  Bardi (2004, 119) agrees that we should expect similarities because 
“individual parties are now more concerned with within-bloc dealignment than in the 
past, in that their relative strengths are important for their position within the coalition as 
well as for their influence on coalition leadership selection” (119).  In 2004, he said that 
“the border between the two coalitions is still blurred, as individual parties and electoral 
alliances try to occupy what is still a relatively available political space.” 
 On the other hand, because 25 percent of seats were allocated proportionally 
between 1994-2005, it was still possible for small parties to gain seats at the national 
level by appealing to niche interests.  Smaller parties have a chance of winning at the 
regional level as well.  Now that Italy has returned to a proportional system for the 2006 
and 2008 elections, small parties are viable even though the two poles are strong.  For 
smaller parties:  
 the fundamental issue is to demonstrate that they can maintain exclusive control 
 over select, albeit small, portions of the electorate.  This can be done through the 
 encapsulation of specific ideological constituencies, as is the case with the 
 Greens, and, to a certain extent, with the UDC; or through the acquisition of 
 special positional advantages, mostly by attracting portions of the moderate centre 
 (RI, CDU and then UDR), but also of the extremes (RC). (Bardi 2004, 121).  
 
Further demonstrating the dual dynamics of Italian party politics, some scholars (for 
example, Bardi 2002) say that citizens may be attracted to coalitions, but not individual 
parties, while others (for example, Floridia 2007) seem to say that parties may be even 
more important under new electoral rules because even small parties are viable.  Thus, I 
anticipate that the two large coalitions will function like a two-party system in their 
platforms, appealing to large numbers of voters including all generations.  The parties 
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individually, however, will likely try to appeal to niche interests, potentially generational, 
as in Germany.  
 It is important to get a sense of how parties operate in Italy before examining the 
text of their messages.  The media is very important in Italy and its place in party politics 
has been crystallized by the involvement of Silvio Berlusconi, media magnate, owner of 
several television channels, and head of the Forza Italia (FI) party and center-right 
coalition.  The emphasis on populist messages means that we must be careful of reading 
too much into the text of party platforms—parties seem to be more about image than 
substance.  Zolo (1999) says that over the last 20 years, Italy has evolved from a 
neoclassical democratic model (competitive multiparty system) to a post-classical 
democratic model, dependent on television and public opinion.  Instead of politicians 
joining parties, they are elite entrepreneurs who speak directly to the citizen consumers.  
The growing role of the media has also increased the importance of image, creating a new 
model of politics.  After 1992, the new importance of the media and new electoral laws 
both “influenced party approaches to candidatures and target groups (Bardi 2004, 135).  
The PDS remained closest to a traditional party organization, whereas other parties like 
FI tried something very different.  As Agnew (2007, 19) points out, under this model 
parties don’t call themselves parties.  Instead, they are slogans, leagues, alliances, poles, 
houses, networks, olive tree.  Parties’ messages are very visual and seem to deemphasize 
substance.  So, while there are substantive differences between the parties’ platforms and 
the ways they appeal to different generations, these differences do not mean that citizens 
are aware of or concentrate on these messages.  For example, a 2001 election survey 
asked respondents to evaluate the statement, “Politics is so complicated that you cannot 
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understand what is happening,” as true, somewhat true, somewhat false, or false.  Around 
55 percent of those aged 18-64 and 67 percent of those aged 65+ said the statement was 
true, while only between 7 and 16 percent said the statement was somewhat false or false 
(Caciagli and Corbetta 2001).  Though I would surmise that the chaotic nature of politics 
may be a driver of the visual populist messages (which could serve to simplify), that is 
not the subject of this study.  What we can note, though, is that these messages 
complicate analysis of party platforms. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 – 2008 election posters for the LN and RC 
  
Source: (Manifesti Elettorali 2008 2008, ; Propaganda 2008) 
 
 Another important factor to consider in analyzing party politics is the place of 
parties and expression of voting among citizens.  Party membership, expressed as the 
membership-electorate ratio (M/E), has declined from a high of about 13 percent in 1963 
to a low of 3 percent in 1994.  Between 1994-98 the ratio increased to 3.75 (Newell 2000, 
54-5), but this is near the bottom of the scale for European democracies.  However, voter 
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turnout in Italy has always been one of the highest in Europe—citizens see voting as 
more of a civic duty than a right (non-voters have even been recorded in the elector’s 
civil and criminal records).  Though turnout began to decline from 1979 onwards, and 
there was an increase in the number of invalid votes, turnout is still relatively high and 
was over eighty percent in the 2006 election ("Archivio Storico delle Elezione" 2008).  
Perhaps most interestingly, in a system with so much fluctuation and so many frequently 
changing parties, “The disappearance or transformation of political parties continues to 
make sizeable portions of the electorate potentially available irrespective of their 
propensity to switch parties” (Bardi 2004, 119).  Bardi (2002, 50-2) warns that we cannot 
extrapolate voters’ attitudes from electoral outcomes only since the supply (i.e., electoral 
rules) continues to be in flux.  Voters would have had to be very strategic with their 
voting over the past 16 years in order to see that their favored candidate and party were 
elected.  The following section attempts to rely on survey data (taken in a context without 
electoral rules) to determine people’s attitudes towards parties; thus, it may be a more 
accurate measure of voters’ attitudes towards the parties than actual outcomes (which the 
Italian government does not collect by age anyway). 
Generational issues within the parties 
 This section attempts to trace the parties’ and coalitions’ stances towards youth, 
families, and older generations in Italy surrounding the most recent general elections, 
which took place in an increasingly aged population.  The review relies on two sources: 
media coverage of party platforms and textual analysis of the platforms themselves 
during the most recent (2008) general elections.  Some scholars have pointed out how 
challenging analyzing party positions in Italy can be: “Italian party policy positions are 
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rather difficult to trace.  This is due to the vagueness of official party documents, often 
conditioned by internal conflicts or coalition compromises, and to discrepancies in party 
behaviour in different parliamentary sessions (e.g. committee as opposed to plenary 
session voting)” (Bardi 2004, 128).  Not only are party documents often vague, as 
mentioned earlier sometimes party platforms appear to lack substance and make populist 
appeals instead.  Rather than a variety of contentious issues, the 2001 election was more 
about concern over what a Berlusconi win would mean for political communication, 
since not only would he then own all private television in Italy, he would also be in 
charge of state media.  The sheer number of parties can be overwhelming as well.  Over 
100 parties ran in the 2001 elections, leading the Ministry of the Interior to publish a 
small book as a guide to the 180 symbols of the election.  One humorous article from 
around that time reports of the symbols: 
 They include donkeys, smiling bears, dolphins, seagulls, butterflies, griffins, 
 cows, mean-looking boars, owls, doves and eagles.  There are stalks of wheat, 
 grapes, carnations, suns, sunflowers, oak trees, olives, daisies, mountains and 
 rivers… There is an artist’s pallet of Green parties.  There are Greens with a 
 smiling sun, a sunflower and a carnation. There are “Ecologist Greens” and 
 “Federalist Greens”. And, just to make sure no one is confused about just how 
 green a Green party can be, one party calls itself the “Green Greens”. Its symbol 
 is a smiling, waving bear (Pullella 2001). 
 
As this news snippet tries to show, party politics are not always taking place in a serious 
atmosphere.  In addition, differences between the two major poles are often few.  For 
example, during the 2001 general elections both the center-right and center-left wanted to 
cut taxes, create jobs, boost economic growth, and curb illegal immigration (Pagani 
2001)—subsequent elections have been a repeat.  In 2006 both Prodi’s center-left 
coalition, The Union, and Berlusconi’s House of Freedoms coalition promised to institute 
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a baby bonus, and increase daycare and housing support for low-income families ("The 
economy, Iraq, family policies among key issues of Italian elections" 2006).  While Prodi 
promised education vouchers, Berlusconi promised cash for families with young children 
("Policy promises in Italy general election" 2006).  There were some labor issue 
differences between the two, however.  Prodi wanted to encourage permanent, not short-
term, employment contracts and cut companies’ social security contributions by 5 percent 
a year to make it cheaper for them to hire.  Berlusconi appeared to have less concrete job 
creation plans, just saying that he would like to create one million new jobs ("The 
economy, Iraq, family policies among key issues of Italian elections" 2006).  The 
similarities of the 2006 election platforms substantiate the hypothesis that the two 
coalitions will try to appeal broadly rather than focus on interests particular to older or 
younger generations.  The parties and coalitions covered in the following section are 
obviously only a snapshot of Italian politics since names and alliances often change 
yearly (or even more frequently).  The parties and coalitions reviewed were chosen either 
because they were representative of an ideology or niche, or because they had some 
historical importance, such as winning seats over the course of several elections.  Though 
not inclusive, the range of parties seems to cover the range of issues and though names 
often change, most of the time the personalities behind the parties stay the same, 
providing some continuity in positions for us to analyze. 
 Though there appears to be little politics of aging in Italy since the 1992-94 
reforms, as the following paragraphs demonstrate, at times, especially during the recent 
election, which took place under new voting rules, the parties do take stands that are 
specific and discernable enough to warrant their inclusion in this review of aging politics.  
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To briefly return to the hypotheses about aging politics that frame this study, because of 
the presence of both wide coalitions and niche parties I expect dual dynamics in party 
politics.  Coalitions should try to target the more moderate voters with broad appeals, and 
smaller parties should target niche generational interests.  As Bardi (2004, 137-8) says,  
 Electoral success depends not only on the ability to attract moderate electors, but 
 also on the capacity to preserve a sizeable hard core.  As a consequence, most 
 parties try to maintain specific, and in some cases relatively radical, policy 
 concerns while at the same time subscribing, especially in fiscal and economic 
 matters, to the ‘responsible’ party postures generally exhibited by coalitions.  
 
Each of the major parties’ platforms and stances towards age groups are reviewed below.   
Center-right coalition and Forza Italia 
 Forza Italia (FI), and the coalition led by FI’s leader Silvio Berlusconi, occupies 
the center-right of the political spectrum.  Berlusconi’s coalition has had a variety of 
names, but two of the most recent are the House of Freedom and the People of Freedom 
(the latter was for the 2008 general elections).  FI’s platform is identical to the People of 
Freedom’s platform because Berlusconi insists upon synchronization as another way to 
cement his leadership and see that his preferences are represented.  The coalition very 
explicitly devotes a large part of its platform to the issue of family in Italy, saying that 
“Famiglia più forte Italia più forte,” or “If the family is stronger, Italy will be stronger” 
("7 Missioni per Il Futuro Dell'Italia" 2008).  They say that families are the backbone of 
Italy.  Specifically, they call for a change in the tax structure so that taxes for families 
will decrease as the size of the family (read: number of children) increases.  When the 
elderly are addressed it is in terms of needing to ease the burden of their care on the 
family—the focus is on the younger generations who provide the care rather than on the 
elderly themselves.  In addition to families they also target youth and claim that the left—
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Prodi’s administration in particular—does not care about youth and youth 
unemployment.  They hope for full implementation of the Biagi Law (which will be 
discussed in detail) to promote the creation of new jobs—yet another measure targeting 
the needs of youth.  They want construction of new houses for young people, vouchers to 
help young renting families, and access to a state-guaranteed mortgage for those who 
have temporary jobs, which in Italy is usually young people.  They also express great 
interest in education.  They do not mention the needs of older people in their main 
program and in fact have a history of trying to cut pensions, as they did in 1994 ("EP 
Criticises Italian Pensions Plan and Job Losses at BT and Eurofonderie" 1994), and raise 
retirement, as Berlusconi did during his second term in office in July of 2004.  That FI 
and the center-right have identical platforms makes it challenging to confirm or reject the 
hypotheses about different patterns in party versus coalition positions by relying on 
election platforms alone.  Thus, we must also examine what kinds of actions the 
coalitions took during times they were in power or in opposition.  Not only did 
Berlusconi cut pensions, his pension reform included raising the retirement age from 57 
to 60 and would supposedly have saved the government about one percent of GDP per 
year by cutting the amount of pensions it paid out ("Italy Pension Reform Consent Seen 
on Jan 10, 04-Trade Unions" 2004).  Berlusconi’s party and coalition are classified here 
as favoring families and youth over older generations.  The additional issue, then, is that 
because FI and the center-right coalition are identical we cannot definitively confirm or 
reject the hypothesis claiming that coalitions will make broad appeals.  FI as a party 
confirms the hypothesis that parties will cater to specific age-based interests.  
Berlusconi’s center-right coalition, however, also appeals to specific age-based interests, 
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favoring the family over older Italians.  Because the connection between the party, FI, 
and the Center-right coalition is so tight, the coalition behaves more like its most 
dominant partner than like a group of parties and makes our hypotheses about coalition 
behavior irrelevant.   
Alleanza Nazionale (AN) 
 Alleanza Nazionale (AN), though originally the successor organization to the neo-
fascist parties, has renounced its connections to fascism and is now a very competitive 
party in Italy.  They usually join the center-right list and are the other major party of this 
pole, FI as the other one.  AN’s main goal is to promote Italian values and strengthen and 
promote Italy’s national identity, which they believe is under threat from globalization.  
Like FI and others of the People of Freedom coalition they show great favor towards the 
family.  In their most recent platform they say that instead of supporting many family 
models (for them, homosexual partnerships especially), “It is necessary instead to favor 
the family and promote demographic policies to revert the trend by which Italy is peopled 
mostly by the elderly and one-child families” ("Alleanza per l'Italia, la sfida del futuro" 
2008).  They claim that previous generations had it much easier than current generations 
because they were able to climb the social ladder and improve themselves and the social 
condition of their families.  Not surprisingly, they have views similar to Berlusconi’s in 
that they want to support couples who want to work and have children.  They believe that 
their campaign can only be realized by creating a “‘national plan for the old age,’ with 
the aim of keeping the elderly involved in social life and aiding the non-self sufficient 
ones, potentiating the volunteer organizations” ("Alleanza per l'Italia, la sfida del futuro" 
2008, 6).  This is couched as another way to support the family, as in context they 
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emphasize difficulties reconciling family and work and promote child and elder care as a 
way to ease the burden on adults caught in between.  As with FI’s platform, the old are 
only acknowledged in the extent to which their care is a burden to the family.  They say, 
“the state has to create structures to care for children, the elderly, the disabled.”  Because 
any benefits that accrue to the elderly would seemingly only be byproducts rather than 
the focus of reform, AN is categorized here as a party that caters to youth and families. 
LN 
 Lega Nord’s (LN) five major platform points for the 2008 elections have little to 
say towards youth, family, or the old.  As usual, their main platform is federalism and 
anti-immigration.  However, in the expanded version of their electoral platform they do 
frame their great concern with the high taxes in terms of its effect on families and child 
poverty.  They frequently express that too much money is taken away from families.  
However, they also use the slogan, “Meno tassi a Roma, più soldi ai pensionati,” which 
can be translated as, “Less taxes for Rome, more money for pensioners.”  They say that 
they want to create job opportunities for young people and a serene old age for the elderly 
("Siamo a rischio di poverta" 2008, 3-5).  Thus, as a regional party, they really try to 
appeal to all generations living in the North of Italy to get as much support as possible.  
In 1996 LN didn’t join the center-right coalition and thus won many single member seats 
on its own, though its independence hurt the center-right coalition and allowed the center-
left to gain power.  The 2001 center-right coalition had more substance than 1994’s 
because it was based on “greater ideological convergence” (Parker and Natale 2002).  
“Among the smaller coalition parties, the LN is the only one that tries...to force the whole 
coalition to adopt relatively radical positions” (138).  LN expressed worries about cuts for 
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pensioners in 1994 ("EP Criticises Italian Pensions Plan and Job Losses at BT and 
Eurofonderie" 1994).  Because of its regional platform and appeal to all generations LN 
is classified here as a party that favors neither the old, young, nor families. 
UDC 
 The Union of Christian and Center Democrats (Unione dei Democratici Cristiana) 
is heir to the post-War Christian Democrats and in some senses keeps a Catholic identity, 
though ideologically centrist.  Though less focused on age, the UDC is very concerned 
with the roles of women.  They seem to express how the role of women in society is an 
impediment to having children and contributes to Italy’s low birth rate.  While they 
acknowledge that the number of elderly women is increasing, they focus on concerns 
with reconciling work and family, and thus seem to pinpoint the needs of younger women 
(Barbeto and Faga 2008).  The party tries to occupy the center of the political spectrum in 
Italy, and though allied with Berlusconi’s House of Freedoms in the past, leader Casini 
disapproves of Berlusconi’s shift to the right (Dinmore 2008).  The UDC is included here 
because it is a major party in Italy, but focus more on the politics of gender than on the 
politics of aging.  Because this study seeks to understand to what degree aging is 
politicized in Italy it is useful to note that this major party does not cater to generational 
interests. 
Center-left coalition and the Democratic Party (PD) 
 The center-left coalition, as is usual with Italian politics, continues to change 
names and composition and the parties within it merge, divide, and change names 
frequently as well.  The center-left has been united under the banner of Olive Tree, 
Union, and most recently ran under the leadership of the Democratic Party and its head, 
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former mayor of Rome Walter Veltroni.  As mentioned above, for most of the post-1992-
94 elections the center-right and -left have not demonstrated widely varying platforms but 
instead have similar goals with regard to cutting taxes and boosting the economy.  As we 
begin to explore the individual parties within the coalition and the individuals who have 
headed them, however, some generational stances emerge.  The most recent Prime 
Minister under the center-left, Romano Prodi, attempted to water down a center-right 
pension reform (instituted before Berlusconi left office in 2006) to raise the retirement 
age from 57 to 60 starting in January 2008.  Prodi preferred to raise the age gradually to 
58 in 2008, 59 in 2009, 60 in 2011, and 61 in 2013 (Stewart 2007).  Given Italy’s rapid 
rate of aging and extremely generous pensions, this stance could only have been taken to 
cater to older workers, rather than being a stance for the “national interest.”  In general, 
though, the PD seems to have a very broad platform that addresses needs particular to 
individual age groups, but inclusive of the range of age groups.  Their broad appeal 
confirms what we expected of the coalitions in our hypotheses.  In 2008 they asked for 
more childcare centers, caretakers for the elderly and better elderly healthcare, and school 
reforms from the elementary to university levels.  In a major attempt to strengthen the 
position of youth, though, the recent PD platform addresses needs of the youth in terms 
of employment protections for temporary labor, which is a type of employment youth 
often have (and that will be reviewed in more detail).  As expected, the PD, as the largest 
party of the center-left, holds stances with broad appeal rather than catering to niche 
interests ("Adesso una Italia nuova: Sì può fare" 2008).  The Left, then, behaves quite 
differently than the right, the latter whom appeal more narrowly.  In contrast, in the 2008 
elections what was unusual about Veltroni’s stance was his refusal to form a coalition 
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with the smaller parties of the extreme left; he often expresses disappointment at Italy’s 
coalition-style governments.  Thus, while his stances reflected the strategy of a broad 
coalition, in practice he rejects this style of politics.11   
Italia dei Valori 
  Italy of Values (Italia dei Valori) is a center-left party that focuses on youth.  The 
party made significant gains in the 2008 general election, winning 4.4 percent of the vote 
and many seats.  Their platform for that election made no mention of the old, older 
workers, or retirement, but it did put forth several proposals to improve the situation of 
youth and young families.  They wanted to help working mothers, provide subsidies for 
couples to buy their first house, tax exemptions for temporary workers (who are most 
often the young), and “For the youth, a minimum starting salary of 1000/1100 Euro” ("11 
Points to Change Italy" 2008). 
The far left – La Sinistra L’Arcobaleno and Rifondazione Comunista 
 The far left in Italy includes Green parties, communist, and socialist parties.  
Combined, the four parties that made up the far left coalition (though they did not run 
together) received 10 percent of the vote in 2006 but only 3 percent in 2008—not enough 
for a seat.  Not surprisingly, the far left continues to shift identities frequently, and 
disbanded what had been a new coalition in the aftermath of the April 2008 elections.  
Two organizations have remained stable enough to study, however.  La Sinistra 
L’Arcobaleno, The Left – The Rainbow (a.k.a., Rainbow Left), is described here because 
it was an umbrella organization of far left parties that ran together in the April 2008 
elections.  Rifondazione Comunista (RC), or the Party of Refounded Communism, is 
                                                 
11 It is tangential but interesting to note that though some (The Economist especially) have remarked on 
Italy’s penchant for older politicians, 30 percent of the PD’s candidates for the lower house Chamber of 
Deputies were under age 40 in the 2008 elections (Jones 2008). 
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described here because of its longevity in Italian party politics, though since the April 
2008 elections it has removed itself from Rainbow Left.  Rainbow Left wants to 
redistribute wealth to retirees and people who have been left behind economically.  They 
try to have a fairly broad generational appeal, often mentioning the troubles of temporary 
employment for youth, the need for families to have more disposable income, and the 
burden of high taxes on retirees.  They want to: “foster a new alliance/covenant between 
the generations, to promote entrepreneurial spirit and skills in the youth and to make the 
elderly feel useful for their experience who makes them active participants in social life” 
("Il programma de la Sinistra l'Arcobaleno in 100 punti" 2008).  Though they focus more 
on youth and families than on older generations, because of their attempt to appeal to 
issues that concern each generation they are classified here as not favoring one generation 
over another.   
 RC “remains faithful to its working-class/pensioners constituency.”  But all other 
parties “try to avoid being typecast as the privileged agents of any particular group” 
(Bardi 2004, 138).  Similar to the post-communist party in Germany, RC in Italy wants to 
raise the minimum social security check to 600 euros a month, and argues that “people 
should have complete freedom in choosing their retirement age, between 57 and 62, 
without penalties and perhaps introducing incentives for those who stay on the job 
longer.”  They also want to reduce the retirement age for those with physically-
demanding jobs.  As one would expect from a communist party, they emphasize 
communalism, wanting to introduce a ceiling for pensions and redistribute that wealth to 
less-fortunate elderly (Riforma delle Pensioni: La nostra proposta 2008).  Because of 




 The Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano (NPSI) identifies as the heir to Italy’s 
socialist parties, starting with the post-War PSI.  They have at times joined the center-
right, at times joined the center-left, and at times stood alone.  They have a very broad 
platform, which is not what one would expect given their small size, but can perhaps be 
explained if they view themselves as the heir to the “third pole” of Italian politics—the 
socialists ("Il programma per un'Italia laica, civile e moderna" 2008). 
Pensioners’ Party (PP) 
 The Pensioners’ Party (PP) is described here because it is a single, age-based 
issue party that has consistently gotten around one percent of the vote in federal elections, 
or around 300,000 votes.  One might expect that the party would do better since elderly 
Italians (pensioners) make up over a quarter of the population.  But, as this larger project 
argues, demography is not destiny for domestic politics.  The mismatch in support for the 
PP and Italian demographics alone are not sufficient evidence of a lack of age-based 
politics, but calls into question the salience of generational identities. On the other hand, 
the very fact that a party devoted exclusively to the older electorate exists (and has for a 
while) demonstrates that Italy’s party system can facilitate the emergence of age-based 
interests.  Usually, the PP joins the center-right in elections but in 2006 they joined with 
the center-left and their nearly one percent of votes helped bring The Union coalition and 
Prodi to power; thus, even though they are a small party, they can be key to elections in 
Italy.  The PP wants greater widows’ benefits through social security, better hospice and 
nursing home facilities, and to repeal the law increasing retirement age, which they 
believe disadvantages “those born towards the end of the year who had to continue to 
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work for three years just for missing the deadline by a few months” ("Programma del 
Partito Pensionati" 2008).  Clearly, the PP is classified here as a party seeking to advance 














Though we expected that there would be dual dynamics in Italian party politics with 
coalitions making broad appeals and parties catering more narrowly to age based 
interests, in actuality the divisions were not so neat. The Center-right and Center-left 
coalitions are dominated by their biggest parties and therefore tend to behave like those 
parties.  Some individual parties do make narrow, age-based appeals but some ignore 
generational politics altogether, focusing instead on regional issues, gender issues, or a 
broader set of problems. 
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Generational response to parties 
 The Italian government does not collect voting data by age, so to assess how the 
different generations in Italy respond to the parties we have to rely on survey data.  In 
some ways this is useful, since because of Italy’s complicated and dynamic electoral rules 
we cannot be certain that voting outcomes reflect the true intentions or preferences of 
Italian voters.  An additional issue, though, is that there is little time-series data on Italian 
party preferences; as Newell (2000, 53) says, these data are “practically non-existent.”  
Table 3.3 – Vote intention survey, Italy, 1994 
Age AN FI CCD LN PP PSI PDS VER RC NONE 
18-29 13.9 27.7 1.8 6.6 3.0 1.2 19.3 7.8 3.6 5.4 
30-49 13.0 28.4 1.1 7.3 10.7 1.9 19.5 3.0 5.7 3.0 
50-64 11.4 30.9 6.3 2.9 16.0 4.0 15.4 2.3 4.0 3.4 
65+ 8.2 30.6 8.2 2.0 18.4 0 20.4 2.0 0 8.2 
NW 7.3 35.8 3.4 12.8 6.7 0.6 15.1 4.5 4.5 4.0 
NE 8.8 28.3 2.7 11.5 15.0 1.8 14.2 5.3 3.5 4.4 
CEN 26.5 9.8 2.9 0 5.9 2.0 29.4 4.9 4.9 7.8 
S/ISL 12.1 32.3 3.5 0 13.6 3.5 18.3 2.7 4.3 2.7 
Source: ("International Social Survey Programme 1994: Family and Changing Gender Roles II" 1994) 
 
The parties in the preceding table are Alleanza Nazionale (still MSI), Forza Italia, Centro 
Cristiano Democratico, Lega Nord, Partito Popolare, PSI, PDS (ex PCI), Verdi, and 
Rifondazione Comunista.  Looking first at differences by age we see that there is a 
difference by age in votes for AN in 1994, but the sample size of those aged 65+ was 
very small, only 5 people, so we should be cautious of reading too much into these 
differences.  The sample sizes for FI were much better and yet we see little difference in 
support for Berlusconi’s party by age.  The sample sizes for CCD were also small for the 
two youngest age groups so even though there is a difference in support by age a sample 
size of three for each group is not enough to trust accurate results.  The same is true for 
the two oldest age groups who responded with support for LN.  The pattern we are seeing 
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here is that when the sample size is large enough the ages all respond similarly—the 
results only show differences by age when the number of respondents is very small, 
between 1-5 respondents. (It isn’t that the sample size is small so much as the number of 
respondents.)  But by region, which had a sample size of over 100 respondents for each 
region, the differences in voter support are much more stark than those by age.  The most 
intuitive is support for the Northern League, which of course received no support in the 
Center or South.  But other parties had just as big or bigger differences in support by 
region.  AN received a quarter of respondents’ support in the Central region, but only 
between 7-9 percent in the North and 12 percent in the South.  The opposite pattern was 
true for FI, where the difference between support in the Center and Northwest was 26 
percentage points—when measuring by age no differences in support were anywhere 
near that stark.     





FI PDS RC Verdi AN 
18-24 36.0 42.7 18.0 22.7 12.7 8.7 22.7 
25-34 35.3 40.3 16.1 25.5 10.7 7.3 21.5 
35-44 41.1 42.1 13.7 33.3 7.8 2.9 23.5 
45-54 34.1 34.1 8.5 26.6 8.5 6.4 21.3 
55-64 28.8 37.3 23.7 20.3 15.3 3.4 8.5 
65+ 44.6 37.0 19.6 35.8 6.5 1.1 9.8 
Source: (Reif and Marlier 1996) 
On April 21, 1996, Silvio Berlusconi’s reign came to an end as Olive Tree coalition 
leader Romano Prodi won the election with over 45 percent of the vote and 285 seats.  
The Northern League ran alone in this election (not as part of Berlusconi’s coalition) and 





Table 3.5 – Party affinity by age, Italy, 2001 
 AN DS FI LN RC VERDI 
18-24 20.4 23.6 26.8 3.2 14 3.2 
25-34 22.6 19.8 28.9 1.9 12.6 1.6 
35-44 20.5 24.5 25.9 0.7 7.9 2.9 
45-54 15.4 32.2 24.2 3.7 7 1.5 
55-64 14.3 26.1 27.8 4.1 8.2 0.4 
65+ 13.3 20.7 36.8 2.2 4.0 0 
Total 17.3 24.2 28.7 2.5 8.5 1.4 
Source: (Caciagli and Corbetta 2001) 
 
 A 2001 survey asking, “To which party do you feel closest?” had mixed results by 
age and by region.  For the most part, party support for particular parties did not linearly 
decrease or increase by age, except in the case of Alleanza Nazionale, which had 
decreasing support by age, from 20.4 percent of those aged 18-24 favoring them, to only 
13.3 percent of those aged 65+.  There were other measurable age differences, however.  
The Democrats of the Left (DS, who later merged with the PD) were most popular among 
older workers aged 45-54 years and least popular among retirees above age 65 and those 
aged 25-34.  FI had fairly similar support among all ages except for retirees above age 65, 
among whom support for the party was about eight percentage points higher than the total 
share of FI’s support.  Interestingly, RC—a party who seemed to clearly court older 
voters—had declining support by age, with youth most likely to favor the party.  This is 
similar to results for The Left in Germany, who also favored older citizens but did not 
have their favor returned.  
 When looking at the same survey results by region we again cannot establish a 
clear pattern.  AN was most popular in the Central region of Italy and least popular in the 
NW.  Among the other parties of the Center-right, it seems that FI fared poorly in the 
NW as well, even though five percent of respondents there expressed favor for the LN. 
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Table 3.6 – Party affinity by region, Italy, 2001 
 AN DS FI LN RC VERDI 
NW 14.6 18.9 17.0 5.0 9.4 1.7 
NE 15.8 23.5 25.3 6.8 6.3 1.4 
C 21.4 32.2 23.6 0 7.8 0.8 
S+I 17.5 24.2 28.6 2.5 8.5 1.4 
Total 17.3 24.2 28.6 2.5 8.5 1.4 
Source: (Caciagli and Corbetta 2001) 
 
Table 3.7 – Vote intention survey, Italy, October-November 2005  
Age Left Center Right 
15-24 43.8 28.1 28.1 
25-34 46.1 28.7 25.2 
35-44 44.3 35.1 20.5 
45-54 48.4 29.8 21.8 
55-64 40.0 41.3 18.8 
65+ 44.8 28.4 26.9 
Source: ("Eurobarometer 64.2: The European Constitution, Globalization, Energy Resources, and 
Agricultural Policy, October-November 2005" 2005) 
 
 
 Before moving on to labor issues it is important to acknowledge other types of 
institutions besides the party system.  In the United States, politicians depend more on 
interest groups for support than they do parties.  In many states in Europe, parties put 
forth candidates and individuals may not be as beholden to interest groups to the same 
extent as they are in the US.  In Italy, individuals “politic” within their own party for 
power, as the party will most likely determine which candidates get put forward for 
election.  Thus, Italy has a very strong party model that to some extent keeps organized 
outside groups, such as single-issue interest groups, from having a great deal of influence.  
Political parties have dominated party-group relations and “interest groups have been 
incapable of autonomously articulating interests or placing their preferences directly on 
the decisionmaking agenda” (Constantelos 2001, 122).  Colonization by the parties of 
Italian society was partly encouraged by “the power vacuum created by the fall of 
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fascism [which] allowed the parties to capture interest groups and, once they had 
consolidated their position, to become the principal channels of access to the bureaucracy 
and the principal transmission belts in the allocation of resources from centre to 
periphery” (Newell 2000, 47).  Bardi (2002, 69) says that during the scandals of the early 
1990s parties were so severely discredited that there was political space for single-issue 
groups to emerge and become influential.  However, this did not happen.  Why not?  
Constantelos (2001, 136) says that interest fragmentation is the problem: “The 
breakdown of ideological ties between parties and groups has produced heightened 
competition for members among groups in the same economic sectors.” For these 
reasons, single-issue interest groups are excluded from this study.  In the future, however, 
trade unions would be interesting to explore, as they still hold a lot of political sway in 
Italy.  For example, trade unions were partially responsible for blocking Berlusconi’s 
1994 attempt at pension reform (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004, 69).   When  
Berlusconi was back in power, the 2001 White Book for the Labour Market prepared 
under his administration argued that the government to consult social partners but not 
hand power to them.  Unions did not like his approach or the reforms to liberalize and 
make labor market more flexible (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004, 157).  
Labor issues 
 The previous sections have addressed how and why the politics of aging could 
have a role in Italy by focusing on the multiparty system and moves toward 
decentralization.  I argued that regional identities remain strong in Italy and may even be 
crystallizing through decentralization.  I also argued that those parties that attempt to 
appeal to specific age groups mostly focus on youth and families, instead of older 
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generations.  The review of party positions challenges the assertion that Italy is a 
gerontocracy where only the needs of the old are addressed in policy.  This section 
examines in greater detail the idea that policies made within the context of population 
aging benefit older generations to the exclusion of youth by examining several important 
recent labor reforms.  First, this section describes the labor market situation in Italy to set 
the context within which policymaking takes place and to understand why certain policies 
have been implemented.  Then, we review the history and effects of some of the most 
recent important legislation.  I find that youth have faced much higher unemployment 
than older workers but regional differences are even greater—Southern youth are the 
most disadvantaged and Northern older workers have the lowest unemployment rates.  
However, the Italian government, with the cooperation of unions and industry, has been 
working to combat youth unemployment and low labor force participation through a 
series of reforms.  So, even as Italy’s population has aged, youth have been the main 
beneficiaries of reforms.    
 There are four relevant labor market characteristics in Italy, many of which are 
interrelated: high youth unemployment, early exit from the labor force for older persons, 
regional differences, and low female labor force participation.  One major difference 
between Germany and Italy is that whereas in Germany unemployment was a problem 
that plagued older workers, in Italy it is youth who are most disadvantaged in the labor 
market.  The age gaps in employment rates are one way to illustrate this pattern: 76 
percent of those aged 35-44 are employed, while only 26 percent of those aged 15-25 and 
33 percent of those aged 55-64 are employed (Lodovici and Semenza 2008, 160).  While 
it may not be surprising that youth employment is low since many young people may be 
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completing their education, unemployment rates are more surprising.  The subsequent 
table describes national-level data by age group for unemployment in Italy (inactivity 
rates are the sum of the two columns subtracted from 100).  Unemployment rates for 
older workers are very low, only around two percent, though a large percentage of the 
group is inactive.  Unemployment rates for youth, however, are very high, from a peak of 
15 percent in 1998 to a low of 8.7 in 2006.  Unemployment declined annually for youth 
during this period, from 1998-2006, thanks to many of the policies reviewed below.  
Table 3.8 – Employment and unemployment rates in Italy by age, 1998-2006 
Percentage of population (remainder is inactive) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un 
18-30 45 15 46 14.4 47 13.5 48 11.7 49 11.5 
31-49 72 6.0 72 5.9 72 5.5 73 5.2 74 5.1 
50-59 50 2.5 47 2.4 48 2.4 49 2.2 51 2.2 
 2003 2004 2005 2006  
 Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un Emp Un  
18-30 49 11.1 53 10.0 51 9.3 51 8.7  
31-49 74 4.9 76 4.5 76 4.5 76 4.1  
50-59 54 2.2 53 2.2 55 1.9 56 1.7  
Source: ("The European Union Labour Force Survey" 2008) 
Older workers above age 50 and youth both have very high inactivity rates, typically 
above 40 percent of the age group; youth are typically inactive to complete schooling or 
other training, whereas older workers are inactive because they have exited the labor 
force through retirement or disability schemes.  In Italy, like in Germany, the average age 
of exit from the labor force is lower than the official retirement age, demonstrating that 
there is to some extent a “culture of early retirement,” and, more importantly for these 
purposes, that there are institutional means for exiting the labor force other than 
retirement.  In 2001 and 2002 the average age of exit from the labor force was just under 
60 years, but this number had increased to 61 years in 2003 (Eurostat 2006a). 
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 The following table adds another element by breaking down the statistics by 
region.  What becomes clear in this chart is that regional differences are very powerful, 
just as they were when we were looking at vote intention and election results. 
Table 3.9 – Unemployment rates in Italy by age, gender, and region, 2002, as percentage 
of the labor force 
 Men Women 
 15-24 25-49 50-64 15-24 25-49 50-64 
Italy 24.6 6.0 3.5 31.4 11.3 4.5 
North and Centre 11.8 2.8 1.8 16.5 6.3 3.3 
South 42.6 12.5 6.4 59.5 25.2 7.4 
Source: Italian Labor Force Survey, in ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Italy" 2005, 52) 
This table demonstrates how unemployment statistics for Italy are driven by the South, 
and unemployment there is particularly high for youth.  With regard to long-term 
unemployment as a percentage of unemployment, Italy has 60 percent of both its cohorts 
aged 25-49 and those aged 50-64 unemployed long-term ("Ageing and Employment 
Policies: Italy" 2005, 53).  Since these charts tell us that youth have proportionally 
greater unemployment in the South, we can see that the 60 percent statistic for those aged 
50-64 must be driven by long-term unemployment in other regions.  Age and region are 

























































Source: (ISTAT 2008b) 
 Another characteristic of the labor market in Italy is that women participate in the 
labor market to a much lesser degree than do men.  Gender differences reflect cultural 
biases and a male breadwinner model, which can make working and raising a family 
incompatible for women.  Why include a discussion of gender?  Certainly, gender 
differences are an important part of the labor market picture in Italy.  But more 
importantly, they are relevant to this study because it is often women with young children 
(i.e., so those of the younger cohorts) who are disadvantaged.  Gender differences, then, 
are related to age differences.  Many economists have suggested that losses in the overall 
working age population could potentially be offset by increasing women’s labor market 
participation, as well as that of older workers, who also have low participation rates. 
Within the OECD, only Greece and Spain have higher unemployment rates for women; 
in 2000 they were 16.9 and 20.6 percent, respectively, while in Italy the rate was 14.9 
percent (Antonelli and De Liso 2004, 111).  Age and region certainly aren’t the only 
major divisions in Italy’s labor force—differences in labor force participation by gender 
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are even more stark.  But of course, these three factors are related: age and region matter 
when assessing employment patterns.  Women of childbearing and rearing ages have the 
hardest time reconciling work and family, while those of younger and older ages do not 
face this problem.  Women in the northern regions are the most likely to have paid 
employment: “In the mid-1990s, 64% of women aged 20-49 in the Northwest, but only 
36% in the South did paid work. Even more strikingly, 41% of the southern women had 
never been in the labor force, compared to only 7% of those in the Northwest (Bernardi 
1999, 753) (in Kertzer et al. 2008, 5).   








































Source: (Eurostat 2006b) 
What does this review of labor force participation really tell us?  Mainly, age, gender, and 
region are all important and often related.  Policies that attempt to increase labor force 
participation will likely try to address all three hindrances to employment—young, 




 Employment and unemployment rates alone seem to demonstrate that older 
generations have all of the political power in Italy—older people seem to have it easy 
compared to youth.  The actual policies, however, and the trends over time, show that the 
Italian government, with the cooperation of unions and industry, has been working hard 
to increase the labor force participation of youth by instituting reforms that focus 
specifically on their needs and problems.  But this has not always been the case.  Early 
policy reforms and schemes that established the system of state benefits were skewed in 
favor of the old: there were generous pensions but almost a complete lack of family 
benefits and services, employment/income and poverty relief (Ferrera and Gualmini 
2004, 42).  What is interesting is that population aging has had little to do with these 
imbalances since the generous pensions and lack of family benefits are a legacy of 1969 
reforms that took place before population aging.12  Population aging and growing 
political power of the old did not drive increasingly generous pensions, as some thought 
it would.  In fact the opposite is true.  As Italy’s population has aged, policymakers have 
tightened rules for pensions and retirement and allocated more money and attention to 
youth issues.  The year 1978 saw some of the first cooperation between unions and the 
government as they worked to combat youth (15-24 years) unemployment.  This 
cooperation was driven by the near doubling in youth unemployment from 10.2 percent 
in 1970 to 25.6 percent in 1979, while the national averages were 4.9 and 10.3 percent, 
respectively (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004, 52-4).  Yet reforms in the late 70s and 1980s 
                                                 
12 But population aging does matter when generous pension reforms continue and the number of old people 
who take advantage of these schemes grows, so that there is less in the federal budget to be allocated 
elsewhere, like to families and youth. 
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did little to improve the situation of youth.  Since the 1990s the government has worked 
to remove some of the rigidities that plagued the Italian labor market and excluded youth 
from obtaining employment.  To address the final piece of this study’s puzzle, this 
section reviews some major labor policies since the early 1990s to argue that youth have 
actually been the main beneficiaries of these reforms.  This argument goes against what 
many alarmists would expect to see in an increasingly aged society such as Italy’s.  As 
with the previous chapter, this review of policies is merely meant to be illustrative, not 
comprehensive.  
 The 1990s were a turning point in Italian labor policy.  Poor economic 
performance in the first half of the decade necessitated reform and external pressures, 
especially when Italy signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to enter the European 
Monetary Union, required that the state make a lot of domestic policy changes (Ferrera 
and Gualmini 2004, 97).  Several Italian governments in the early 1990s began to tighten 
the reins on benefits to older generations.  Technocrat13 and former socialist Giuliano 
Amato, prime minister in 1992, was tough on old age pensions and retirement.  Italy’s 
second technocratic prime minister, Ciampi in 1993, cracked down on fraud for disability 
benefits, which are a common way for older workers to exit the labor market in Italy.  
Berlusconi, who took over in 1994, increased the retirement age but faced backlash from 
opposition parties and unions.  The third technocrat, Dini, struck a deal with the unions 
and rolled back Berlusconi’s reforms; he introduced a flexible retirement age that would 
allow people to retire between ages 57 and 65, usually depending on occupation.  Ferrera 
and Gualmini (2004, 141-2) argue that during the technical governments of Amato, 
                                                 
13 Italy’s three technocratic prime ministers, Amato, Ciampi, and Dini, were appointed as prime minister, 
rather than coming out of a party leadership position.  Technocratic prime ministers are often not as 
beholden to intra-party politics as other prime ministers. 
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Ciampi, and Dini from 1992-95, unions as interest groups had more say because of how 
parties were delegitimated and in flux due to the political scandals of Tangentopoli.  
Political parties reasserted themselves from 1996-8 and pro-labor prime ministers led the 
reforms, they say.  But an alternative characterization of the time period has been put 
forth by Luciano Bardi.  Bardi (2002) points out that the desire to meet EMU 
requirements brought together both unions and industrialists, and politicians from most 
parts of the political spectrum from 1996-8.  This explanation is appealing because it 
explains the unions’ and industrialists’ willingness to go along with reforms in terms of 
external pressures, and since we see similar cooperation in other European countries 
around that time this explanation carries some weight.   
 The Onofri Commission under Prodi in 1997 was another driving force behind 
reforms.  Onofri was a Bologna economist appointed by Prodi as part of a commission to 
suggest reforms of the stato sociale.  This was the first time since the 1960s that such a 
broad effort had been undertaken.  The Onofri Commission said that the Dini reforms to 
pensions were too limited; they wanted to get rid of seniority pensions, rationalize public 
pensions, and reform unemployment benefits to make them more rational.  But, the social 
partners (unions) and the Rifondazione Comunista party (RC), who supported Prodi’s 
government, made Prodi back off of the commission’s recommendation for a much faster 
phasing in of the new pension formula introduced in 1995.  RC fiercely opposed Prodi’s 
proposals and because their votes were necessary the government had to water down 
some reforms.  One victory for the RC was that they were able to exempt blue-collar 
workers from the cut in seniority pensions.  Prodi was still able to get some cuts of 
seniority pensions passed and those helped Italy reach its 1998 budgetary targets (Ferrera 
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and Gualmini 2004, 114-7).  Even today, as we learned above, RC champions older 
generations, favoring a flexible retirement age, and argues that those with physically 
demanding jobs (blue collar workers) should be able to retire early. 
Table 3.10 – Summary of major employment reforms 
1997 Treu Laws Revised apprenticeships to ease school-to-
work transition; facilitated part-time work 
and temporary contracts 
1999 (April)  Introduced tax benefits who hired part-time 
workers (designed for youth <25 and 
women with families) 
Amato 1992 Tough on old age pensions and retirement 
age 
Ciampi 1993 Cracked down on fraud for disability 
benefits 
Berlusconi 1994 Increased retirement age (faced backlash) 
Dini 1995 Instituted flexible retirement age 57-65 
(struck deal with unions) 
Onofri Commission 1997 Wanted to get rid of seniority pensions, 
rationalize public pensions, and reform 
unemployment benefits to make them more 
rational 
Pact for Italy 2002 Tripartite agreement, signed by 36 
employers’ and trade union organizations 
(except CGIL) that made it possible to 
reorganize the labor market. Extended the 
period of unemployment benefits 
Biagi laws 2003 Reformed job placement and liberalized 
employment services. Introduced more 
flexibility into the labor market through 
measures like promoting part-time work. 
Sources: (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004, ; Lodovici and Semenza 2008, ; Tiraboschi 2005) 
 The Pact for Italy was a tripartite agreement, signed by Berlusconi and 36 
employers’ and trade union organizations (except CGIL), which made it possible to 
reorganize the labor market.  The Pact for Italy “reform assigns a central role to the social 
partners, as shown by the 43 references to collective bargaining in the decree law.  
Collective bargaining is therefore intended as the means for dealing with the various 
matters covered by the reform” (Tiraboschi 2005, 151).  The reform improved the 
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replacement rate and duration of the unemployment benefit, from 40 to 60 percent and 
from 6 to 12 months.  It also implemented most of the October 2001 White Book 
proposals, which “advocated a new method of interaction with the social partners, dubbed 
as ‘social dialogue’ (a term explicitly borrowed from the EU jargon), and basically 
consisting of milder forms of consultation and preventive negotiations on economic and 
social policy” (156).  It also launched initiatives for development of the Mezzogiorno 
(South) and supported lower income workers and pensioners.  We are ultimately 
interested in “winners” and “losers” of these labor policies and we have to conclude that 
both old and young benefited greatly from this policy.  Older generations benefited from 
greater assistance to poorer segments and, given the much higher rate of youth 
unemployment, this reform was also in the interest of youth.   
 One of the toughest aspects of the Italian labor market has been its strict 
adherence to traditional full-time employment contracts (Antonelli and De Liso 2004).  
Flexible labor contracts are key for labor market entry and generally benefit youth 
seeking employment.  The last two reforms this section will cover are those that have 
worked explicitly to change the system and make it more flexible.  The Treu Laws and 
Biagi Laws have been major changes in Italian labor law.  Their importance alone could 
justify their inclusion in this review, but because they were explicitly designed to reduce 
unemployment and help youth, they are particularly relevant.  On the one hand, youth 
clearly “won” because they were the group designed to benefit from these reforms; but on 
the other hand older persons seem to have taken advantage of them in practice to a 
greater degree than younger cohorts.  This study has to take into account the intent of 
these reforms and their effects, but scholars are undecided as to what those effects have 
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actually been.  The shift to part-time, non-traditional work contracts in Italy has been 
controversial.  Some argue that youth benefit because their unemployment rates have 
measurably declined; others point out that use of part-time and temporary work may 
actually make it harder for youth to obtain full-time or permanent jobs. 
 The 1997 Treu package “revised the regulation of apprenticeships and work-
training contracts, aiming at easing the school-to-work transition (one of the main 
shortcomings of the Italian labour market)...” (Lodovici and Semenza 2008, 169).  
Though one review claims that after implementation of the Treu Laws part-time 
employment nearly doubled from 1998-2000 (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004, 101), 
according to OECD statistics, the percentage of 15-24-year-olds engaged in part-time 
work only went from 5.3 percent in 1996 to 7.3 percent of the labor force in 2001 
("OECD.Stat" 2008).  Two percentage points is a decent increase, but among older 
workers aged 55-59 the percentages went from 9.5 to 13.1.14  Though the effects of the 
reforms on part-time work may have benefited older generations more, in other ways the 
reforms clearly did benefit youth over older generations.  Fixed-term (temporary) 
contracts are especially taken advantage of by youth: “one out of two young workers 
entering the labour market for the first time are hired in this way, usually in the form of 
training and work trial contracts (56 per cent of young workers with fixed-term 
contracts)” (Lodovici and Semenza 2008, 163).  Women who take advantage of these 
new flexible contracts are likely those of childbearing and rearing age (prime age 
workers).   
 
                                                 
14 Young workers under age 25 also benefited from an April 1999 law giving tax benefits to employers who 
hired new part-time employers—the law was designed for them and women with families (Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2004, 102). 
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Table 3.11 – Incidence of flexible contracts in Italy (as percent of total) 
 Male Female Total 
Part-timers 4.0% 26.3% 13.5% 
Fixed term contracts 11.2% 15.8% 13.1% 
Non-standard employment 13.8% 37.4% 23.8% 
Source: (Lodovici and Semenza 2008) 
As the above table shows, even though the very youngest segments of the workforce 
might not have benefited as much as hoped, prime-age women have.   
 The 2003 Biagi Laws introduced new, non-traditional forms of employment 
contracts and made part-time work more elastic, both horizontally and vertically.  They 
also reformed work and training contracts and apprenticeships, making a closer link 
between training and the fruition of unemployment benefits (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004, 
160, box 2).  They also reformed job placement and fully liberalized and modernized 
employment services.  These services are very important as vehicles through which 
people actually get jobs in Italy. Though these are fixed-term contracts they are aimed at 
job stability.   
 The reforms particularly aim at youth in several regards.  First, the new contracts 
introduced by the Biagi Laws “are intended to combine (genuine) training and (quality) 
employment, such as the new apprenticeship contracts”—these are supposed to “allocate 
economic incentives for employment primarily in favour of weaker groups in the labour 
market,” which as we know are mainly young workers (Tiraboschi 2005, 158).  Second, 
the laws created two additional categories of apprenticeship contract: “one aimed at 
highly educated young workers up to 29 years of age and one as a way to comply with 
the new educational and training reform” (Tiraboschi 2005, 170).  Third, the 
apprenticeship contracts provide credits to facilitate a return to full-time education for 
those who have dropped out of school.  And fourth, the reforms try to reach all segments 
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of young workers: “Educational training apprenticeships are designed mainly for 15-18 
year olds, whereas vocational training apprenticeships and higher-level apprenticeships 
are for 18-29 year olds, or for 17 year olds with a vocational qualification (pursuant to the 
reforms proposed by the Education Minister)” (Tiraboschi 2005, 183).  But older workers 
and other segments of the labor market benefit from other aspects of the reforms, 
particularly the access-to-work contracts.  Those that can utilize access-to-work contracts 
are 18-29 year olds; long-term unemployed 29-32 year olds; workers over 50 years who 
are out of employment, workers who want to return to work after a break of two or more 
years; women of any age who live in areas where the employment rate is greater than 20 
percent less than for men, or unemployment rate is 10 percent higher than men’s; or 
individuals with a physical or mental disability (Tiraboschi 2005, 183-4). 
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As far as the effects of the reforms, there was no growth in full-time work among ages 





in 2003 to 73.7 percent in 2004, 74.2 percent in 2005, and 77.1 in 2006.  The political 
party Alleanza Nazionale (AN) says that “The leftist government has confused flexibility 
of the labor market with precarious working contracts and exploitation.  The temporary 
jobs have been the source of frustration and uncertainties to an unbearable degree among 
the young.”  They want to “support legislation to give incentives to young people in 
every sphere, job, housing, access to credit, welfare” and want “comprehensive 
legislation in favor of youth” ("Alleanza per l'Italia, la sfida del futuro" 2008, 6). 
 There has been little in the way of review of the reform and because it is a 
complicated law its implementation has been uneven.  Firms show little use of 
apprenticeship and insertion contracts (Lodovici and Semenza 2008, 170).  However, the 
reforms were successful in supporting firms’ flexibility and strengthened the vocational 
training system.  In Germany, older workers were the clear losers in the aftermath of the 
Hartz Reforms.  Italy’s Treu and Biagi laws had indefinable effects.  Though the reforms 
were geared primarily towards the young, both young and old benefited, and older people 
might have benefited more.  Perhaps it is too early to tell. 
Conclusion    
 In Italy, like Germany, even though the context for population aging is set, aging 
issues are not as divisive as one might think.  We expected to see that parties would cater 
to niche age-based interests because Italy’s electoral system rewards parties for even 
small numbers of votes.  However, not all parties focused on age-related issues, like 
education, family, or pensions, at all.  Those that did mention these issues tended to focus 
on families, not issues that might be relevant to the growing elderly cohorts in Italy.  This 
goes completely against what we would expect to see in a country where older people are 
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an increasing share of the population, important members of the family, and more 
politically active than younger generations, who tend to be disenfranchised politically, 
economically, and within the family.   
 The last two chapters show that Germany and Italy have one major thing in 
common: a territorial split.  While Germany is split East-West, Italy shows a similar 
divide along North-South lines.  The situation for youth is particularly distinct when 
looking North-South, as unemployment for youth there is particularly high.  Cultural, 
political, and economic regional differences are still very strong in Italy and are 
highlighted by election results, which differ greatly by region, and even political parties, 
like the Northern League.  Italy’s moves towards decentralization will likely only 
increase the salience of these regional differences in the future and provide a further 
impediment to the emergence of age-based interests.  Lastly, labor policies show that 
youth have been the primary beneficiaries of the most recent important labor reforms, 
again going against what we would expect to see in the context of population aging.    
 How is the situation likely to change as the population grows older?  As in 
Germany, interest groups in Italy have not yet shown the same type of policymaking 
influence as in the United States.  But, trade unions remain important in Italy and 
membership still grows.  The CGIL, the largest union, had a membership of 5,697,774 in 
2007 and the proportion of women increased by 14 percent.  While the number of 
pensioners decreased by 1,936, the number of active workers in 2006 increased by 
50,936.  The number of retired women is 50 percent (Baldini 2007).  In 1999 about half 
of the members of the two biggest unions, CGIL and CSIL, were retired (Hellman 2002, 
455).  An important next step in this research would be to include a review of unions as 
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interest groups and understand their role in navigating the party system and policy 
process.  While single-issue interest groups are not as important in Italy as they are in 
places like the US, trade unions likely function as interest groups, and because they are 




Chapter 4: The Politics of Population Aging in Japan 
Introduction 
 If Germany and Italy seemed to have a setting ripe for conflict, with a very aged 
population and generous social spending on the elderly, Japan takes the cake.  Japan has 
been the vanguard of aging for the world’s industrialized countries and merits study for 
its extreme demographics alone.  But because Japan’s institutions are quite different from 
those of Germany and Italy the country is even more useful to study when trying to 
understand the political effects of demographic change.  As the country with the most 
aged population in the world and the longest history of aging, Japan is the best case we 
have to study the political effects of population aging. 
 Though dominated for decades by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan 
now has a two-party system and so we expect to see something opposite the situations in 
Germany and Italy.  Indeed, parties in Japan do attempt to appeal to the broadest 
segments of the electorate possible, rather than narrow, age-based interests.  Though 
aging issues, like education, healthcare, and the challenge of reconciling work and family 
life, are high on the radar of all political parties, no party has thus far chosen to target one 
particular age group to the exclusion of others.  This is what we expect from a two-party 
system, but is still remarkable when one considers the extreme apathy of Japanese youth: 
their interest in and identification with political parties is much lower than that of older 
age groups, yet parties seem more keen on drawing them into the political process than 
focusing on older cohorts who are more likely to vote.    
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 A review of labor issues in Japan demonstrates that, as with Germany and Italy, 
though older workers are an increasing share of the electorate, labor policies have not 
focused on their needs only or on coddling retirees.  Rather, labor polices of recent years 
have tried to bring in all disadvantaged segments of the labor market, which in Japan are 
younger workers, older workers, and prime-age women, the latter whom often have 
difficulties reconciling work and family obligations.  Prime-age male workers remain the 
most highly protected segments of the Japanese labor market, and the segments with 
which disadvantaged workers of all age groups compete, but moves to make the labor 
market more flexible are breaking down the old system and creating space for these 
disadvantaged groups.   
The context for generational conflict in Japan 
Japan’s demographic structure provides ample fodder for a “doom and gloom” 
scenario about political, social, and economic ramifications of population aging.  The 
median age in Japan is over 43 years and life expectancy is one of the longest in the 
world, meaning that their elderly live long past retirement—and long past their working 
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Source: ("World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007) 
The saving grace for Japan, however, is its sustained attention to the issue of population 
aging, which is very unlike the situation in Germany.  Though politicians may not have 
always instituted the most effective policies, they have recognized aging since around the 
1980s and continue to place the issue high on their agenda, even creating several 
ministries for low fertility and population aging.  According to Japan’s Cabinet Office, 
“In June 2003, the Headquarters for Youth Development was set up within the Cabinet, 
chaired by the Prime Minister, with all Cabinet ministers, as a framework to further 
promote policies for youth development. The Cabinet has also designated a minister 
extraordinare who is responsible for planning measures for youth development and 
mitigation of declining birthrate” ("White Paper on Youth 2005 in Japan" 2005).  
Since the most unique thing about Japan as a case study for aging is its advanced 
status, we begin by briefly examining Japan’s history with low fertility.  In no case do 
demographers have a consensus on why low fertility occurs, but in Japan a few particular 
reasons are frequently cited.  Though Japan is a more affluent society now than ever in its 
past, economic reasons seem to drive low fertility, particularly the high costs of 
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education.  The fiercely competitive and rigid educational system, combined with the 
chauvinistic society, has also been cited as a social disincentive to have children.  
Women, as the primary caretakers, prefer to avoid the exhausting job of mothering a 
Japanese school child (Coulmas 2007).  If a child performs poorly in school it is seen as 
the mother’s failure, and increases the pressure she feels.  Further, the wife of the eldest 
son is expected to take care of her husband’s aging parents ("Consensus and Contraction" 
2002).  The rigid social structure that excuses males from family responsibility and favors 
them with regards to employment is also cited as a cause of the decline in marriage and 
fertility and, ultimately, the graying of Japan.  Recently, some have argued that Japan’s 
emphasis on lifetime employment, or at least long-term relationships with employers, 
penalizes women who want to have children, making the idea of work and family even 
more incompatible than in other countries (Rosenbluth 2007).   
No matter the underlying reasons, a combination of four demographic factors is 
driving Japan’s population trend: later marriage, low fertility, high life expectancy, and 
nearly non-existent immigration.  In 1950, the average age at first marriage for men was 
26 and for women was 22.  By 2005, those averages had jumped to 29 years for men and 
nearly 28 years for women—the difference for males and females has been narrowing 
("White Paper on Youth 2005 in Japan" 2005).  One could argue that the reasons are 
related.  Men are perhaps marrying later because they have a hard time finding a mate, 
since marriageable women (meaning, of age) are finding the prospects of a life-long 
union increasingly undesirable.  
There is one clear similarity between Japan and Italy: the propensity for youth to 
rely on their parents for support instead of branching out on their own, getting married, 
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and having children.  Observers of Japanese youth often portray them as freewheeling 
and freeloading, spending their family’s money on shopping and travel instead of moving 
on to get their first home and establishing a traditional family life.  Even Japan’s Cabinet 
Office says, “The delay in social independence of youths, such as work instability and 
long-term dependency on their parents, present new problems” ("White Paper on Youth 
2005 in Japan" 2005).  Observers have even coined several terms to describe the idea that 
young people shun responsibility.   For example, “freeters” are those who are either 
unemployed or irregularly employed.  A freeter is “one who drifts from job to job rather 
than settling down to conventional employment.”  About ten percent of the fifteen million 
unmarried Japanese women between the ages of 20-34 are freeters ("Consensus and 
Contraction" 2002).  Japanese demographer Masahiro Yamada has coined a term to 
describe the increasing numbers of unmarried Japanese women who live with their 
parents: “parasitic singles.”  These women pay very little in rent to their parents and use 
their disposable income to travel and purchase designer goods.  The term “gives a name 
to the 60 per cent of unmarried men and 80 per cent of unmarried women between the 
ages of 24 and 30 who continue to live with their parents” (Coulmas 11).  When 
compared with their other options of joining the rigid employment system or entering 
into a demanding marriage, being a “parasitic single” looks quite attractive to these 
women (Butler and Whitelaw 1998).   
These statistics might not have such a dramatic effect on the birthrate were it not 
for the social stigma in Japan that looks unfavorably on childbirth outside of marriage—
only one percent of Japan’s babies are born out of wedlock ("Consensus and Contraction" 
2002).  The fertility rate has been below 2.1 since around 1955 and was 1.29 children per 
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woman between the period 2000-2005.  Because life expectancy for the population as a 
whole is one of the highest in the world—82.6 years—and the birthrate is low, only 14.6 
percent of the population was between the ages of 0-14 years in the year 2000, while over 
17 percent of the population was aged 65 and over—an obvious sign that Japan is graying 
("World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007).  Because 
of these trends Japan’s overall population is shrinking—quickly.  The first time the 
overall population experienced negative growth was between 2005-2010 when it shrank 
by -0.01 percent; between 2010 and 2015, however, it is expected to shrink by -0.18, and 
so on at an accelerating rate.  The shrinking is driven by declines in the youngest 
segments of the population.  Between fiscal years 2004 and 2005 the number of 
kindergarteners went down 7,000, the number of elementary school children 26,000, the 
number of junior high schoolers 85,000 and senior high schoolers 91,000.  The figure for 
elementary school children in 2005 was the lowest number recorded since the start of the 
Japanese government’s Basic Survey on Schools ("White Paper on Youth 2005 in Japan" 
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Source: ("World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007)  
 
 The above chart shows something a little different from the similar charts on 
Germany and Japan—the proportion of the population above age 80.  One of the benefits 
of a comparative study with only a few cases is that it provides an appropriate forum to 
take into account the unique qualities of each case.  One focus of this study is older 
generations, and typically by older generations we are concerned with both older 
workers—those in the decade or so before retirement—and retirees.  The categories of 
“working-age” and “older workers” are different in Japan than in Germany or Italy.  
While for the latter two we considered the working-age population to only extend to age 
60, in Japan the average retirement age is just under 70 years for men and 66 for women 
("Ageing and Employment Policies: Japan" 2005).  The above chart, then, considers 
working-age until age 65, because those data are readily available, but could go as far as 
around 67 or 68 years.  This is why the proportions of working-age are much higher than 
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those shown in the donut chart for Germany or Italy.  So in the sense that the ratio of 
workers to dependents is not as low as that in Germany or Italy, the context for 
generational conflict is actually not as bad.  Japanese live much longer than those in other 
countries, especially Japanese women: life expectancy at birth for women born between 
2005-2010 is 86 years ("World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population 
Database" 2007).  But because people work so long in Japan, long life expectancy isn’t 
the kind of drain on the state that we might expect—people are not exiting the workforce 
early and then living off of the state for twenty or more years, but are actively working as 
long as possible.  What might make a difference is healthcare costs, however.  According 
to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Japan will fare worse in 
the future aging crisis than many of its western counterparts.  Between 2000 and 2020 
public financing of long-term care is projected to increase 20%-21% in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, but 102% in Japan” (CDC 2003).  Generous benefits, a 
high number of aged, and a longer life expectancy are a few of the reasons for this 
discrepancy.   
 Countries worry about population aging because healthcare expenditures are so 
much higher for the elderly than for any other group.  In developed countries the 
healthcare cost per capita for those over 65 years is three to five times greater than for 
those who are younger (CDC 2003).  Japan is often referred to as a victim of its own 
progress because by having improved its population’s overall health and extending life-
expectancy, they will be paying more for elderly healthcare, and for longer.  
Technological innovation often compounds the problem, as it often creates upward 
pressure on healthcare spending (CDC 2003). 
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So, in Japan, as with Germany and Italy, the context for generational conflict is 
set because of both demographic structure and government spending—both of which 
favor older cohorts.  As in the previous chapters, the following table lists spending three 
ways: per person, at current prices and current purchasing power parities (PPPH) in 
current US dollars; as a percentage of gross domestic product (PCT_GDP); and as a 
percentage of total general government expenditure (PCT_GOV).  The category of old 
age spending includes pensions and retirement (OECD category OLD AGE); survivor 
benefits for widows and widowers; and disability measures, including incapacity-related 
benefits and employment measures for the disabled.  The category of youth includes all 
family benefits, as categorized by the OECD, and youth-related Active Labor Market 
Programs (ALMPs): those specific to youth, measures for disadvantaged youth, and 
apprentice allowances.  Because labor policy is central to this study, data on 
unemployment (minus early retirement for labor market reasons) are shown at the bottom 




Table 4.1 – Social expenditure in Japan (in millions):  
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 






































































































































































































































































































Source: ("The Social Expenditure Database" 2007) 
* Minus early retirement for labor market reasons 
Blank spots indicate that data were unavailable
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 Social spending on the aged is many times that on youth, as in Germany and Italy, 
though in Italy old age spending takes up more of the government’s budget.  In 2003, 
spending on the aged—excluding healthcare—was 26.4 percent of government spending, 
while that on youth-specific programs was only 2.0 percent.  Spending needs for these 
two groups is different, as the types of programs for youth, such as education, are not as 
expensive as pensions.  But one of the more remarkable trends is the growing disparity in 
spending.  Over time, spending on older generations has grown as a percentage of GDP 
while that on youth has stayed flat.  These patterns make sense since older cohorts are 
growing and youth cohorts are shrinking, but they still illustrate a general trend that many 
cite as part of the context for generational inequality.   












Source: ("The Social Expenditure Database" 2007) 
Japanese institutions 
 Though Japan’s population is the most aged on the planet, with over half of the 
population at least 43 years old, and social spending on the aged greatly outweighs that 
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on youth, it is important to explore how societal interests are channeled through Japan’s 
political institutions, and to measure the success of the aged in the arena of labor policy 
in order to have a comprehensive picture of the politics of aging in Japan.  This section 
describes the institutional setting in Japan and the ways in which various actors, 
particularly political parties and voters, navigate these institutions.  One of the most 
unique aspects of Japan’s institutional setting is its party system.  Very different from 
Germany and Italy, Japan’s party system was dominated for decades by one party, the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and has only recently begun to move to a more 
competitive party system, though still nowhere near the multiparty system of Germany.  
If with the multiparty systems we saw parties differentiate their platforms—often on the 
basis of age—to appeal to niches of voters, in Japan we expect the opposite.  Under 
Japan’s more limited system, parties should try to appeal to the broadest segments of the 
population as possible, rather than narrow generational interests.  Such an assertion is a 
bit counterintuitive: in the world’s most aged society, one might expect that parties would 
try to appeal to the large blocks of aged voters more than anywhere else in the world.  
But, that is why institutions matter: demography is not destiny.  Indeed, I find that parties 
do make broad appeals, confirming the hypothesis.  The organization of the state in Japan 
is less relevant to this study than its party system, but some allusions to its unitary nature 
and moves toward decentralization will be covered in order to provide an additional point 
of comparison with Italy and Germany.  This section first briefly describes the political 
party system in Japan and then examines contemporary party politics, paying particular 
attention to aging issues.  
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 Japan’s political party system is unique in that one particular party dominated 
politics for most of its post-War history.  The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ruled 
Japan and provided the country’s prime minister from 1955 until its split in 1993 without 
the need for coalition formation.  Hrebenar (2001) notes that this is one of the longest 
ruling periods in any democracy in the world.  One of the five internal factions of the 
LDP left in 1993 and joined with other non-LDP parties to form a government.  The LDP 
then had to ally with the Socialists and an LDP splinter group to form governments 
between 1994-6 (Hrebenar 2001, 158).  Its main opposition party during the times of its 
dominance was the Japan Socialist Party (JSP)—the JSP lost their second place position 
after the 1996 elections and earned just a handful of seats in the 2000 elections.  Now, the 
two main parties are the LDP—which is still dominant, though cracking—and the 
Democratic Party (DPJ)—as the opposition party.  Though the system has at times over 
the last several years been growing more competitive, movement has not been linear or 
uniform.  Just as commentators write the LDP’s obituary they will resurge in the polls 
and capture that dominant position yet again. 
 Japan underwent electoral reforms around the same time as those in Italy.  After 
1994, Japan adopted a hybrid electoral system of 300 single-member district (SMD) and 
200 (later amended to 180) proportional representation (PR) seats.  Krauss and Pekkanen 
(2004, 8) say, “the LDP is able to continue being the largest party...because it can be 
successful in the 300 SMD-seat portion of the system; it has difficulty remaining the sole 
governing party because the 180-seat PR portion gives incentives for smaller parties to 
continue to exist and deprive the LDP of a majority of seats, thus producing a limited 
multiparty system with coalition governments...”  Since Krauss and Pekkanen wrote, 
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however, politics in Japan have changed even more.  There have been more electoral 
reforms and the last couple of elections show that the 1994 change in electoral rules may 
have begun to do what it was intended for in the beginning—unseat the LDP.  Their 
downfall began with the 2005 Upper House elections; though the LDP had a landslide 
victory with 219 single-member seats and 77 proportional representation seats, the DPJ 
had a respectable showing of 52 and 61 seats, respectively, showing that they perform 
well under PR rules but not as well under winner-take-all (SMD) rules.  In July 2007 
even more unprecedented changes occurred and in the House of Councillors election the 
DPJ won 20 PR seats to the LDP’s 14 and New Komeito (NK) won a respectable 7.  In 
prefectural seats the DPJ won nearly twice as many seats as the LDP—40 to their 23—
and independents won 7 ("Japan Statistical Yearbook 2008" 2008).  Though not all seats 
were up for election the DPJ was still able to unseat the LDP ending 2007 with 109 to 83 
seats.  In the House of Representatives, however, the LDP is still very strong with 304 
seats and only 113 for the DPJ and NK at 31 (Strength of Political Groups in the Houses 
2008).  Thus, it is premature to say that the LDP has lost its dominant position, though 
the political atmosphere is certainly different now that the DPJ has show itself to be a 
viable opposition party. 
 Though before 1994 the LDP needed no coalition power to rule, now “The party 
[LDP] does not rule Japan by itself, for it is seriously checked by major interest groups, 
its own factional rivalries, bureaucrats representing key government ministries, major 
corporations, and even foreign governments and interests” (Hrebenar 2001, 168).  The 
DPJ was created in 1998 when several opposition parties came together to try and oppose 
LDP.  In Sept 2003, the DPJ merged with the Liberal Party (LP) to mount a challenge 
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against the LDP.  When the new DPJ was formed on 24 September 1998 they had 137 
seats in the House of Representatives and 67 in the House of Councillors (Kato 2004, 
1047).  The LDP merged with the Komei Party and New Conservative Party and this 
helped them keep charge of the government.  
 As in previous chapters, one of the primary sources this study relies on to 
understand how the parties target different generations is the party manifesto.  In Japan 
this is particularly useful, as the party manifesto holds a central place.  Since 2003 
political parties have been required to formally list their party policy platform as a 
campaign promise (Estevez-Abe 2006), a measure that the DPJ pushed for.  In my review 
of the most recently available party manifestos, I find that the parties try to appeal very 
broadly to all age groups; though they do put forth proposals with age-related themes 
they usually address the needs of children, youth, families and prime-age workers, and 
older generations—there is something for everyone. 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
 The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) consistently exemplifies the broad 
generational appeal.  In their 2001 manifesto for the House of Councillors elections they 
appeal to all ages by saying that they want to make it easier to balance work and family, 
get young people into work, and end age discrimination, which is “a major obstacle for 
middle-aged and older unemployed people.”  They go on to talk about generational 
equity, even framing their ideas for the future of the pension system in a way that will not 
alienate any one generation: “As we enter an era of fewer children and more elderly 
people, it is important to allay the fears of younger people concerning social security and 
to build a social security system that fits Japan’s changing circumstances.  The DPJ will 
 
 185 
guarantee a minimum level of income through pensions, income support and other 
measures” ("Policies for the 19th House of Councillors Elections" 2001).  It seems as if 
they try to portray the LDP as old and stagnant, and themselves as fresh and new by 
saying in multiple documents that the “DPJ is a party dominated by young professionals” 
(Brief History of the DPJ 2006).  They keep emphasizing young bureaucrats and seem 
like they are trying to get rid of some form of “gerontocracy,” perhaps blaming the LDP 
for being very “old”: “We will change the conventional seniority-based personnel 
practices at the heart of the bureaucracy, forming a Kantei policy team comprising young 
bureaucrats, private individuals, academics, and others who are competent and brimming 
with enthusiasm for reform, irrespective of age, gender, or background" ("Creating a 
Dynamic Japan: Towards a Secure Society" 2003, 25).  It seems that here they are 
alluding to the difficulties young politicians may have in expressing their voice in 
politics, perhaps blaming the LDP because through their long dominance they have been 
able to set the standards.  
 For their 2003 manifesto, none of the DPJ’s five pledges had a generational 
component but, of their two proposals (different from the pledges), one is geared at the 
young and one at the old, again demonstrating their attempts at a broad appeal.  They 
again frame pension reform broadly: “There will come a day when today’s children and 
young people reach pension-recipient age. We will also create a reliable pension system 
that can be trusted by both current and future generations” ("Creating a Dynamic Japan: 
Towards a Secure Society" 2003, 16).15  In their 2004 manifesto they want to “Enhance 
nursing care, health, medical care to support an affluent greying society” (p. 8), but also 
                                                 
15 Though not age related, it is interesting to note just how broad the DPJ’s appeals are: they frequently 
make reference to meeting the needs of the disabled. 
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“use ‘Young Work Service Centres’ to help young people to gain qualifications and find 
employment” ("Directly and Single-mindedly: Together with the People, Creating a New 
Kind of Politics and a New Japan" 2004, 15).  In their most recent 2007 manifesto, 
though pensions are the first thing they mention, they still spend a lot of time talking 
about benefits at each stage of life, from pregnancy to old-age healthcare ("Putting 
People's Lives First" 2007). 
New Komeito (NK) 
 New Komeito is another important Japanese party that also makes broad 
generational appeals.  By the way of background, in 1994 the party Komeito split and 
became Komei and the Komei New Party; the latter became the New Frontier Party with 
the Japan Democratic Socialist Party.  They claim that the NFP in 1995 ushered in the 
two-party system in Japan when they won 12,506,322 PR votes in the 17th House of 
Councillors election but the LDP only captured 11,096,972 in the same district.  The NFP 
disbanded in December 1997 and some members merged with Komei and some formed 
the New Peace Party.  New Komeito has been around since November of 1998 when 
Komei and the New Peace Party (NPP) joined.  One of the party’s documents claims the 
former Komeito “illuminated the plight of politically neglected, weaker members of our 
society.”  They saw themselves as having a kind of third way from the LDP and Social 
Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ).  According to their document on their history, Komei 
and the NPP were crucial players after the LDP defeat in the Upper House election in 
2007, when they needed 22 members of the opposition to join them in order for them to 
have a majority.  The two parties (Komeito and NPP) formed New Komeito in November 
of 2007 ("Our History and Birth of "New Komeito"" 2007).  
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 Like the DPJ and other parties, though they mention the issues and concerns of 
different age groups specifically, they still try to appeal to the concerns of all generations 
equally.  For example, they have separate pages for initiatives for children and for the 
elderly on their web page.  They are concerned about finding jobs for youth and say that 
“New Komeito played a pivotal role in the 2004 launch of a one-stop placement service 
catering specifically for young people” ("Economic Initiatives" 2008).  Like the DPJ, 
they are concerned about the physician shortfall, especially in obstetrics and gynecology.  
They want to establish daycare facilities at the hospitals these physicians work for to 
“ease the often-conflicting demands of career and family.”  They also want to secure 
pension financing and make sure pensions are secure, and want to expand eligibility for 
the supplemental pension benefit package (National Pension Fund system).  They also 
have some pronatalist policy proposals, wanting to improve childcare support and give 
cash subsidies to parents with children through the ninth grade (presumably to help allay 
the cost of education).  They again reference the high cost of education by arguing for 
student loan help.  They are also concerned with elderly housing and making sure that 
“senior citizens and other low-income residents can continue renting state-subsidized 
apartments.”  Their concerns about and attention to issues from childcare and pensions 
demonstrate their wide generational appeal.   
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 
 The JCP has been around since the 1920s, and thus has been a successful 
opposition party, though never having won enough seats to be competitive against the 
LDP.  In their 2007 manifesto, they focus on their opposition to the rewriting of the 
Japanese Constitution that would allow the Japanese Self Defense Forces to have a more 
 
 188 
proactive role.  Though they do not give prominence to age-related issues, they do spend 
a few pages talking about them. They want better health coverage for pre-school children 
and those who need nursing care and want to “improve conditions for raising children 
without anxiety.”  They say that “Both men and women should be able to work while 
raising children” and “Parents’ economic burdens for child raising should be reduced” 
("Japanese Communist Party Manifesto" 2007). 
 They are concerned about cutbacks in welfare services and the worsening job 
situation and oppose the tax increases that have taken place under the LDP, and were 
called for by Komei.  Other than concerns over the mismanagement of the pension 
system,16 there is little generational appeal.  However, we should not necessarily consider 
their attention to the pension scandals as a generational appeal.  Rather, I believe it is just 
another way to point out the shortcomings of the ruling government.  Likely, even if the 
scandal had been over mismanagement of elementary school funds rather than pensions 
they would have spoken out just as vehemently.   
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
 The LDP is known for being conservative, promoting traditional Japanese values, 
having a pro-business orientation, and being pro-US military and foreign policy—they 
are not particularly known for their stances on age-related issues. The results of one 
survey asking prefectural chapter executives to choose one of four policy areas they think 
should be on the top of the new Cabinet’s agenda found that rural-urban issues are more 
important to LDP officials than pension reform.  The officials could choose from the 
pension issue; income disparity; foreign diplomacy and national security; and fiscal 
reconstruction:   
                                                 
16 The LDP “mismanaged” pension records and lost many.   
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 According to the survey, narrowing the income disparity between urban and rural 
 areas was the most pressing issue facing single-seat constituencies where the LDP 
 took a severe beating in the Upper House election.  The LDP lost in most of the 
 29 single-seat constituencies, but won Fukui and Gunma, a prefecture represented 
 by Fukuda.  Chapters in 21 single-seat constituencies, including Iwate, Toyama, 
 Shimane, Okayama, Kumamoto prefectures, said income disparity should be the 
 main issue addressed. ("Most LDP chapters say income gap the key issue" 2007)   
 
Rather than pension reform, an issue with clear generational appeal, LDP politicians 
focused on the non-age related issue of rural-urban income disparity. 
 Even the JCP buys into the hypothesis of this study, that Japan’s party system 
leads parties to have platforms that appeal to the broadest segments of the population 
possible, as they say of the 2007 House of Councillors election: “The Democratic Party 
(DPJ) is trying hard to stage its ‘confrontation’ with the LDP.  However, the policy line 
that has been followed by the DPJ is indistinguishable from the LDP line” ("Japanese 
Communist Party Manifesto" 2007).  In their 2007 manifesto, the LDP proposes the 
expansion of job opportunities for the elderly and “Dankai” generation, utilizing their 
skills by re-employment and training of their successors.17  They also propose that work-
life balance must be adjusted in order to harmonize child rearing and work, and propose 
to reduce long working hours, promote “tele-work”, and promote vacations and reduction 
of working hours for those raising a child.  They also propose that the financial 
compensation for parental leave should be raised from 40 percent to 50 percent of one’s 
salary.  In a similar vein, the LDP proposes a “male-female joint participation society,” 
where women more actively participate in every field ("Public promises for nation-wide 
regional elections (2007): Energy to communities, energy by growth" 2007).  In their 
2005 manifesto the LDP makes an appeal to reduce the mismatch of employment by 
                                                 
17 The Dankai generation is composed of baby boomers born after WWII, more specifically from 1947 




expanding “Silver Human Resource Centers” for the aged but also wants to bring youth 
into the full-time labor force ("Big Changes Are Vital For the Nation's Future" 2005).  
These broad appeals are present in the 2004 and 2003 manifestos as well ("Public 
promises for the upper house (2004): Koizumi's reform further advanced" 2004, ; "Public 
promises of the governing party: Declaration of Koizumi's Reform" 2003).  
 To understand the policy positions of the LDP we are also in the unique position 
of being able to look at their actions as the main governing party, rather than just the 
words they publish in their manifestos.  Though the LDP has a reputation within the 
media as a “gray” party, favoring the old, under their rule a number of reforms to reduce 
pension payouts have gone through.  One of “the most politicised was a series of bills on 
pension reforms. Facing the rapid aging of society, the government proposed increasing 
contributions (for the employed by 0.345 per cent of their wages and for the self-
employed by ¥3.360 annually) by 2017 and cutting benefits from approximately 50 per 
cent to 40 per cent of the average income by 2023.”  Though opposition parties opposed 
these measures, they did not do so on behalf of older generations.  Instead, they just 
wanted to put forth their own proposals: “For example, the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) proposed a plan to unify pension systems that were divided according to 
occupation and finance the basic pension by an additional levy of a 3 per cent 
consumption tax” (Kato 2005, 1073).  Under LDP rule the bill to increase medical 
charges for the elderly from October 2002 and for salaried workers from April 2003 
passed despite strong opposition from doctors and the opposition parties (Kato 2003, 
1000).  Thus, while the LDP may have the reputation of being a party for older 
generations, they have not been afraid to make the kinds of reforms to the pension system 
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necessary to keep Japan’s budget sustainable.  One final political move to mention is the 
LDP’s support for age limits for politicians.  At Koizumi’s initiative, “the LDP adopted a 
rule that bans candidates over age 73 from running in the proportional representation 
segment of Lower House elections” (Coulmas 2007, 99).  But, there is still no age limit 
for candidates running in single-seat representation districts.  Koizumi was well known in 
the press for bringing a youthful glow to the LDP and helping to shed its stolid, gray 
image.  These age limits were perhaps one other way to help reinvent the party as new 
and fresh.  
Generational response to parties 
 As the previous section demonstrated, political parties in Japan’s party system do 
not attempt to appeal to particular age groups, but instead appeal widely across 
generations.  Do the generations, then, respond by evenly supporting the parties?  Or do 
particular age groups tend to support certain parties over others?  The most important 
finding is that those of older ages are much more likely to identify with a particular 
political party than those of the youngest cohort.  The youngest members of Japan’s 
electorate are particularly apathetic, but parties still attempt to try and draw them into the 
political process.  Youth are more likely to vote for New Komeito than older generations, 
who still favor the LDP.  Support for the DPJ in 2005 did not vary by age. 
 As mentioned in the introduction, oftentimes those in the academy and media who 
comment on population aging claim that a gerontocracy is a political system in which the 
old are far more active in politics than younger generations.  I argued that whether or not 
older generations were more active did not matter very much for questions of 
generational conflict or equity, as long as those voters were not voting in their interests 
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only to the exclusion of youth.  But if there ever were to be a case where this form of 
gerontocracy exists, it is Japan.  Similar to many other democracies, elderly Japanese 
participate in elections to a much greater degree than do youth, but Japanese youth seem 
to be particularly apathetic.  In Japan, “In 1980, 63.1 per cent of voters in their twenties 
went to the polls...By the 1996 election, the generation gap had widened, as political 
apathy spread among the younger cohorts...[the turnout] of the youngest segment was 
down to 36.4 per cent” (Coulmas 2007, 97).  In that same 1996 election the turnout of the 
65 and over cohort was 70.7 percent.  The pattern was even more pronounced in the 2005 
general election, where 23 percent of men and 33 percent of women aged 20-29 did not 
vote, but only 3 percent of those aged 60 and over abstained (p. 97).   
 The voting age in Japan is 20 and given the increasing number of potential older 
voters and declining number of potential youth voters, most parties have argued to lower 
the voting age to 18. Though a National Referendum Law granting 18-year olds the right 
to vote on constitutional amendments passed on 14 May 2007, the voting age for 
elections is still 20 years.  All parties seem to be in favor of lowering the voting age, 
though Coulmas (2007) argues that the LDP has been the least enthusiastic.  New 
Komeito (NK) frames the proposal in terms of population aging: “Given the consistently 
poor voter turnout in Japan over the years and the demographic shift toward the elderly, 
New Komeito believes it is imperative that young people also be granted the right and 
opportunity to choose for themselves the political course of their country” ("Editorial: 
Lower voting age to 18" 2007).  But because youth turnout is so low, a lower voting age 
would not do much to counteract the elderly vote—there were over 25 million potential 
voters over age 65 in 2005 and only 16 million between the ages of 20 and 29.  Because 
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the 15-19-year-old age cohort has about one million less than the 20-25-year-old cohort 
two extra years would not make much of a difference ("World Population Prospects: The 
2006 Revision Population Database" 2007).  But these statistics are why an institutional 
argument, such as the one this study makes, is so appealing.  It seems that political parties 
would attempt to court increasing proportions of elderly voters, but as the previous 
review of party manifestos shows, they do not.   
 Though the DPJ claims that they want to lower the voting age “in response to the 
growing political awareness of young people,” there isn’t much evidence to show that 
young people are suddenly becoming interested in politics ("Directly and Single-
mindedly: Together with the People, Creating a New Kind of Politics and a New Japan" 
2004).  The following chart describes political party support in Japan for the three major 
age cohorts: youth, prime-age workers, and older generations, as surveyed about party 
preference in 2002.  Support for the LDP remains robust, with 67 percent of respondents 
who identify with a party choosing the LDP.  New Komeito and the Democratic Party of 
Japan are a distant second with eight to ten percent of respondents’ favor.  Across age 
groups, it appears that support for the LDP increases with age, while support for the DPJ 
and New Komeito declines.  For those 65 years and older, support is nearly exclusively 
for the LDP.  Considering that that group has been voting the LDP in for decades, this is 
no surprise.  The opposite is true for support for New Komeito; support wanes with age, 
with over a quarter of those under 30 supporting NK, and only 8 percent of those 65 and 
over supporting them.  As we have in a few other instances, we have to ask whether it is 
really age that matters, or the particular generations.  Once those voters who grew up 
under LDP dominance pass on, will younger generations switch their votes from parties 
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like the DPJ?  As many of the studies mentioned in the introduction found, this will not 
likely be the case—party preference tends to deepen with age, not switch (Binstock and 
Day 1996).  So, while we can say today that elderly Japanese prefer the LDP to a greater 
extent than young Japanese, there are sound reasons to believe that this is temporary. 
 To determine patterns of party support for different age groups we turn to the 
ISSP data.  These data are more useful than actual election results because so many youth 
abstain from voting.  These surveys, then, allow us to determine what percentage of 
youth do or do not prefer a particular party and what party those who do have a 
preference support.   
Table 4.2 – Party support in 2002,18 of those with a party preference 
 LDP DPJ LP NK JCP SDPJ OTHER N 
18-30 56% 16% 0% 28% 0% 0% 0% 25 
31-64 66% 8% 3% 10% 4% 7% 1% 283 
65+ 73% 6% 4% 8% 4% 4% .5% 140 
Total 67% 8% 3% 10% 4% 6% 1% 448 
Source: ("International Social Survey Programme 2002: Family and Changing Gender Roles III" 2002).  
 
Though the preceding numbers seem to indicate a generational split over support for the 
LDP and other parties, more important numbers are obscured by focusing on only this 
segment of the sample.  While 448, or 42 percent, of respondents identified with one of 
these major parties, 624, or 58 percent, said that they had no party preference.  Again, 
there are major differences with age.  The n for the youngest cohorts supporting political 
parties is small, so we should not read too much into their waning support for the LDP.  
However, it is small because so many of this cohort have no political party preference at 
all.  In this age group of 18-30, 127 respondents said that they had no preference for a 
political party—that is 83 percent of respondents.  By contrast, 58 percent and 43 percent 
                                                 
18 These parties are the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ); Liberal Party 
(LP), which disbanded in 2003 and joined the DPJ; New Komeito (NK); Japanese Communist Party (JCP); 
and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). 
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of those ages 31-64 and 65 and over, respectively, had no preference.  These data support 
the claim that “Japanese identify themselves as supporters of a party less than citizens in 
any other consolidated democracy” (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004, 12). 
Table 4.3 – Preferences in Japan, 2002 
 Party 
preference (n) 





18-30 25 16% 127 83% 152 
31-64 283 42% 392 58% 675 
65+ 140 57% 105 43% 245 
Totals 448 42% 624 58% 1072 
Source: ("International Social Survey Programme 2002: Family and Changing Gender Roles III" 2002).  
 
As the preceding table shows, there is a lot less support for political parties than in 
Germany and Italy, especially among the younger cohorts. Low citizen participation in 
general and widespread apathy is a somewhat unique aspect of Japanese politics.  As 
Hrebenar (2001, 169) says: 
There has been a long-standing discussion in Japan about what many have 
called Japan’s ‘spectator democracy,’ which refers to the fact that the average 
Japanese citizen participates very little in the political process beyond casting 
an occasional vote.  This seems especially true in terms of political party 
participation and interest group lobbying. 
 
But there are still major generational differences, as we saw previously.  Those of older 
ages are much more likely to identify with a particular political party than those of the 
youngest cohort, 83 percent of whom have no party preference at all.  Again, because 
they are so uninterested in party politics one might think that political parties would avoid 
courting them at all.  But as we saw above parties still devote as much time to youth 
issues in their manifestos as they do to issues that affect older generations.  A 2005 ISSP 
survey revealed a change in the pattern.  Only 66 percent of respondents aged 18-30 
claimed that they had no political party preference—a 17 point decline.  In 2002, 43 
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percent of those aged 65 and older had no preference, whereas in 2005 only 29 percent 
felt that way.  It seems that either parties’ attempts to reach out to voters, perhaps through 
the new emphasis on manifestos, worked or that the political atmosphere changed in a 
way that galvanized the citizenry.  It will be enlightening to see the next iteration of the 
ISSP survey to determine whether or not this is a trend.  
Table 4.4 – Political party preference, 2005 
 LDP DPJ NK JCP SDPJ N (for 
preference) 
NONE* 
18-29 42% 19% 29% 3% 6% 31 66% 
30-49 62% 21% 11% 5% 0% 98 59% 
50-64 70% 19% 6% 3% 3% 145 42% 
65+ 72% 18% 4% 2% 4% 188 29% 
Total 67% 19% 8% 3% 3% 464 46% 
Source: ("International Social Survey Programme 2005: Work Orientation III" 2005) 
* Out of the total.  These numbers were excluded from the party calculations, which show support out of 
those who answered that they did prefer a particular party. 
 
 In this 2005 survey, of those who preferred a particular party, 29 percent of those 
aged 18-39 favored NK, while proportions declined dramatically by age, to only 4 
percent of respondents aged 65+.  Support for the LDP again declined with age, but 
support for the DPJ was steady across age groups, a result very different from the 2002 
survey where support declined with age.  Actual election results support these findings.  
In the most recent Japanese elections DPJ performed better than ever, and since we know 
that elderly voter turnout is at least twice as high as youth turnout, it was certainly those 
older voters who helped secure so many DPJ victories.  Either the DPJ was successful in 
courting older voters between 2002 and 2005, or these older voters were turned off by the 
LDP and switched allegiances out of protest. 
 Though political parties do not target specific age groups to the exclusion of 
others, what these surveys from 2002 and 2005 show is that there are still major 
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generational differences in support for parties.  Additionally, though there were some 
generational differences in Germany and Italy, the percentages did not even come close 
to approximating the divide in Japan between young and old voters.  This most likely 
means that younger voters identify less with the monolithic LDP than older voters who 
lived under decades of LDP dominance.  The reputation of the LDP is not particularly 
rosy, with accusations of corruption and overly close ties to business interests tainting the 
party.  But if we take a closer look at the 2005 data another pattern emerges that points to 
much less of a generational difference.  In the 2005 elections, NK joined the LDP in a 
coalition government and supported LDP leader Junichiro Koizumi.  Assuming that the 
population was aware of this alliance—which hopefully is not a bold assumption—when 
we compare the survey results for LDP/NK across age groups we get a very different 
result.  Seventy-one percent of those 18-20 supported LDP/NK, while 73 percent of those 
30-49, 76 percent of those 50-64, and 76 percent of those 65+ did.  So, when we compare 
the two major blocks of parties: LDP/NK and DPJ, there is very little difference across 
age groups.  The big difference, then, is that younger voters are more attracted to the NK 
half of the alliance than the LDP half.   
Role of outside organized interests  
 One potentially fruitful area to explore in the future will be the role of outside 
organized interests.  In Japan, these will most likely be business organizations, as “Senior 
citizens are a huge and growing voter group, but there is not much for them in terms of 
organized political participation with particular political agendas” (Coulmas 2007, 99).  
There is a Federation of Senior Citizens’ Clubs, but it has never aligned with a political 
party.  Noted expert on Japanese demography, Florian Coulmas, argues that “In the past, 
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elderly voters have seen their interests well protected by LDP-led governments, which 
may explain why a strong nationwide political lobby of the elderly has never emerged” 
(Coulmas 2007, 100).  So, as far as groups besides parties with the ability to influence the 
political process, business interests are by far the most influential, especially the umbrella 
organization of the Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) (Hrebenar 
2001).  As the JCP says, “The fact that DPJ shares the LDP position is clear from its 
relationship with the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren). In drafting its 
policies, the DPJ holds discussion with Nippon Keidanren to have its policy proposals 
assessed and receives donations in accordance with the assessment” ("Japanese 
Communist Party Manifesto" 2007).  
Labor issues 
The previous sections have addressed how and why the politics of aging could 
have a role in Japan by focusing on the two-party system.  Our expectations that Japanese 
political parties would attempt to appeal to the broadest segments possible were 
confirmed by a review of recent party manifestos.  Though parties often focused on age-
related issues like education, family policy, and pensions, they did so equally for all age 
groups.  Among the citizens themselves, however, there are major differences by age.  
Young people are particularly apathetic towards political parties and participation in the 
political system.  But, parties have not responded by changing their focus; instead parties 
seem to be more interested in trying to draw young people into politics than exclude them 
to focus on the large blocks of elderly voters.  This section adds a final layer to the 
discussion by examining in greater detail the policies addressing generational labor issues 
within the context of population aging.  Though parties do not appear to target certain age 
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groups and exclude others, do policies in Japan favor the numerous old over the 
dwindling young?  To answer this, the following paragraphs describe the labor market 
situation in Japan to set the context within which policymaking takes place so that we can 
understand why certain policies have been implemented.  Though Japan has many 
similarities with Germany, Italy, and other OECD countries, a few aspects are important 
to point out.  First are the gender issues, which are relevant because they affect prime-age 
women and because the difficulties of combining work and family are part of what is 
driving Japan’s low fertility and population aging.  The second important aspect is the 
longevity of the work career in Japan and the third is the exclusion of youth from the 
labor market.  Within the discussion of older and younger workers I review the history 
and effects of some of the most recent important legislation.  I find that though the 
system was initially set up in a way that favored seniority and age, politicians have been 
working hard to combat youth unemployment and bring young people into the labor 
market.  As with the previous chapters, this review of policies is merely meant to be 
illustrative, not comprehensive. 
 In Italy, labor policy changes were driven in large part by pressures from the EU 
as Italy tried to meet their standards.  In Japan, a different kind of external pressure in the 
1990s led to the beginnings of new labor policies.  When the Japanese bubble economy 
burst in the 1990s, by far the most devastated segment of the labor force was the 
youngest.  For this reason the press and many scholars refer to the 1990s as the “lost 
decade” or the “ice age”.  According to the DPJ:  
During the long period of economic stagnation that followed the collapse of 
Japan’s bubble economy, young people faced difficult employment conditions.  
Many new graduates were unable to find work, or could not find regular 
employment.  Even now that the economy is improving, people who joined the 
 
 200 
workforce during the severely depressed ‘employment ice age’ and who are 
now in their 30s or younger cannot make an easy transition to regular 
employment.” ("Putting People's Lives First" 2007, 28)   
 
In Japan, the number of youth in the labor force jumps about five-fold when going from 
the 5-year age group 15-19 to 20-25.  So, we will consider figures for youth employment 
starting at age 20, and following the Japanese Cabinet Office, will go to age 29, though 
some government categorizations consider youth up to age 34.  According to the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare, the number of underemployed youths who lacked 
fulltime employment or were unemployed was around 2,170,000 in 2003 ("White Paper 
on Youth 2005 in Japan" 2005).  By age group, there were 130,000 unemployed persons 
in the 15 to 19 age group, 480,000 in the 20 to 24 age group, and 480,000 in the 25 to 29 
age group.  For this group ages 20-29 unemployment was low during the first half of the 
1990s but began to rise sharply after 1997 until 2003 when it began its decent, thanks to 
attention by the government and better economic conditions overall. 
















































Source: ("Labour Force Survey (Time Series)" 2008) 
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 Brinton (2007, 418) warns that we must be aware of the “‘cohort effect’ 
experienced by the current young generation; the repercussions of highly circumscribed 
job opportunities are likely to play themselves out as this cohort ages into its thirties and 
beyond.”  Any assessment of youth labor issues should consider that it may not be 
“youth” employment, per se, that is really under the microscope, but particular youth 
cohorts’ employment.  In an earlier section of this chapter that described Japan’s 
population we introduced the terms parasitic singles and freeters.  These categories are 
relevant to this discussion of the labor market as well.  The Cabinet Office reports that a 
2002 Employment Status Survey conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIC) found that: 
as many as 430,000 young people at ages between 15 and 34 years, who are 
neither married nor students, are not making any effort to find a job despite the 
fact that they desire to get employed. It was also found that another 420,000 
people in the same age group and same status have no intention of finding a 
fulltime job. 
  
 A 2004 Labour Force Survey by the MIC found that 640,000 youth aged 15-34 do 
not have a job, home duties, nor are they attending school ("White Paper on Youth 2005 
in Japan" 2005).  When you read through documents and web pages on the Japanese 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare website (such as the aforementioned “White 
Paper on Youth 2005 in Japan”) you get the sense that they buy into the idea that 
Japanese youth—and the parents who spoil them—are partly to blame for their own 
troubles.  They use the terms parasitic singles and freeters frequently and also cite 
surveys about youth being uninterested in finding jobs or intimidated by the process.  To 
them, then, one way to combat youth unemployment is by changing the attitudes of youth 
themselves.  To combat these issues, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
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“deploys ‘job supporters for young workers’ at public employment security offices 
nationwide. Those supporters are supposed to provide youths with continuous support 
from the job seeking stage to the training stages after employment. For example, they 
arrange workplace tours for school students to gain good understanding about workplaces 
even before leaving a school” ("White Paper on Youth 2005 in Japan" 2005).  
 Yuji Genda (2005) argues that the discourse in the 1990s about parasitic singles 
and freeters was actually misplaced.  He argues instead that firms’ preservation of jobs 
for more experienced workers has limited the number of entry-level jobs.  This goes 
against a lot of economic research on the job market that shows that skill level matters 
more than age—low skilled workers trade off with other low skilled workers no matter 
their age, and the same for high skilled workers.  But, because the employment system in 
Japan is extremely rigid and favors lifetime employment, this argument may have merit 
when considering those older workers below mandatory retirement age.  Katz and 
Darbishire (2000, 230) argue that in Japan wages are usually determined primarily by 
seniority and secondarily by skill level.  Genda also argues that raising the retirement age 
could damage job opportunities for young people.  This leads to our discussion of the 
labor force context for older workers. 
 In Japan, the employment situation is so different from that in Germany and Italy 
that in order to discuss older workers we really need to divide the category into two 
groups: those older workers before mandatory retirement age (the group aged 50-60) and 
those who find other employment afterwards (the group aged 60-70).  Most estimates of 
“working age” for developed states stop at 60 or 65 years, but in Japan labor force 
participation and employment rates are high for older people, compared with its OECD 
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peers.  To a small degree this larger pool of “working age” forestalled the time when 
Japan’s labor force would shrink, but low fertility and aging have now caught up and 
Japan’s available labor force has begun to contract.  Job opportunities and employment 
varies within the group of older workers.  According to the OECD ("Ageing and 
Employment Policies: Japan" 2005, 69), “the government’s policy of raising the legal 
minimum age of mandatory retirement may have improved job security for men in their 
late 50s but at the expense of men in their early 60s.”  Unlike many other countries, 
Germany especially, Japan did not institute measures to force early retirement during 
economic downturns in order to create more job openings ("Ageing and Employment 
Policies: Japan" 2005, 13).  Japan began much earlier than Germany in trying to keep its 
older workers from taking alternative pathways out of the workforce.  In 1995 the 
government introduced The Employment Continuation Benefit for Aged to increase the 
incentives for older persons to continue working rather than take up unemployment 
benefits: “This in-work benefit compensates workers aged 60-64 who experience a wage 
reduction of more than 25% after mandatory retirement” ("Ageing and Employment 
Policies: Japan" 2005, 15).  Additionally, there is little opportunity for older workers to 
exit the workforce using disability benefits or unemployment.  In fact, the Japanese 
government has shortened the length of time unemployment benefits are available to 
older workers.  Before 2001 a worker who reached mandatory retirement age and had 
worked for at least 20 years could receive 240 days of benefits. “After 2001, only 
workers who had ‘involuntarily’ lost their jobs are eligible for this period, and mandatory 
retirement is not considered to be ‘involuntary’ from the point of view of the benefit 
system.”  Thus, those who are forced to exit through mandatory retirement can only 
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receive 180 days of benefits (Rebick 2005, 131).  One could ask whether Japan’s high 
average age of exit from the labor force is because there are few legal pathways to exit 
early, but two factors hint that the lack of opportunity is not the problem.  First, opinion 
surveys show favor towards working, and second older people actually tend to exit even 
beyond the legal retirement age.  Instead, perhaps the reason Japan has been able to pass 
restrictions on early retirement that other OECD countries have struggled to institute is 
because the population does not vehemently oppose these measures.   
 As mentioned, Japan is unique among advanced industrial countries because of its 
early recognition of population aging and attempts to head off some of the effects.  The 
OECD points out the Law for the Stabilisation of Employment of Older Workers 
(originally introduced under another name in 1971), which provides a comprehensive 
framework to promote better employment opportunities for older workers.  Reforms of 
this law have led to a rise in the mandatory retirement age from 55 to 60 and potentially 
to age 65.  According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare: 
The Employment Measures for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities 
Department is striving to secure stable employment for workers until 65 by 
raising the mandatory retirement age or introducing a continued employment 
system, to support and promote outplacement for people of middle and advanced 
age, and to create jobs of various styles through use of manpower centers for the 
aged. (Department of Employment Measures for the Elderly and Persons with 
Disabilities) 
 
The government continues to institute measures to keep older workers in the labor force.  
For example, pension reforms, such as an increase in the minimum age of entitlement, 
will increase incentives to work longer.  A recent reform raises the earliest age at which 
men can receive the flat-rate portion from 60 to 65 over the period 2001-2013 and the 
period 2006-2018 for women.  The Japanese government will also be increasing the 
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minimum age for receiving the earnings-related portion ("Ageing and Employment 
Policies: Japan" 2005, 12-3).  There were three amendments to the law in 2002, which 
were perhaps partly responsible for the beginning of the decline in old-age 
unemployment beginning in that same year ("Law Concerning Stabilization and 
Employment of Older Persons" 1971).  From age 70, there is no reduction in the 
Employee’s Pension Insurance (one of the three pension tiers) if a person continues to 
work ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Japan" 2005, 83). 
 Whereas with Germany and Italy we argued that parties who asked older people 
to work longer were working against their interests, the situation is different in Japan.  
Rather than it being common for older workers to exit the workforce several years before 
the official legal retirement age, in Japan it is common for them to exit several years 
after.  Surveys back up this assertion.  In a 2005 survey on work orientations undertaking 
by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), when asked whether they would 
“Enjoy a paid job even if I did not need money,” 66 percent of respondents in Japan 
either strongly agreed or agreed, whereas only 21 percent strongly disagreed or disagreed.  
Of those, 41 percent strongly agreed.  Responses in Germany were quite different, as we 
would expect given their labor force participation patterns.  Only 20 percent of 
respondents in western Germany and 27 percent in eastern Germany strongly agreed.  
Age discrimination is a major problem in Japan, according to the OECD, observers, and 
the parties. In fact, the NK argues that older people are entitled to work and receive 
training, whereas when reviewing manifestos in Germany, the SPD and CDU used 
language that insinuated they wanted older people to work, even if older people would 
prefer to retire.  The NK says that they want to "Establish an educational system in which 
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workers, irrespective of age, are entitled to enroll in adult education classes and 
vocational training programs” ("New Komeito Key Upper House Election Policy Pledges 
Manifesto 2007 (Revised from Manifesto 2005)" 2007).  They appeal to all generations 
by saying they want to reduce the unemployment rate of young people by half, help 
women reconcile work and family, but also “Ensure employment up to the age of 65 by 
extending the retirement age, as well as through post-retirement placement.”  As this last 
statement hints, the problem in Japan is often mandatory retirement; though this can be a 
problem in other countries as well, the high average age of exit from the labor force in 
Japan—70 for men and 66 for women—means that it is even more of a problem there, 
especially when compared to Germany and Italy. 
Table 4.5 – Responding to the statement, “Enjoy a paid job even if I did not need money” 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
30-49 43.5% 24.8% 6.1% 9.3% 
50-64 42.0% 23.6% 5.4% 16.7% 
65+ 33.9% 26.8% 6.3% 20.9% 
Source: ("International Social Survey Programme 2005: Work Orientation III" 2005) 
 Mandatory retirement is a particularly widespread phenomenon in Japan: “In 
2000, roughly nine out of ten firms with more than 30 employees had a mandatory 
retirement system and by far the most common age of retirement was 60, although age 65 
was also used by some of the smaller firms” (Rebick 2005, 132).  As mentioned, the 
government wants to increase this age to 65 but is facing resistance from firms.  Many 
have argued that mandatory retirement is necessary in Japan because the seniority wage 
system is so generous towards older workers, making them expensive to employ.  So, 
while a seniority wage system sounds like it would be beneficial to older workers in 
theory, in practice it just makes employers desire to get these expensive workers off their 
books as soon as possible.  In fact, many firms offer workers the opportunity to retire, but 
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become rehired at a lower wage or to transfer the worker to another part of the company, 
usually a subsidiary (Rebick 2005, 133).  One of the areas that the party New Komeito 
takes a stand on is mandatory retirement and its effect on older workers.  NK says, “New 
Komeito led the way in revising a law that previously set the retirement age at 60, 
allowing companies today to choose between extending mandatory retirement to 65 or 
lifting the limit altogether.  Either option is expected to significantly expand employment 
opportunities for older workers.  In addition, smaller firms that extend their mandatory 
retirement age to 70 will be eligible for a government subsidy...” ("Initiatives for the 
Elderly, Physically Challenged" 2007). 
 Japan’s reputation for hard work is well deserved when considering that Japan has 
one of the higher labor force participation (LFP) rates in the OECD.  When looking at 
labor from an age perspective, though, patterns are perhaps not quite what we would 
expect given the situations in Germany and Italy that have preceded this chapter.  The 
gulf in participation and unemployment rates between young and old workers that has 
been mentioned for these other two cases does not seem to exist on such a scale for 
Japan.  The following chart of unemployment rates for young (20-29) and older (60-70) 
workers illustrates how similar patterns are for the two age groups—when conditions are 
good for one group they are good for the other as well, and similarly when conditions are 
poor.  For this comparison, we are considering older workers beyond the age of 
mandatory retirement until the average age of exit from the labor force.  We are not 
considering those before the age of mandatory retirement because those workers tend to 
fit better with prime-age workers in general, as will be explained.  Observers concerned 
about population aging causing generational conflict are often worried about tradeoffs 
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where one generation wins while another loses.  That concern has guided the exploration 
of labor issues for each of the chapters in this study.  The following illustration of 
unemployment rates in Japan painst a picture that should be somewhat reassuring. Instead 
of a zero-sum relationship between employment for young and old, in Japan patterns tend 
to move in tandem, as shown by the shape of the lines.  Not until around 2001 did the 
unemployment rates for these two age groups really begin to diverge, and even since then 
the difference between the unemployment rates for the two age groups is not nearly the 
gulf that it is in many other countries—in 2007 the rate was 3.5 for the older group and 
6.5 for the younger.   








































Source: ("Labour Force Survey (Time Series)" 2008)  
 Though older workers might appear to have some advantage according to the 
above graph, there are differences even within the categories above.  In 2002, for men 
aged 60-64 the unemployment rate was 9.7 percent, twice as high as that year’s national 
rate of 5.4 percent ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Japan" 2005, 12).  Long-term 
unemployment for older workers has also increased.  After the financial crash of 1997, 
unemployment increased for both younger and older workers and began to fall for both as 
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the Japanese economy recovered around 2002, though as we see it recovered better for 
older workers, for reasons mentioned in the previous section on youth employment.  
What these data illustrate is that contrary to some press accounts, younger and older 
workers are not in competition for jobs—if that were the case, when unemployment for 
one group went down it would go up for the other.  Rather, both groups are in 
competition with highly protected prime-age male workers.   
 But before explaining the situation for prime-age workers, it is important to add 
one more element to the discussion: gender.  Though not the focus of this study, women 
are important to include because of the relationship between childbearing and work, and 
because women of these ages fit into our prime-age worker category.  Japan has one of 
the highest labor force participation rates for older men in the OECD but one of the 
lowest for women.  Japan’s treatment of dependent spouses leads to disincentives for 
older women to continue working ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Japan" 2005, 14).  
Marriage and childrearing are also made to seem unattractive or impractical due to the 
rigid employment system and discrimination against female workers in Japan.  
“Conventional employment” in Japan for a long time has meant joining the lifetime 
employment system.  Loyalty to a company and hard work (as in 12-hour days) is valued 
and expected.  This type of work is not conducive to raising a family, and many women 
in Japan are rejecting both this type of work and the family altogether.  Younger (20-29) 
and older (60-70) workers and prime-age women, then, all compete with prime-age males 
for employment in Japan.  The highly regulated system there excludes these three groups 
while it protects prime-age males.  Even the OECD agrees that because of the correlation, 
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to solve high youth unemployment in Japan, it is important to encourage older workers to 
stay on in the workforce.   
 Though labor policy is becoming more flexible, lifetime employment practices 
are not waning much; according to a 1999 survey, 80 percent of firms wanted to retain 
some form of lifetime employment practices ("Ageing and Employment Policies: Japan" 
2005, 103).  Japan’s anti-age discrimination law became effective in October 2001 and 
Japan has wage subsidies for hiring older workers ("Ageing and Employment Policies: 
Japan" 2005).  For women, participation rates have either been stable or have only 
declined slightly, while rates for younger women have sharply increased ("Ageing and 
Employment Policies: Japan" 2005, 54).  
 Employment protection is high by international standards.  “Any loosening of 
employment protection would have two opposite effects: it would lower job security for 
employed older workers, but at the same time it should increase the chance of re-
employment for the older unemployed” (p. 17).  Here, they refer to older unemployed as 
those past mandatory retirement.  This is the group we are concerned with because it is in 
the decade before the average age of exit from the workforce and the ages at which 
studies show older workers want to continue to be employed through but often have a 
hard time finding jobs.  Lifetime employment is the primary way that prime-age males 
are protected in the workforce: “Average tenure [in the largest firms] is 30 years for men 
aged 55-59 in firms with 1000 employees or more” ("Ageing and Employment Policies: 
Japan" 2005, 61).  Lifetime employment practices protect jobs for prime-age workers but 
prevent older and younger workers from obtaining employment because the practice 
greatly restricts the number of jobs available at any one time. One area where these 
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practices are particularly prevalent is the auto industry: “Since the 1950s, Japan’s auto 
assembly firms have maintained lifetime employment commitments to their regular status 
employees…[and] Employment relations in the auto industry are representatives of the 
practices found elsewhere in Japan’s private sector, particularly the practices of large 
firms” (Katz and Darbishire 2000, 233-7). Women of prime-age are also hurt because 
they will need to exit the labor force in order to have children and then have a hard time 
reentering.  Further, “These job tenure profiles thus suggest that while male workers in 
large firms benefit from lifetime employment, this is a much less common occurrence for 
female workers in firms of all sizes and for all workers in smaller firms” ("Ageing and 
Employment Policies: Japan" 2005, 62). 
 Some parties feel that moves to make the Japanese labor market more flexible by 
introducing fixed-term contracts and increasing part-time work have actually made the 
job situation eve more precarious for younger and older workers because these jobs have 
too few protections.  The DPJ makes a broad appeal is in their job protection plans.  Not 
only do they want to increase minimum wage levels, which would help both younger and 
older workers, they also want to give part-time and contract employees equal treatment to 
full-time workers: “We will support the employment of permanent part-timers and NEET 
(young people Not in Education, Employment or Training) by introducing individual 
employment counsellors and work support allowances” ("Putting People's Lives First" 
2007, 12).  They therefore support both younger and older workers’ attempts to enter the 
tough labor market and try to secure the same protections for them that prime-age male 
workers have.  The JCP, too, wants to defend jobs and worker rights for contingent 
workers ("Japanese Communist Party Manifesto" 2007). 
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 Finally, gender differences matter in the realm of unemployment: “In 2002, 36% 
of the older unemployed had been unemployed for one year or more compared with 30% 
for the prime-age unemployed and only 22% for unemployed youth.  In general, the 
incidence of long-term unemployment is higher for men than for women” ("Ageing and 
Employment Policies: Japan" 2005, 71).  But to return to the idea that it is prime-age 
women, and older and younger workers who are often the most disadvantaged, if a 
discouraged worker is defined as someone who is neither working, nor actively looking 
for work, but who would like to work, then for men “there is a sharp rise in the 
proportion of discouraged workers after the age of 55...[but] the proportion of women 
who are discouraged workers is actually much higher in the 25-44 age group than in the 
older age groups, and it is much higher than for men in all age groups prior to the age of 
65” (p. 71). 
Conclusion 
 Japan provided an important counterpoint to Italy and Germany because of its 
party system, which was dominated for decades by the LDP and is only recently growing 
more competitive.  Though aging issues permeate Japanese politics, they are not divisive 
in the sense of pitting one generation against another.  Rather, the limited party system, 
which encourages parties to appeal to the broadest segments of the electorate possible, 
prevents such polarization by creating incentives for parties to appeal equally to the needs 
and interests of citizens at all stages of life.  Though it goes against popular press reports, 
we can conclude that there are no signs of generational conflict in the world’s most aged 
state.  Indeed, politicians have been trying to increase labor market flexibility to 
introduce more job opportunities for women, youth, and older workers who have been 
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forced out due to mandatory retirement practices but who would like to continue to work.  
All of these groups seem to benefit from policies that make the market more flexible, as 
the trajectory of unemployment in Japan for youth and older workers has shown.   
 Japan was also a unique case to include because of its non-European setting.  
While we saw with Germany and Italy that the EU, especially with regard to the Lisbon 
Strategy, was a major driver of domestic policy, this context does not matter for Japan.  
What did appear to drive domestic labor patterns, though, was the international economic 
context.  After the 1997 financial crisis unemployment for both older and younger 
workers sharply increased, though more so for youth.  Therefore, we have to 
acknowledge that more than just domestic issues, like population aging, drive domestic 
policy.   
 While federalism and regional identities were important in both Germany and 
Italy, these issues did not arise in the course of reviewing age politics in Japan.  
According to the DPJ, this is because “The Japan of today is a centralized state in which 
the centre exercises excessive control over the regions, and also a bureaucracy in which 
bureaucrats, rather than the ordinary people of the country, dominate the political and 
economic spheres” ("Creating a Dynamic Japan: Towards a Secure Society" 2003, 4).  
Though decentralization is a priority for the DPJ, regional identities and differences were 
not salient to the degree that they were in Germany and Italy. If the DPJ is successful in 
introducing a system of states, we could see federalism emerge as a further hindrance to 
the emergence of age-based interests.  Another area to explore in the future would be the 
place of business interests in Japan.  Again, like Germany and Italy, the emergence of 
powerful single-issue based interest groups like the AARP in the US has not materialized.  
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However, business interests in Japan may be an important factor to include in future 
reviews of labor policies, in some ways similar to unions in Italy, yet different because 
their membership profiles are not likely to have been changed by population aging. 
 As mentioned, one aspect of Japan’s graying is the awareness of the government 
and citizens about low fertility and aging.  “Seventy-six per cent of the respondents to a 
Mainichi Shimbun poll ‘feel uneasy’ about the fact that social ageing continues and the 
population is beginning to decrease” (Coulmas 2007, 2).  Discourse about aging began in 
Japan in the 1980s, and now, the need to deal with aging is now one of Japan’s seven 
national priorities.  Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi set about cutting public spending 
in general, in order to finance some of Japan’s rapidly rising social security outlays.  He 
planned to cut overall general expenditures by more than 3 trillion yen with the deepest 
10 percent cut being in overseas development aid and spending on public works projects.  
Jonathan Watts (2001, 647) says of these measures: “The change is noteworthy for two 
reasons. First, because it indicates that Japan is shifting from a focus on equality.  
Second, it reveals that Koizumi accepts that a rise in social security spending is inevitable 
and that the best he can achieve is to hold down the rate of increase.”  Faced with the 
knowledge that Japan’s economy will suffer under the burden of increased healthcare 
spending, Prime Minister Koizumi scrambled to institute a series of spending reforms 
before he left office.  As McCurry (2006, 1385) points out, “If spending levels stay 
unchanged, costs will almost double to 56 trillion yen a year by 2025. But the 
Government is confident it can pare back funding by around 8 trillion yen to 48 trillion 
yen over the next 20 years.” 
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In addition to spending changes, the Japanese state has begun to recognize that 
several issues are combining to prevent women from wanting to have children and have 
taken a few steps to remedy the situation.  It appears that the government is gaining a 
better understanding of the gender-related cause of Japan’s fertility problems because 
some of the reforms focus on decreasing the burden on women.  The New Gold Plan was 
established in 1994 and provides various services for the elderly, including home care 
aides, short-stay service facilities, home-visit nursing stations, and other special facilities 
for elderly care (Reich 1999).  Of course, the New Gold Plan will help to ensure the care 
of the elderly in Japan but it will also free women’s time by relieving them of some of the 
burden of caring for aging parents.  Around the same time as the New Gold Plan, four 
government ministries approved the ‘Angel Plan’ or the ‘Basic Direction for Future Child 
Rearing Support Measures.’  These five measures were: (1) improve the employment 
environment to support working parents; (2) alleviate the psychological and physical 
burdens of child care at home; (3) alleviate the economic burden of child-rearing; (4) 
encourage men and women to rediscover the joy and pleasure of child-rearing; and (5) 
support the employment of female workers who have infants and toddlers (Reich 1999, 
465).  Japan is showing promise in addressing the root cause of its fertility problem.  
Because women have a higher life expectancy than men, the New Gold Plan is also 
important because it will benefit women as they age alone, in addition to easing the 
burden on them while they are young.  These measures may help Japan draw on its 
under-utilized female labor pool. 
 However, treating the situation only in terms of gender or age ignores one other 
potential solution: immigration.  Japan has been historically loath to admit immigrants, as 
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reflected in its current net migration rate of 0.4 per one thousand persons ("World 
Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007).  In fact, there are 
only 1.7 million official foreign residents, or just over one percent of the population.  
Japan is also unwilling to grant citizenship to immigrants or let them assimilate; they 
operate under a jus sanguinis policy.  Foreigners are merely tolerated, not welcomed, and 
are more often blamed for trouble like the rising crime rate ("Consensus and Contraction" 
2002).  Thus, it appears that Japan will have to rely on its family policy to reverse the 




Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
The chapters in this study have been a first step in examining the effects of demographic 
change—what mechanisms and institutions are important, what state traits matter, and 
what the trajectory of policies has been to date.  The conclusion will outline important 
steps for this research that I hope will set an agenda to expand and improve our 
understanding of the political effects of population aging.  But first, we will take a step 
back and view Germany, Italy, and Japan from a comparative perspective to try and draw 
some lessons from the three cases.  Then, this chapter will describe under what conditions 
the situation for these countries might be likely to change.  Finally, we will return to the 
next steps for this research. 
Comparisons 
 This study has shown that fears of population aging, such as gerontocracy and 
intergenerational conflict, are exaggerated.  Though the proportions of youth and elderly 
are reversing and older voters are growing more numerous, it does not immediately 
follow that strength in numbers turns into political power for several reasons.  One is that 
the interests of age groups are not homogenous; instead, in all three countries of this 
study older voters were concerned about a variety of issues, like unemployment and 
regional problems.  Second, age does not appear to be a category around which people in 
these states mobilize.  Single-issue interest groups that focus on age-related issues hold 
little to no sway in policy making and voters in Italy and Germany, at least, vote more on 
geographical than generational lines.  Another reason that concerns have been 
exaggerated is that many studies and media reports linking aging and political power 
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focus on social spending on pension and healthcare benefits, which are skewed towards 
those of older ages.  When looking at another important policy arena that engages those 
of all ages—labor policy—we see that Germany, Italy, and Japan are moving towards 
tapping into underutilized segments of their labor markets by trying to bring in youth and 
prevent early retirement.  Thus, youth are being courted in the arena of labor policy, and 
empowered to acquire employment, rather than being discarded as a casualty of 
population aging.  All three cases had two important similarities: a relative weakness of 
age as an identity around which to mobilize; and a propensity for other policy areas—
often unemployment—to be more important than age politics.  Rather than population 
aging driving change, domestically, regional identities in Germany and Italy were strong 
determinants of party preference, and on a larger scale, globalization was a greater driver 
of labor policy. 
 There is a politics of aging but it does not look as zero-sum as alarmists insinuate.  
Political parties and governments in Germany, Italy, and Japan, as well as those of other 
states in Europe, are aware of and working actively to combat the negative ramifications 
of population aging.  Even if not all parties in these states are targeting the concerns of 
specific age groups, all are discussing how best to keep the budget balanced in the face of 
growing dependents and how to tap into underutilized segments of the labor market.  We 
can anticipate more of these conversations in the future and more actions to decrease 
unemployment and keep government accounts robust.  Another area of aging that has 
been politicized is one that was outside the scope of this study: pronatalist policies.  All 
of the countries in this study have seen raising the birth rate as part of the solution to 
population aging and attempt to accomplish this by making work and family more 
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compatible.  Though results have been spotty, there are no signs of abatement and 
debates over how best to increase fertility are likely to remain a contentious part of the 
conversation about population aging in the future. 
 In all three cases had the party system was an important mechanism for 
translating interests and I argued that the stability of this political institution has 
ramifications for the future political effects of population aging.19  In none of the cases 
were single-issue age-based interest groups, like the AARP in the US, important.  The 
conclusions of this study, that generational conflict is mostly a myth, is contingent upon 
the continued exclusion of interest groups from policymaking.  If interest groups become 
important we could indeed see generational conflict start to arise.  Yet just because there 
are no interest groups of this ilk in these countries does not mean that outside interests are 
unimportant.  In fact, organized interests are one of the most fruitful potential areas to 
expand this research.  In Germany, social partners were excluded from negotiations over 
the Hartz reforms, but in other areas they continue to exert influence.  In Italy, unions and 
business organizations, like Confindustria, are quite influential.  And in Japan, organized 
business interests are not only powerful on their own, they are closely tied to the LDP.  
Examining the agendas of these groups, how they translate and articulate the interests of 
their “constituencies,” and their stances on important age-based issues, especially those 
pertaining to labor, would do much to bring this research to the next level. As Thomas 
(2001, 7) says, “Generally, it has been held that groups provide a mechanism through 
which citizens who have a shared attitude or a shared interest can come together and 
                                                 
19 Within parties there are often leagues specifically for youth or older generations.  The Greens in 
Germany have a league for older members and several parties in Japan, like the DPJ, have youth leagues.  
These appear irrelevant in pushing policymaking but might be important for increasing political 
participation of these segments in the future. 
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channel their collective resources into political action.”  Interest groups and social 
movements are present in these states and in some cases numerous.  For example, there 
are over 1,000 registered interest groups that lobby the Bundestag and their main entry 
points are committees.  However, they currently do not play a pivotal role in this type of 
policymaking. 
 One similarity in party politics that came up in Germany and Italy but not Japan 
was the focus of the communist, or former communist, parties.  The Left (in Germany) 
and Rifondazione Communista (RC) in Italy both appealed exclusively to older workers 
and retirees.  Because communism likely resonates more with older generations, for 
whom the ideology is fresher and more real, the similarities between the platforms of The 
Left and RC might be because those parties are catering to their bases.  In Japan, 
however, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) makes a broad appeal to all generations 
and seems to focus more on non-age related issues, such as preventing Japan from 
revamping its constitution to give more power to the Japanese Self Defense Forces.  
Likely, there is something fundamentally different about the former communist parties in 
Germany and Italy than in Japan but this is another potentially fruitful area for research. 
 Another similarity between Germany and Italy was the importance of regional 
identities as a check on the emergence of cross-border age-based identities.  In Germany, 
East-West differences were stronger than generational differences when we compared 
votes by region and by age.  In Italy it was North-South differences that were more 
important.  Germany’s federal organization crystallizes regional identities and gives them 
prominence in national policymaking; Italy is moving towards such an organization and 
we should expect that if Italy continues to decentralize, regional identities will only grow 
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in importance.  In Japan, regional differences did not emerge as a major division but in 
the future it would be interesting to go even deeper to into local politics and compare 
rural with urban areas to see if there are differences in the ways parties target the two 
areas.  This could likely be the case since rural areas tend to have higher proportions of 
elderly and youth are more populous in cities.   
 One of the two central foci of this study was the party system as the mechanism 
through which the interests of the population were translated and articulated.  At the 
beginning, we hypothesized that in an aged state, a competitive multiparty system would 
encourage parties to differentiate their platforms and try to appeal to particular 
generational interests, such as those favoring youth, but not the old, or vice versa.  In a 
one-party dominant system we expected to see that parties would do the opposite: they 
would try to appeal to the broadest segments of the citizenry and try not to alienate any 
particular age groups.  Both Germany, as a multiparty system, and Japan, as a one-party 
dominant system, confirmed these hypotheses.  Parties in Germany, such as The Left and 
the CDU, focused on specific age groups much more than others; in the case of the 
former older generations were the focus and in the case of the latter youth and families 
were the focus.  In Japan, age-based issues were certainly a large part of all of the parties’ 
platforms, but they all made broad appeals rather than focusing on families or the aged 
only.  It is interesting that in Japan all parties, not just the biggest (the LDP), used broad 
appeals.  Likely, they did so because coalitions are important in Japanese politics and 
even smaller parties would be joining their larger partners, but further research is needed 
to determine whether or not this guess is correct.   
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 Italy did not exactly fall in line with either hypothesis.  Because of the 
increasingly bipolar coalitions in Italy and its competitive multiparty system, I expected 
to see a little of what was happening in both Germany and Japan—parties would appeal 
to niche interests like they did in Germany and coalitions would appeal to broad interests, 
like the more limited system in Japan.  But this proved to be incorrect.  Coalitions tended 
to have platforms similar, if not identical, to the most dominant party of the coalition.  
And, while some parties focused on particular generational interests, a few either made 
broad appeals or ignored age issues altogether.  Why would that be?  One reason likely 
has to do with Italy’s chaotic party system.  With parties frequently changing, perhaps it 
is too difficult to expect Italy to behave like a classic competitive multiparty system such 
as Germany’s.  The rapidly shifting system in Italy is certainly hard to pin down.  To 
provide additional corroboration for these hypotheses, then, cases should be included that 
have stable systems where we can study party politics without worrying about too many 
complicating factors. 
 Somewhat surprisingly, Japan was the only country in which major differences by 
age emerged with the way the population responded to the parties.   In Germany, we 
expected that youth would be attracted to the parties that supported their interests, such as 
the CDU and FDP, and that The Left would be most popular among the aged.  Instead, 
voters of all ages showed increasing support for The Left out of protest against the 
policies instituted under the SPD, especially the Hartz reforms, which were also 
supported by the Greens and the CDU.  And citizens did not necessarily receive the 
messages the parties were sending out along age lines.  For example, a significant number 
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of citizens thought that The Left was the best party for family policy, even though their 
platform dealt almost exclusively with retirement and pension issues.   
 In Italy, though there were some differences in support by age there was no clear 
pattern.  Rather than seeing support for particular parties wax or wane when moving from 
younger to older voters, a party might be popular with every other age group.  Again, we 
can only conclude that the fractured and chaotic nature of Italy’s party system makes it 
difficult to study generational response.  Considering that parties often change annually, 
any survey that asks citizens about their knowledge of parties may be faulty—it is a lot to 
expect of people to be aware of all of these changes. 
In Japan, though, differences did emerge.  The LDP was much more popular with 
older voters than younger voters and the NK was much more popular with younger voters 
than older voters.  When considering these two parties together, though, (which makes 
sense since they joined together in government) support for the block of the two was even 
across the age groups.  Support for the DPJ was even across age groups as well.  One 
important thing to consider for Japan is that just because today’s older voters prefer the 
LDP does not mean that tomorrow’s will so we are likely to see support for the LDP 
decline as their traditional supporters pass on, unless the LDP is successful in changing 
their image to appeal to younger voters.  An additional wildcard for Japan, especially, 
would be if its electoral system changes to introduce more PR seats.  As we have seen 
throughout the chapters, under PR rules smaller parties fare better.  As some have argued, 
Japan has begun to move from a one-party dominant system to a two-party system, and 
smaller parties are consistently able to gain a few seats.  If the playing field evens and 
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Japan becomes a competitive multiparty system then parties may change their platforms 
and appeal to niche voters to gain representation, much as they do in Germany.   
Though this study has focused on party system, the electoral system is intimately 
connected with the party system.  The electoral system within which the parties operate 
matters as well because the system connects citizens’ preferences to the policies 
governments enact.  Gallagher and Mitchell (2005, 4) describe all of the ways the 
electoral system matters:  
They may make a big difference in the shape of the party system, to the nature of 
 government (coalition or single-party), to the kind of choices facing voters at 
 elections, to the ability of voters to hold their representative(s) personally 
 accountable, to the behaviour of parliamentarians, to the degree to which a 
 parliament contains people from all walks of life and backgrounds, to the extent 
 of democracy and cohesion within political parties, and, of course, to the quality 
 of government, and hence to the quality of life of the citizens ruled by that 
 government. 
 
Newell (2000, 29), says “Electoral systems influence the characteristics of party systems 
not only directly—by determining the manner in which votes are translated into seats—
but also indirectly by creating a structure of opportunities and constraints for parties in 
the pre-election period” (emphasis in original).  Since at least the early 1990s, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan have all undergone major changes in their electoral systems and in the 
strategies and platforms of their major parties.  If the electoral systems change once 
again, the entire nature of party politics will also likely change. 
 One related factor that could be an area for future study is that people vote 
differently in local, regional, national, and EU elections because citizens take into 
account not only the party’s position when voting, but also the powers allotted to the 
office for which the election is being held.  “To the extent that separation of powers 
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exists, institutions controlled by different parties can satisfy citizens’ preferences on 
different issues” (Colomer 2001, 142).  This study has just cracked the surface of party 
politics in Germany, Italy, and Japan; peeling back another layer by looking at politics on 
a more local level could reveal different, but equally interesting, dynamics. 
 Along these lines, another point of comparison is the involvement of youth in the 
political process.  In all three countries, political party membership is waning, especially 
among youth.  But it is in Japan that youth appear the most apathetic.  While many cite 
youth apathy as a danger for the emergence of policies that exclude the interests of youth, 
there was no evidence to indicate that this is on the horizon.  Rather, in all three 
countries, parties either courted youth as voters outright or, in the case of Japan, sought to 
entice them into the political process, even proposing lowering the voting age.  Thus, 
fears that youth apathy will be the political downfall of that generation appear unfounded. 
Globalization  
 Our final point of comparison is the other pillar of this study—labor policy.  The 
most vocal commentators on population aging warn that within aged societies policies are 
likely to increasingly favor the interests of the aged and exclude youth, primarily because 
larger older cohorts can exert political influence and see that outcomes favor their 
interests.  The review of party politics shows that parties are not moving in the direction 
of favoring these large blocks of voters to the exclusion of youth, nor are citizens aligning 
along age lines in order to maximize their influence.  If age groups aren’t able to present 
the kind of influence these commentators suggest, then perhaps their prognostications 
about policies are also wrong.  Indeed, labor policy proved a useful area of policy to 
explore because it involved the interests of all age groups—youth, prime-age workers, 
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older workers, and retirees—and showed that more often than not youth were 
increasingly benefiting from the most recent reforms.  In Germany, older workers were 
disproportionately disadvantaged by the Hartz reforms and other reforms to labor policy.  
In Italy, though youth unemployment is much higher than that for older groups, the 
government has been taking an active role to increase opportunities for the youngest 
Italians.  In Japan, the inflexible employment system actually protects prime-age male 
workers the most, leaving youth, older workers past mandatory retirement age, and 
prime-age women disadvantaged.  Trends for young and old seem to move in tandem and 
policies to make the workplace more flexible are designed to benefit both young and old.   
 This leads to an important reflection: Why would we ever expect that countries 
would focus on policies that benefited the old by making retirement ever more generous?  
Of course, the answer is politics—the ability of older voters (or their interest groups) to 
come together and exert such a great influence that economically unsound policies like 
lower retirement age or more generous pensions are put through.  But the similar 
trajectory of policies in all three cases may mean that pressures on labor in the context of 
globalization are even greater than the pressures of population aging.  In the cases of 
Germany and Italy, the EU provided an important pressure to see that what voters or 
outside groups might push for mattered little.  Germany needed to reduce its 
unemployment rate and decrease its generous benefits in order to meet the Lisbon 
criteria.  So, the political parties excluded the social partners from negotiations over the 
Hartz reforms.  This likely could not have happened in a place like the United States, 
where interest groups exert such tremendous influence over politicians.  In Italy, desire to 
enter the European Monetary Union (EMU) and meet the Lisbon goals meant that 
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politicians pushed forward the most economically-sound proposals they could get away 
with, ones that would increase retirement age and cut pension spending.  But what we 
saw in Italy was that unions and industrialists supported these moves, to some extent.  
Because low retirement age and generous pensions are unsustainable in an increasingly 
aged society such as Italy’s, politicians and the social partners had the foresight to realize 
that these reforms were necessary, even if they went against the wishes of older workers 
and retirees.  Have we then learned that economic calculations are more important than 
political calculations?  It seems so, at this point.  In all three cases the government 
appears to be trying to do everything possible to bring in underutilized segments of the 
labor market—youth, older workers, and women—in order to make up for labor 
shortages caused by population aging.     
 Of course, another possibility is that aging isn’t so important because it pushes 
policies to increasingly favor the aged, but because it creates a backlash that pushes 
policy in the other direction, whether to make up for changing demographics or create 
conditions that might raise fertility.  This is another fruitful area for future inquiry.  To 
some degree, both backlash and external pressures are likely driving policy change that 
increasingly favors youth and supports families.  While it might be tempting to draw an 
immediate causal arrow and say that backlash against aging in Italy is responsible for this 
reversal, the reality is much more complicated.  Upon closer inspection we see that Italy 
has only instituted these reforms in response to pressure from the EU, most notably in 
two phases: one after signing the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to join the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) when they needed to reduce their deficit; and second with the 
Lisbon strategy handed down by the EU where member states must comply with 
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suggested reforms by 2010.  On a broader level, though, one could argue that population 
aging is in fact what drove the EU to institute the Lisbon strategy in the first place, since 
European leaders have demonstrated an awareness of population aging in Europe and an 
understanding of the necessary policy changes that must be made for Europe to continue 
to thrive and grow economically despite age structure changes.   
 In what direction are policies like to move in the future?  In Italy, at least, policies 
are likely to continue to try and bring in underutilized segments.  Italy is still far behind 
the Lisbon employment target of 70 percent and will need to greatly increase women’s 
employment to reach this goal.  The growing consolidation of the EU will also likely 
continue to be an influence.  According to The Left in Germany, “In Europe the free 
movement of capital, the displacement of production sites and the migration of labour are 
normal and reflect the neo-liberal orientation of European integration manifested by the 
Maastricht Treaty” ("Founding programmatic document of the political party DIE 
LINKE" 2007, 4).  The EU says that member states’ policies must reflect a desire for the 
social market economy, and sees unemployment as a huge problem that affects young 
people, women, migrants, and older workers between ages 55-64 most ("European values 
in the globalised world" 2005, 5).  Germany’s policies, supported by all parties except 
Die Linke, seem to reflect the EU’s suggestion that, “We want more people to work, 
productively for longer” ("European values in the globalised world" 2005, 10)—German 
parties are certainly asking that of their citizenry.  The EU also says that member states 
should: “Raise employment rates and reduce unemployment, particularly through active 
labour market policies and promoting flexibility and adaptability designed to protect 
people rather than jobs” ("European values in the globalised world" 2005, 14).  And 
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states should also “offer family friendly policies which address the low birth rates in the 
EU and offer affordable care for children, to increase the possibility for women and 
single parents to enter and stay in the labour market” (p. 14).  
 When we examine the text of the Lisbon Action Plan, Germany’s and Italy’s labor 
reforms that disfavor older workers make sense, as the Lisbon strategy is tough on older 








Source: ("Lisbon Action Plan " 2005) 
  
 Though so far the desire to institute sound and sustainable economic policies and 
follow the mandate of the EU has been an important factor in the most recent policies of 
Germany and Italy, whether or not this will continue—or a backlash against these moves 
may occur—is uncertain.  Some parties in both countries speak out against these neo-
liberal reforms and there are definitely segments of the population in each state who 
support these parties stances.  The Greens in Germany, for example, argue that “The EU 
must relinquish the neo-liberal fixation of its economic policy and play an even more 
active international role in the social and ecological management of globalization” ("The 
future is green: Alliance 90/The Greens: Party Program and Principles" 2007, 13).  They 
also say that “In an ecological and social market economy, one basic principle is that an 
individual should not make profits at the cost of society as a whole” (p. 37).   
Table 5.1 – Main points of the EU’s Lisbon Action Plan: 
- Use Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) to create incentives for employment 
- Restrict unemployment benefit 
- Increase female labor market participation by offering childcare and leave for 
both parents 
- Provide apprenticeships and training to reduce youth unemployment 
- Develop active aging strategies to prevent early exit from the labor force, such as 
higher retirement and fewer restrictions on pension benefits with part-time work 
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 There is at least one more factor to consider behind changes in labor policy 
regarding how governments were able to get these reforms passed despite that the 
reforms went against the direct interests of large blocks of voters—that is the Nixon goes 
to China factor.  Some argue that only Dini and Prodi could have possibly passed the 
reforms that the unions opposed because they were not seen as antagonistic to the 
unions—Dini was a technocrat and Prodi was a leftist leader: 
Just as it took a hyper-conservative politician such as Nixon to persuade the 
American Congress to normalise relations with China, it is easier for left-wing 
parties to persuade trade unions to reform the welfare state (Ross 1998)...During 
the 1990s, the ‘Nixon goes to China’ approach was adopted by many other 
European centre-left governments, which justified their reforms as measures 
aimed at substituting past ‘vices’ (overly generous pensions, passive 
unemployment benefits, poverty and unemployment traps, and so on) by means of 
new ‘virtues’ (such as a contributory pension formula, funded forms of financing, 
active labour policies, fight against social exclusion, etc.) (Levy 1999a, 1999b)" 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2004, 137).   
 
The “Nixon goes to China” factor applies with the Hartz reforms as well, as the center-
left SPD was the party in charge during the legislation.  The reforms possibly would not 
have passed if the center-right CDU had led the way.   
 What is likely to happen in the future?  Labor policy in all three countries has 
been moving in the direction of liberalization, guided by the principle that the more 
flexible the labor market, the more employment opportunities there will be for 
underutilized segments of the labor market. The following table provides a summary of 
employment protection within the OECD to demonstrate that there is wide variance 
among the countries, and thus room for additional change.  Figure 5.1 supports the idea 
that future change is needed.  
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Population aging reduces the number of workers relative to dependents.  When 
there are fewer workers, states have less tax revenue but more obligations to pay 
entitlements to dependents.  The EU estimates that “Under current policies, projections 
suggest spending, for example, for age related spending on pensions, health and long-
term care will increase by between 4 and 8% of GDP in coming decades.  Some EU 
countries may face even higher increases” ("European values in the globalised world" 
2005, 9).  By being proactive with labor policies these states may be able to forestall the 
negative effects of population aging.   
Figure 5.1 – Impact of aging on potential economic growth rates 
 





Table 5.2 – The strictness of employment protection, 2003 
Level-2 OECD indicators20 
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Australia 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.3 0.5 2.9 1.5 
Austria 2.5 0.9 3.8 1.8 1.3 3.3 2.2 
Belgium 1.0 2.4 1.8 1.5 3.8 4.1 2.5 
Canada 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 0.5 2.9 1.1 
Czech 
Republic 
3.5 2.7 3.8 0.5 0.5 2.1 1.9 
Denmark 1.0 1.9 1.5 2.3 0.5 3.9 1.8 
Finland 2.8 1.0 2.8 3.3 0.5 2.6 2.1 
France 2.5 1.9 3.0 4.0 3.3 2.1 2.9 
Germany 3.5 1.3 3.3 1.8 1.8 3.8 2.5 
Greece 2.0 2.2 3.0 4.5 2.0 3.3 2.9 
Hungary 1.5 1.8 2.5 1.8 0.5 2.9 1.7 
Ireland 2.0 0.8 2.0 0.8 0.5 2.4 1.3 
Italy 1.5 0.6 3.3 2.5 1.8 4.9 2.4 
Japan 2.0 1.8 3.5 0.5 2.0 1.5 1.8 
Korea 3.3 0.9 3.0 0.8 2.6 1.9 2.0 
                                                 




Mexico 1.0 2.1 3.7 2.5 5.5 3.8 3.2 
Netherlands 4.0 1.9 3.3 0.8 1.6 3.0 2.3 
New 
Zealand 
2.0 0.4 2.7 1.5 1.0 0.4 1.3 
Norway 2.0 1.0 3.8 3.3 2.5 2.9 2.6 
Poland 3.0 1.4 2.3 0.0 2.5 4.1 2.1 
Portugal 3.5 5.0 4.0 1.8 3.8 3.6 3.5 
Slovak 
Republic 
5.0 2.7 2.8 0.3 0.5 2.5 2.0 
Spain 2.0 2.6 3.3 3.0 4.0 3.1 3.1 
Sweden 3.0 1.6 4.0 1.8 1.5 4.5 2.6 
Switzerland 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.0 3.9 1.6 
Turkey 2.0 3.4 2.3 4.3 5.5 2.4 3.5 
United 
Kingdom 
1.0 1.1 1.3 0.3 0.5 2.9 1.1 
United 
States 
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 2.9 0.7 
OECD 
average 
2.2 1.7 2.7 1.7 1.9 3.0 2.2 
Source: OECD (2004a), Employment Outlook, Paris. In (117"Ageing and Employment Policies: Germany" 2005)
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Other factors to consider 
 But what about another major solution to labor shortages, immigration?  One 
aspect of population that this study excluded (in the interest of focusing on age) was 
immigration, but that is often a solution put forth to solve labor shortages from aging.  
In none of the three cases does immigration appear poised as the next step in labor 
policy.  In Germany, Italy, and Japan, there is still significant cultural bias against 
outsiders and though some liberalization has taken place in all three states, borders 
have not been opened to let immigrants in en masse and politicians show no signs of 
moving in that direction.  Rather, in all three states politicians seem more eager to 
bring in under utilized domestic sources of labor, such as women, rather than looking 
beyond the borders.   Finally, though in this study I have used the term generation to 
mean age group, it might also be appropriate to think about the influence of cultural 
generations in the cases as well.  Though the reviews of Italy and Germany in 
previous chapters have shown that regional identities are more important than cross 
border age-based identities, it is possible that as older generations who grew up and 
lived during a time when these identities were more important die, younger 
generations may have a different experience.  In Germany, older people have strong 
memories of life under a divided Germany.  We have seen that the former communist 
party, The Left, is more popular in the East, and among older people.  As older 
cohorts there and in West Germany pass on young people may not show the same 
support because the message of a post-communist party may not resonate with them.  
However, I do think it is important that Germany’s regional identities are crystallized 
in the formal institutions through federalism.  This legality means that even if there 
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are cultural forces sweeping away divisions between Länder, there will still be legal 
institutional reasons why regional identities stay important.   
The case of Italy could be different, however.  There is no formal federal organization 
to ensure that North-South differences remain, and that they continue to impede age-
based factions.  Yet, these identities show no signs of abating.  We must still be open, 
however, to the possibility that as aging intensifies new identities based on age may 
crop up. 
 In Japan the idea of a political generation is a bit different.  As the preceding 
chapter demonstrated, youth in Japan are very apathetic and much less involved in the 
political process than older generations.  As these more active older generations pass 
on, it remains to be seen what will happen politically in Japan.  Will the apathy of the 
population permit the government to have free reign in designing policies they 
believe are in the best interest of the state?  And in whose best interest will that be? 
Projections 
The populations of Germany, Italy, and Japan are nowhere close to the peak 
of their aging.  Even if fertility were to rise significantly (and that is not likely to 
happen) there are so few potential mothers in the cohorts who have already been born 
that the populations will continue to shrink and age for decades.  We cannot be sure at 
what point we are in the spectrum of aging, but if fertility continues at current levels, 
in Japan the median age will be over 50 years in 2025 and over 52 years in 2030.  In 
Italy the median age will be 49.7 in 2025 and 51 in 2030; and in Germany the median 
age will be 48.3 in 2025 and 48.9 in 2030.  The number of youth who are entering the 
labor market each year will be shrinking as the number of retirees grows.  In Japan, 
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the age group 15-24 will go from 11 percent of the population in 2005 to 8.8 percent 
in 2030, while the proportion over 60 years will be almost 38 percent by then.  In 
Italy and Germany, only 9 percent will be aged 15-24 by 2030, while 36 percent will 
be over 60.  While the average age of exit from the labor force is around 67 in Japan 
right now, it is just above 60 in Germany and Italy ("World Population Prospects: The 
2006 Revision Population Database" 2007).  Unless it begins to rise in these latter 
two countries the budgets of those states will be under even more strain and social 
spending will become even more imbalanced. 
But what about other countries that are aging?  Though the most advanced, 
Germany, Italy, and Japan are certainly not the only aged states in the world.  Spain is 
also one of the fastest aging states.  The median age there was only 38.8 in 2005 but 
will be on par with the cases in this study within a couple of decades—their median 
age is projected to be 47.6 by 2025 and 50 by 2030.  Greece is also very aged and 
could be a potential future case study.  Though France has a unitary organization that 
would provide a nice counterpoint to the federal organization of Germany, France has 
taken a very active role in pronatalist policies for many years and will reap the 
benefits of that in the future.  Because of their relatively high fertility (around 1.85), 
their median age will be only 42.5 in 2025.  The following figures show the most 
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Source: ("World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database" 2007) 

































































Source: ("2007 World Population Data Sheet" 2007) 
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Conclusion 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study should be seen as the beginning of a 
conversation, not the definitive answer about the politics of aging in Germany, Italy, 
and Japan.  While the reviews of party positions and the ways they target age have 
shown us that there is some degree of generational politics in Germany and Italy, 
many questions remain unanswered.  To this end it is now time to try and move the 
conversation forward.  I have plans to do this in a few ways, one of which includes 
expanding to examine the issues raised in this chapter.  Most importantly, I am 
planning a large-scale survey and interview series for the members of the German, 
Italian, and Japanese parliaments to understand more about how parties try to both 
articulate the interests of their changing constituencies and target citizens for support.  
Without the work to date there would not be a solid enough foundation upon which to 
begin to ask the right questions about aging politics but this study has illuminated 
several important relationships, namely that between labor and aging politics.  Thanks 
to an external funding source, this survey and subsequent interviews will allow me to 
tease out the relationships between labor policies and generational politics during my 
interviews.  These surveys and interviews, along with the work done in this study, 
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